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PREFACE 
In the course of the last ten years my work as an employee with a major oil company has been 
involved with project control and estimating of modification work in the offshore sector of the 
Norwegian oil and gas industry. At the time of starting to work with modifications, there were 
relatively few offshore modification projects from which to draw experience. The conventional 
wisdom at the time, drawn from the little hard experience that was available, amounted to 
recognition of the fact that modification work was subject to great uncertainty. The wags 
recommended the use of pi as a contingency factor. 
The range of this involvement has at different times covered early phase estimating, preparation of 
contract compensation formats, bid check estimates and formats for contract bid evaluations, as 
well as detailed cost control follow up during execution. In parallel and more or less continuously, 
the major part of my work also included the collection and analysis of historical performance data 
as a basis for verifying and improving estimating methods.  
The nature of this work, particularly that of operative estimating in parallel with collection and 
analysis of performance data from a wide range of modification projects, naturally led to exposure, 
at times very closely, to projects that experienced overruns and poor performance. Being an 
operative estimator, these experiences stimulated enquiry regarding the validity of the methods of 
estimating, the accuracy of the norms of performance and legitimacy of project control methods 
that in most instances failed to foresee impending overruns early enough for any mitigating action 
to have much effect.  
In one instance this process of enquiry led to involvement in a multi-company program aimed at 
pooling modification performance data from several sources in order to establish a broader base of 
experience than any one company could muster alone. The essence of this study was to collect 
actual man-hours used and collate with installed weights in order to establish performance norms 
for offshore work directly, rather than interpolate from performance norms derived form onshore 
module fabrication adjusted by the use of offshore factors, which was current at the time, and in 
most organisations is still in use. The hard data was supplemented by information concerning the 
nature of the work and a quantitative/qualitative performance report that included comparisons of 
the initial budget values with the final results as well as a summary of the nature of problems 
encountered during the execution period.  The approach established in the study was continued and 
extended and is the basis for much of the work in this thesis. 
Subsequently, wishing to continue to draw on as broad a base of experience as possible, and in 
connection with enquiries regarding whether the subject of my work was of interest within the 
context of the PS2000 program, I came into contact with Professor Asbjørn Rolstadås, who 
suggested that the material might form the basis of a Dr.Ing study. The results of that study are 
presented in this dissertation.     
The dissertation addresses the use of performance measurement as a core process and holistic basis 
for the many project control activities required in the short term of a project life cycle as well as 
experience transfer and organisational learning processes in a longer term multi-project 
perspective.  
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List of acronyms, keywords and terminology 
Absolute contra relative performance measurement implies measurement of resource use (cost, man-hours) in terms of 
material quantities processed as distinct from actual resource use measured in terms of planned resource use.      
Absolute measures of performance express efficiency in specific physical units such as man-hours used per tonne of 
piping installed; resources used expressed  in terms of the product of the process.  
Benchmarking (BM) denotes  the process of continuously measuring and comparing business processes against 
comparable processes in leading organisations to obtain information that will help the organisation identify and 
implement improvements.  
Benchmarking contra performance  measurement: benchmarking is seen as qualitative comparison of processes with a 
view to isolating root causes of superior performance compared to the essentially quantitative character of 
performance measurement.   
BOQ  denotes the term ‘Bill of Quantities’. 
CI denotes the term ‘Continuous Improvement’. 
Discipline: a grouping of specific types of work of similar character such as piping or steelwork. Discipline mix is the 
relative content of the disciplines making up the concept, also termed Discipline Balance.  Sub-discipline denotes a 
sub-division of the discipline work into categories with characteristic properties.  
EPCI:  an acronym for a type of contract covering engineering, procurement, construction and installation all in the 
scope of work of one contractor. 
Experience transfer: a process of organisational learning whereby events, processes and occurrences, both 
detrimental and beneficial, are made explicit and communicable to other actors in order to secure that lessons learnt 
in one project become part of the knowledge base of the project community of practice. 
Generic: characteristic of a genus or class; applied to (any individual of) a large group or class; general; not specific 
or special – The Concise Oxford Dictionary The use of the term in BM context seems to derive from and apply to 
practices comparing core business processes regardless of industry, but accordingly may also be used in a general 
context to describe activities and functions characteristic for specific types of industrial applications (such as oil and 
gas projects). 
Greenfield denotes ‘new’ development as opposed to ‘modification’. 
Integration denotes the offshore installation of the materials that can be lifted on board by the platform cranes as 
opposed to modularisation that denotes the installation of major sub-assemblies that require lifting by external crane 
vessel.    
Modification: pertains to construction work on an oil production facility in production and means rebuilding and 
extending existing facilities for changed functions and duties, normally during ongoing production (often termed 
brownfield or retrofit).   
MTO  denotes the term ‘Material take-off’. 
Process: The term process seems subject to some ambiguity, being applied both to ongoing industrial, administrative 
or service activities in general as well as being synonymous with qualitative aspects of benchmarking performance. It 
is essentially multi-functional in nature.  
Relative measurement expresses performance as a ratio of resources actually used to perform a certain activity in 
terms of resources planned and has no specific physical units of measurement.   
TQM denotes the term ‘Total Quality Management’. 
VO denotes variation order, a formal change to contractual scope of work such as additions or deletions or changes to 
the premises for performing the work, such as the design basis or project milestones. 
Volume of processed materials means quantities of materials subjected to a work process be it engineering (quantities 
designed and drawn), fabrication (quantities cut, fitted, welded, painted), installation (quantities installed in final 
location), or similar, and measured in appropriate units (number, length, weight, area). 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to describe and demonstrate the practical application of 
techniques of performance measurement to the control and execution of modification projects in 
the offshore oil industry. The techniques were developed partly as a consequence of practical work 
in the industry and partly as a consequence of the work underpinning this dissertation.  
The term ‘performance measurement’ as used here is a measure of efficiency, such as man-hours 
per tonne, that denotes resources used (man-hours) expressed in terms of the product of the activity 
(tonnes of processed materials). This form of measurement is regarded as absolute as opposed to 
relative forms of measurement which measure actual resources used (man-hours) with respect 
planned resource use (man-hours) to perform specific work operations. The distinction is central in 
this dissertation.    
The term ‘modification projects’, as used here, is generally taken to apply to all work performed on 
offshore platforms and production facilities which are in production. The nature of modification 
work is very varied, typically covering tie-back of satellite fields onto existing production facilities, 
or process and utility upgrades in response to changing duties in the production process as reservoir 
depletion proceeds, or general optimisation of production facilities, often concerned with process 
optimisation, as well as discrete elements of maintenance and repair type of work. The work is 
normally performed as discrete projects and may vary in size range from approximately 40 MNOK 
(6 M$ US) up to about 2000 MNOK (300 M$ US).  
Modification projects have intrinsic tendencies towards growth in material quantities and 
complexity of work. This is due to the indeterminate interface between the existing facility and the 
new installations, the general complexity of modification work and the special conditions related to 
work on a process plant in ongoing production. Such growth may lead to disruption of the orderly 
progress of the work, straining the project resource and time frame and posing particular project 
control challenges. The potentially high order of magnitude of these disruptive effects speaks for 
methods to identify scope and complexity growth as early as possible in order to provide the 
longest possible management horizon for corrective action. The normative approach to project 
control is relativistic and historically it has not succeeded in mitigating the overrun tendencies in 
modification work. The performance measurement techniques proposed in this thesis are deemed 
to have the necessary characteristics to mitigate this problem. 
The terms performance measurement and benchmarking used here are loosely interchangeable and 
include processes for quantification of performance, both as a basis for project control purposes, 
such as estimating, and as a platform for qualitative analysis in order to identify causes of 'good' or 
'bad' performance and thereby identify good practice. In effect, the major difference may be a 
matter of scale on the one hand, and intent on the other. Benchmarkers are often more concerned 
with qualitative issues while performance measurement processes often stop at quantitative level. 
However, it could be said that there is a continuum between the concepts that includes both 
qualitative and quantitative perspectives as prerequisites to the understanding of the underlying 
causality of underperformance. 
Benchmarking and performance measurement have been available as management tools for several 
years. Nevertheless, few practical applications to the management of projects, either particular or 
general, have been developed beyond the principal theoretical stage or beyond applications at high 
levels of aggregation. The repetitive nature of projects and high degree of project control 
sophistication in the oil industry would seem to be conducive to the application of benchmarking 
methods, with respect to both control of individual projects and general development and 
improvement of project control techniques. However, in view of the transitory nature of projects, 
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the organisational dispositions between the individual projects and the overarching project owner 
organisation must be taken into account in setting up benchmarking processes.  
Although benchmarking is in use for comparing performance at high levels of aggregation (say 
field development costs in NOK/barrel) the parameters used, while adequate to document a major 
performance deviation, are less useful for identifying the prime cause(s) of deviations, be they 
positive or negative. This is due to lack of detail parameters that measure the central activities of 
the process under scrutiny. In effect, when using high aggregation performance measures to 
exclusion and having identified a deviation, a detailed benchmarking exercise will need to be 
planned from scratch in order to start to identify the real causes of the deviation and ultimately a 
basis for action or conclusion. This is not a practical proposition in the transitory world of projects. 
If, on the other hand, parameters that measure the core processes are built into the measurement 
structure, it will provide a basis for analysis in further detail that may more easily yield conclusive 
insights on which to base further qualitative investigation. From this point of view, benchmarking 
processes suitable for application to improvement of industrial processes will benefit by including 
a detailed substructure of significant parameters that measure core processes in order to sustain a 
detailed performance analysis.  
To illustrate what is meant by substructure, consider, as an example, the overrun analysis of three 
projects that underpins the cost risk simulation model for modification work that forms one of the 
performance measurement applications presented as part of this thesis. The existence of detailed 
performance data permitted comparison of core activities for all the projects, thereby exposing a 
consistent overrun in all core activities and defining orders of magnitude. This information 
signalled that correlation effects are present in the most severe overrun cases thereby laying an 
important premise for the simulation model which hitherto had tended to ignore correlation effects 
since they were difficult to define and quantify. The existence of parameters that specifically 
measure efficiency in all core activities facilitates the type of quantitative-qualitative analysis of 
project performance presented in the Appendices of this thesis. In turn this supports the qualitative 
investigations that are the essence of benchmarking processes directly without needing to set up 
specific benchmarking exercises for which it would probably be too late anyway. Deviation may 
also be related to other factors that are not apparent at early stages of study such as concept 
maturity, changed complexity, schedule restraints, or project specific installation restraints seen 
either in isolation alone or interrelated. All such constraints may significantly impact performance 
and are of interest in an individual project control context as well as being of more general ‘good 
practice’ interest. It can at once be seen that these are ‘micro’ benchmarking perspectives of 
interest to the estimator and hence the project controller but exist in the domain many associate 
with performance measurement rather than benchmarking. However, this appears paradoxical 
given the detailed level of benchmarking activities in the manufacturing industry from which the 
whole concept arises.  
Possibly as a consequence of the lack of detailed structure, or possibly as a consequence of 
insufficient account of the special organisational dispositions surrounding projects, techniques of 
performance measurement and benchmarking have not yet found a role as a project control tool 
either for setting or measuring performance targets for individual projects or as a tool for 
improving project control techniques in general. From experience in Norway and the UK, it can be 
claimed that this is valid for both oil companies and the major contractors. Project control and 
performance measurement continues to be based primarily on the relative project-specific goals 
that are defined by budget and milestone commitments. Absolute goals in the form of production 
efficiencies, measured for example in terms of quantities of processed materials (typically man-
hours per tonne), as a measure of industrial production efficiency in project type work, are not in 
common and systematic use. This view is supported by the fact that the monitoring of quantities of 
materials comprising the scope of work of any project is generally only indirectly part of the 
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project control monitoring effort.  It may thus be said that project control as a management 
technique has a focus on reporting and budgeting rather than scope monitoring, production 
optimisation and problem-preventive analysis seeking to anticipate and manage potential problems 
and maximise project performance. Problem-preventive analysis, for which correlation between 
cost, man-hour use and worked material volumes is essential, will accordingly be dependent on 
maintaining a good practice of performance measurement. Such performance measurement may 
also have the long-term beneficial effect that both project control personnel and management 
personnel gain a better ‘feel’ for the product and for the commonly applied fabrication techniques 
and efficiencies, as exemplified by the ‘rules-of-thumb’ that were typical of shipyards and other 
construction industry in the past. 
Many would object at the statements made above, pointing to the fact that man-hour per tonne 
factors and similar units are precisely the basis for estimating and that such factors are regularly 
extracted from close-out data. This is certainly so, but there is nevertheless little systematic 
ongoing practice of performance measurement and analysis in use as project control tools either in 
the short term perspective of a single project or the long term multi-project perspective.  
Accordingly, it can be said that in the absence of absolute measures of performance at any level of 
detail, continuous improvement processes will be handicapped by being restricted to evaluation of 
relative performance and qualitative experiences only. Fact is that many experience-recycling 
activities initiated as project start-up activities restrict the information exchange with other projects 
to qualitative experiences only, such as contractual, administrative and organisational problems, 
real success of a project being judged exclusively in terms of its relative goals (e.g. on budget, on 
schedule, acceptable quality).     
The main purpose of this dissertation is then to describe the measurement structures and techniques 
that have been developed for measuring and comparing performance in modification projects. 
These techniques have application as specific project control tools, such as estimating tools, and in 
application as improvement tools for project performance in general, such as close-out reviews. 
These techniques are intended to extend and supplement, not replace, the normative project 
reporting practices and simultaneously provide ‘rules-of-thumb’ in traditional (pre-computer) terms 
of reference in order to give project management personnel a better general feel for the 
performance capability of the industry as a basis for continual performance improvement. 
It must be pointed out that the promotion of these practices and methods has not been without 
challenge, so that this dissertation will also provide a review of the difficulties associated with 
gaining acceptance and implementation on a broad basis of the methods and techniques described 
here. 
The structure of the dissertation is as follows: 
Chapter 1 - introduction to the general background of the project control environment, the special 
nature of the modification work, the specific issues relevant to project control of modification work 
and the role of performance measurement  
Chapter 2 – review of professional literature for related topics of research and other perspectives on 
the general theme of the dissertation 
Chapter 3 - presentation of a generic data structuring format for performance measurement of 
modification work, including discourse on the metrics of performance measurement and 
characteristics of modification work     
Chapter 4 – discourse concerning estimating and related project control applications based on 
performance measurement  
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Chapter 5 - discourse regarding risk and presentation of a generic cost risk analysis model for 
modification projects based on historical performance data 
Chapter 6 - discourse and presentation of a generalised benchmarking process model for projects 
based on life cycle performance measurement processes 
Chapter 7 - an organisation theoretical perspective on the project control environment, issues of 
experience transfer and processes of organisational learning    
Appendix 1 and 2 – description of two project case studies illustrative of the application of the 
quantitative and qualitative review method, based on performance measurement processes 
Appendix 3 – description of a practical basis for selection of estimating parameters from 
performance data that harmonises with the premises of basic risk analysis theory 
The discourse will of necessity follow a cyclic nature due to the fact that several discipline 
perspectives influence the way project work is performed, the nature of the tools used to perform 
administrative tasks and the prescribed reporting structures. These discipline perspectives perform 
aspects of the project execution task that overlap, but that are not always aligned to common 
advantage.  
1.1 The underlying estimating perspective  
As mentioned above, the structures and techniques presented here have their roots in estimating 
techniques for modification work based on analysis of close-out data. 
The nature of modification work is extremely varied, each new job providing new problems and 
challenges to the estimator, which in turn requires a more or less continuous follow-up and analysis 
of close-out data as a basis for continuously developing and refining the parameters and estimating 
techniques available. This on-going process, on which renewal and development of the estimating 
practices relies, is a natural basis for benchmarking and performance measurement, as the 
parameters collected from the set of projects which have been analysed is a natural measure of 
good or poor practice. It follows as well, in so far as estimating systems are product and process 
based, that estimating has the same concerns as, and is part of, project control.      
An essential feature of any estimating system based on the analysis of close-out data is the correct 
and consistent structuring of data in a way which facilitates data collection in the field and that, on 
analysis, provides parameters which can be applied to information available from early engineering 
studies.    
Were the general principles for structuring of data to be incorporated in the structure of contract 
compensation and reporting formats, it would facilitate the easy and efficient collection of data 
after close-out. This would provide, in the same manner, a basis for the efficient use of the 
reference data in a wider project control context, such as the basis for evaluation of tenders and the 
setting of absolute project performance targets based on production, rather than budgets, using 
actual performance levels in the industry as a standard.  
The major advantage, however, would be acquiring the means to easily update the overall resource 
framework of the project on the basis of quantity updates combined with an objective assessment 
of likely performance. In short it would provide an alternative means of updating project baselines 
using the same estimating techniques as were used prior to sanction 1. Alternatively, it would 
provide verification of baseline updates produced by other means, typically by aggregation from 
detailed work packages or by addition of VO-based costs and man-hour assessments. As 
mentioned previously, VO-based estimates leave a lot to be desired regarding accuracy and in any 
                                                 
1 Noting that these methods are normally discontinued in the execution phase. 
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event only reflect changes and not concept development. Work package or task sheet based 
estimates are not complete until all the detailed engineering is completed, leaving the project in a 
state of ‘information black-out 2’ (Clark, Lorenzoni, 1985) for a long and critical period while the 
concept is matured as detailed engineering progresses. This information gap can be filled by 
continuation of the quantity based estimating practices after sanction as an integral part of the 
regular baseline updates, thereby providing a life-cycle role for active estimating in the project. 
Such a routine will also serve to promote the utility to the project of the feedback routines based on 
performance measurement on which the continual development of good estimating methods is 
dependent. 
The applications and techniques described here are based on a structure of ‘universal’ applicability 
to all modification work, utilising the same basic parameters for both estimating and performance 
measurement. Thus the same parameters can be applied in the context of improving project control 
practices in general by iterative application in the full life cycle of the individual project.  
The methods have been developed for offshore modification work, but the principles involved are 
more widely applicable, for instance for greenfield projects in the oil industry, both onshore and 
offshore. 
1.2 The nature of modification work 
As previously mentioned, modification work is extremely varied, each project having an own 
special character. 
The purpose of modification engineering is to maximise the utilisation of the existing infrastructure 
for new functions and duties. The resulting physical interface between the project scope and the 
rest of the facility cannot be clearly defined at early stages of development. Not all systems will be 
affected and only parts of systems and not whole systems will be rebuilt. The impact of changes in 
one system may affect the duties and functional requirements in other systems while the effects 
will often only be identified as detailed engineering proceeds. The installation process will in itself 
often require extensive temporary works and site clearance may require extensive demolition or 
relocations, all of which are project specific. These aspects place other demands on the phasing of 
development engineering activities for modification work, which follows a different logic and is 
exposed to different uncertainties than greenfield developments. 
In addition the nature of modification work is generally very complex, not only in the individual 
project, but also seen as a whole with resulting difficulty in identifying reference parameters which 
have universal validity and out of which project-specific requirements can be identified. For 
instance, it is normally not possible to interpolate on the basis of system or plant capacities, a 
technique much used in greenfield work. This topic is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
Projects vary considerably in size, character and complexity all dependent on their purpose and the 
installations where the work will be performed. Material cost, installation methods and local 
circumstances relate to specific functions, a specific platform and specific locations for performing 
the work on the platform may vary considerably. This can be exemplified by considering a single 
discipline, typically piping, where for example, material quality, pipe dimensions, valve content 
and layout complexity may vary considerably between different projects. Considering equipment, 
one project may require a compressor, another a separator, a third only a pig receiver, all at 
significantly different cost and requiring different bulk infrastructure. Installation locations vary 
widely with regard to local constraints such as access, work method, congestion, weather exposure, 
safe practice and so on and the degree of exposure to the effects of local conditions is partly 
dependant on size. All such constraints may have considerable effect on the work content and cost 
                                                 
2 Terminology borrowed from Clark and Lorenzoni. 
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of each individual project contributing to the high variability that can be observed in the 
performance data.  
1.3 The project control challenge 
From the above it is apparent that modification work has a significant risk exposure to change in 
the nature and quantity of the work to be performed as a result of the concept development 
processes, often resulting in volume growth in materials and man-hour use, schedule overrun and 
ultimately cost growth. Risk of material volume growth will endure at least until detailed 
engineering is completed whereas the risk of man-hour growth applies to all phases and is coupled 
to complexity and location, as well as quantity growth. Equally, the resulting strain on resources 
and disruption of the orderly progress of the work may have seriously negative effects on 
efficiency. All this in turn provides a focus for project control practices aimed at verification of the 
commitment frame after award of contract in the form of factual material volumes, the nature and 
complexity of the subcomponents and production constraints. Not the least important element of 
verification is the offshore accommodation requirements with respect to schedule and project 
milestones. This focus on verification of the scope of work is, however, by no means common 
practise. 
It is of primary importance for successful execution that the factual volumes and nature of the 
materials be established as early as possible in order to provide as long a management horizon as 
possible for the implementation of corrective action in the event of significant deviation from the 
original assumptions and committed goals. Consequently routines for the establishment and 
follow-up of material volumes, with an appropriate degree of detail along with the associated 
assessment of cost, man-hour and schedule impact, are central to the methods described here and 
should be implemented as a central discipline in project control activities.  
Paradoxically, material measurement systems are a routine and essential part of the engineering 
and procurement activities performed by the contractors. This suggests that the data are already 
available in the project management systems, but are not systematically employed in project 
control practices. What is required is a recognition of the added value that analysis of the data can 
provide, and the will to initiate and sustain programs of measurement and analysis throughout the 
lifecycle of the individual project and beyond in a multi-project multi-cycle context. 
1.4 The original contribution  
The dialog above points to the need to establish project control procedures that may correct the 
deficiencies of the current normative project control and project administrative practices which are 
observably inadequate with regard to identifying and resolving the problems experienced by 
overrun projects at a sufficiently early stage to limit the efficiency loss associated with many 
overrun projects.  
Accordingly, that is the focus of the practical/theoretical work research and method development 
the results of which are presented in this thesis. The problem of performance failure (overrun) and 
inadequate experience transfer (inability to learn from past failures) has been examined in the 
context of first-hand experience with modification project work in the offshore oil industry in 
capacity of estimator and project controller. The methods presented are intended to promote a 
systematic and cyclic quantitative-qualitative type of performance review based on long term 
performance measurement processes.  
The proposals of this dissertation form an holistic framework for systematic improvement in an 
experience transfer process model which extends the current project control practices with 
essentially four elements: 
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1) A data structuring model as a basis for collecting and collating performance data with metrics 
suitable for absolute quantitative performance measurement relating resources and 
quantity/complexity aspects of the product, suitable for comparing all types of modification 
projects in all phases of development . The breakdown structure in the model will serve as a 
coherent holistic basis for all project control activities, such as estimating as well as contract 
compensation formats and incentive mechanisms. This will increase the total utility of data 
collection and analysis effort and also eliminate frustrating and wasteful duplication of data 
processing effort in project administration. Consistent product-resource data structuring 
systems currently available are inadequate and also are not currently used on an holistic basis 
for the structuring of data.     
 
2) A systematic review and re-estimation procedure for project baselines based on updated 
quantities and normalised historical performance data formatted in accordance with 1) above, 
as the concept is matured during detailed engineering. This scope verification and estimate 
update procedure should preferably take place as an inter-active process between the project 
controllers and estimators from the base organisation responsible for the early phase 
estimates. Such procedures are not part of current practice. 
 
3) A cost risk simulation model for modification work based on historical performance data 
intended to better define the magnitude and range of performance related risk scenaria and 
validate the need for the other risk mitigating actions defined here. 
 
 3)   A benchmarking process model based on systematic review of quantitative performance in a 
multi-project cycle context with a view to isolating qualitative issues affecting performance 
such as complexity, concept maturity, market problems, schedule pressures, and so on and the 
management methods and construction methods chosen in response to such problems. 
Applied in the context of a specific project, this implies a close-out review of projected and 
final performance in quantitative terms in order to identify anomalies of performance and 
benchmark them with respect to normative historical performance data for the purpose of 
establishing qualitative causal effects. Like 2) above, this should take place as an inter-active 
process between the project team and representatives from the base organisation. A special 
aspect of this model is recognition of the special organisational context in which project 
benchmarking takes place and how this may influence the functionality of benchmarking 
processes in project based organisations.   
 
By contrast to the above proposals, the methods currently in use for project control are static and 
relative and performance measurement in absolute terms is sporadic. Experience transfer processes 
are performed ad hoc by the individual project, are qualitative in nature and generally lack 
continuity in a multi-project cycle context.  
1.5 Research Method - the way the work was done 
The methods presented here have their roots partly in a program to introduce performance targets 
to project control of modification projects. But the deeper roots are based in a program to improve 
estimating methods for modification work in general, which in turn stemmed from a project that 
experienced problems of material and complexity growth and associated strained commitment 
frame as related in the previous sections.  
The program was performed under the auspices of one specific oil company, in co-operation with 
project partners and several other oil companies that were invited to contribute. The program was 
based on performance data from a selection of modification projects contributed by each 
participating company, for which purpose a suitable data structuring system was required. A 
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central feature of the program was to utilise actual reported man-hours from measured field work 
and collate with the installed materials expressed both in weight and, where possible, in other 
characteristic metrics such as metres. The role of the author was, as the representative of the 
coordinating company, to prepare the data structuring basis for the study, collate and analyse the 
data, prepare conclusions and submit a final report. The work took the form of a series of 
coordinating meetings and workshops in order to gain consensus from all the participants for the 
basis of the study and endorsement of the final product.  
The study was limited in scope, addressing only man-hour and weight relations. Thus the basis and 
the conclusions of the program were subsequently developed further in-house by the author to 
encompass the full project scope and followed up by the systematic collection and analysis of data 
from some 50 projects, mainly in-house, in all stages of development up to the present time. The 
project portfolio used in this thesis includes some 38 projects. The data structures described in 
Chapter 3 were used to format the data on a consistent basis. Some of the results of these processes 
are presented in this thesis.  
The data analysis constituted of the setting up of performance comparisons and life cycle profiles 
of the type presented in Appendix 1 and 2, in order that the performance might be judged against 
the background defined by the existing data. This process involved setting up the data in the 
formats presented in Appendix 1 and 2 and isolating quantitative anomalies. The purpose of these 
comparisons was to gauge whether the level of performance was representative of general or 
special characteristics and circumstances pertaining to the project at hand. It follows that 
qualitative criteria relating to each new set of data had to be established and this involved dialogue 
with project personnel.  
In addition to the data analysis described above, the processes involved continuous dialogue with 
project and base organisation management in attempts to engage their commitment to the data 
collection procedures, using as primary argument the immediate value of performance data as a 
basis for estimating tools. An important aspect was gaining understanding for the usefulness, in a 
benchmarking context, of the qualitative insights arising out of the quantitative analyses. The 
nature of these insights is described in the case descriptions of Appendices 1 and 2. 
One of the observations of these dialogues is that these issues easily translate into critique of 
methods and performance that invokes defensive responses. Accordingly, such dialogues are best 
conducted on an informal basis. The conclusions of this thesis are thus not based on analysis of the 
results of formally structured interviews, rather the synthesis of impressions gathered sporadically 
over longer periods of time. 
Thus the material and conclusions presented here are based on observations and analyses made in 
the course of several years of interaction with projects and base organisations in several companies, 
both owner and contractor, in Norway, the UK, the USA and France, in addition to co-operative 
dialogues with professional organisations 3 working on the same matters. These interactions were 
part of a practical work situation as an operative estimator, which not only included collection and 
analysis of data for the purpose of underpinning estimating practices, but also the development of 
unified formats for data collection, estimating, contract compensation formats coupled to weight 
development and alternative weight estimating routines in project control. There is no discrete 
time-limited program of research underpinning this thesis.  
It follows from the above that the author may be seen in the role of a practitioner-enquirer as 
defined by Argyris and Schøn (Argyris, Schøn, 1996). In their work, Argyris and Schøn maintain 
that a practitioner-inquirer, being a participant in the processes being studied, must necessarily 
study himself and his own work and may be predisposed concerning the outcome of the analysis. 
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This raises questions concerning the objectivity of criteria and the rigour of judgement in reaching 
conclusions. The implication is that the explanations and solutions proposed here may merely be 
coincidentally congruent with the circumstances; others may not see any alignment at all. 
However, as mentioned previously, the explanations and the proposals are the result of several 
years of reflection backed up by a breadth of practical experience in general construction and the 
oil and gas industry, gained while working with engineering, construction, QA (Quality Assurance) 
auditing, project control, estimating and contracting, at various times and partly in parallel. Not the 
least relevant experience is that of QA auditing, which was primarily concerned with verifying the 
correspondence of formal procedures of work with actual practice. A by-product of auditing 
experience is insight into the interaction effects provoked by enquiry. This insight leads to an 
understanding of the importance of objective judgement regarding to what extent deviation is 
significant to the final outcome of the work process under review.  
In the final instance, however, that which is presented here is naturally the result of an attempt to 
systemise and explicate the more-or-less tacit (meaning un-theorised) conclusions of accumulated 
reflections resulting from practical day-to-day work with the matter of this dissertation over several 
years. In this regard, the formal studies of this Dr.Ing program have contributed the stimulus of 
new perspectives as well as a formal and rigorous basis with which to articulate the tacit 
conclusions of practitioner-enquirer reflections. This program has included studies in the fields of 
project management, project control, benchmarking, risk analysis and organisation theory.  
Some of the views expressed here are in contradiction with the normative practices and theories of 
the project management community. In this light, it was considered important to seek endorsement 
for these views in the professional literature. This need was addressed by scanning the professional 
press for research publications in the same field as a supplement to the literature included in the 
formal studies forming part of this Dr.Ing project. Thus the literature studies have included three 
perspective levels, namely research and review articles in the professional press, literature specific 
to the various fields of project work, and the overarching organisation theory.  
Notwithstanding the above considerations, it is important to emphasize that the motivation to 
pursue these investigations has all the time had a practical outcome as its goal, namely the 
promotion of the methods and procedures advocated in this thesis as normative practice in the 
project control community. This has an impact on the form the models take. They will be judged 
for the extent they are perceived to define and address legitimate problems and the way they work 
in the pragmatic circumstances of the everyday working life. The methods are intended to promote 
the insight which is essential to proficiency, through participation. In order to promote 
participation, transparency and flexibility of method and system are prerequisites. To this end, 
standard application software tools, graphical presentations and a descriptive rationale have been 
used, as far as possible.   
Argyris and Schøn point out that a practitioner-enquirer will, for pragmatic reasons, tend to stop 
enquiry when a satisfactory conclusion has been reached. By contrast, academic enquiry is 
expected to endure as long as there exist unanswered questions to clarify. In this particular case, 
contrary to the above view, the methods proposed in this thesis promote institutionalisation of 
enquiry in the form of analytic and reflective project review and closure procedures. This is 
consistent with the general principles promoted by Argyris and Schøn concerning the nature of 
organisational learning. In an ongoing multi-project context this applies both to basic processes, 
such as estimating, as well as the over-arching multi-project analyses and recycling of current 
performance data on which renewal is based.   
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2 STATE OF THE ART - A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
STATE OF THE ART IN MANAGEMENT OF MODIFICATION PROJECTS - A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter comprises a review of literature in the professional press concerning performance 
measurement, benchmarking and experience transfer as a basis for organisational learning and 
performance improvement in project based organisations. 
The project form of organisation, in general and in the oil industry in particular, has long enjoyed a 
reputation as an effective form of organisation especially suitable for the realisation of one-off 
capital development projects. Success in bringing large, complex and technologically innovative 
developments to fruition under difficult environmental conditions (although not always within 
budget or schedule) has been associated with a management image of dynamism and innovation. 
These successes are, however, often marred by the recurrent, though sporadic, cost and schedule 
overruns that do occur in spite of considerable in-house expertise on the part of organisations that 
make repeated use of the project from of organisation. It is generally accepted that project-based 
organisations experience problems related to experience transfer and associated learning potential 
between projects with a view to performance improvement. They also appear to have difficulty in 
adopting many of the accepted techniques such as performance measurement and benchmarking as 
processes leading to performance improvement. The purpose of this chapter is to review relevant 
literature for publications by other researchers in the same or relatable fields. 
2.2 Selection of the literature 
A consequence of the focus of this dissertation is a need to scan literature on a broad basis and 
from several related fields in order to assess the extent to which the above issues feature in the 
literature of the various actors, schools, or professions that are operative in the project 
environment. The reason for this is the influence different sector interests exert on the approach to 
organisational improvement processes and particularly the way performance data is recorded and 
used before, during and after the project execution cycle. The central disciplines are project 
management, procurement management, project control/cost engineering/estimation, contract 
administration and accounting. The contributions of the professional weight engineering and 
weight based control and estimating consultants are naturally important. The schools of Total 
Quality Management (TQM)/continuous improvement (CI)/benchmarking (BM), have perspectives 
of relevance in an overarching sense. More peripherally, the knowledge management professionals 
and the contributions of the organisational theorists and management consultants and associated 
processes such as Business Process Reengineering, Work Flow monitoring and organisational 
learning processes, are important influences on the working environment of projects.  
The selected papers have been supplemented with articles from trade publications (Flingtorp, 1999) 
and professional presentations 4 by consultant practitioners with commercial interests and, where 
appropriate, the latter have been incorporated in the discussion. These presentations have not been 
formally published in the professional literature and as such have not been subject to peer review. 
Nevertheless, the views represent current practise within specialist sectors of the industry.   
In general it may be said that the literature scan did not reveal many papers with direct applicability 
to the themes of this dissertation, but all the selected papers include aspects of general relevance to 
the underlying rationale.  
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2.3 Review of individual papers and discussion 
The subject matter of the selected papers is organised sequentially progressing from the general 
theoretical perspective of the academic to the pragmatic problem-solving perspective of the 
practitioner. The specific subject matter includes such topics as the suitability of the standard 
project management techniques to manage all sorts of projects, organisational learning processes 
such as knowledge diffusion (tacit to explicit), simulation of project dynamics based on rework 
cycles, benchmarking and process performance measurement as a basis for performance 
improvement, total quality management analysis techniques, cost and weight estimating systems 
and a review of commonly recurring weaknesses in improvement processes.     
The review and discussion will take the form of a brief review of the content of the selected papers 
followed by discussion and comment on the content in relation to the research background for this 
thesis. The conclusion will include a summation of the general background and general conclusions 
which may be drawn from a global evaluation of the selected literature.  
2.3.1 The suitability of traditional project management techniques  
In their paper The Management of Innovation in Project-based firms), Keegan and Turner (Keegan, 
Turner, 2002) take up issues concerning attitudes to innovation in project-based organisations such 
as the EPC engineering/construction industry.  
Keegan and Turner’s main thesis is that the traditional innovation literature largely ignores projects 
and that innovation as a theme is largely ignored in the project management literature. Project-
based firms employ many of the organisational features associated with innovation, and projects 
are portrayed as a fast, flat and flexible approach to managing change and innovation. Most 
project-based organisations specialise in the design and construction of bespoke products and can 
therefore be said to be always innovating. ”Their work is always unique, always delivered to bespoke designs, 
always achieving something new.…The necessity to produce bespoke answers to client needs has organisational 
implications. Project based firms should behave like innovative firms”. On the other hand, these organisations 
are seen to be mechanistic in their approach to management of projects particularly with regard to 
views on the usefulness of innovation and the application of standardised project control practices 
that stifle innovation, where the issue of slack resources is central.  
Keegan and Turner conclude that the application of standard project management practices stifles 
innovation because of the focus on efficiency and control and the selection of projects through pre-
conceived set of sanctioning criteria. The authors do differentiate between two types of project, 
namely innovation projects, (those carried out by companies on behalf of themselves), and more 
routine projects,( those carried out on behalf of clients), but their findings imply that the same 
mechanistic approach is adopted for all types of projects. However, their real concern seems to be 
that there is too little understanding for the right way to manage innovation, where organic 
management methods are to be preferred rather than traditional mechanistic project management 
methods. The paper then concludes finally that the project management methods should 
differentiate in a direction that is more supportive of innovation.   
Firstly, it is more likely that the temporary nature of the organisation, the short term goals and tight 
economic constraints are responsible for the modus operandi of the project-based organisations. 
Flexible organisational formats such as matrix organisations are more a product of the need to 
establish the temporary project teams of skilled personnel quickly and are not necessarily focused 
on innovation. 
The above argument does not have the same relevance for both types of project. The distinction 
between types of projects is an important one. A bespoke product does not necessarily imply a high 
order of innovation, rather variations on well-known technological/industrial themes, managed, 
designed and built by highly skilled personnel often within tight constraints of budget, schedule 
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and performance specification. In such a context, project control is of central importance because 
of the need for efficiency and the need to maintain a focus on the short term goals that are the 
raison d’etre of the routine project. However, bespoke products may include innovative elements of 
greater or lesser magnitude such as new technology, extended applications of existing technology 
or new construction concepts that pose challenges of organisation and control. It is often in such 
circumstances that projects overrun and challenging technology often receives the blame. 
However, the magnitude of overruns suggests that there are other contributory factors that do not 
get caught up by the existing management techniques. 
The project management literature focuses on the unique bespoke nature of project work as a 
central argument for the utilisation of the project organisational model and management methods. 
This focus on uniqueness encourages the view that individual projects cannot be compared with 
each other shutting the door on comparative performance measurement as a basis for improvement 
of project management methods and production techniques. The strong adherence to the standard 
approach is also a product of the need to establish a working organisation quickly and get on with 
the job. The routine project is thus not the best arena either for method or product innovation. The 
specialist personnel who man the projects bring these work procedures and technical expertise with 
them ‘ready made’ from the functional organisation, often termed a toolbox, in the form of best 
practice as well as own experience from previous work, mostly in the form of tacit knowledge 
(Nonaka, Takeuchi, 1995) and skills as routines (Nelson, Winter, 1982).  
Conversely, it is suggested that, to succeed, the innovative project will need to focus and encourage 
other qualities than those required to see through a routine project. One may suggest that the 
routine project may pose similar challenges of definition and control as innovative projects, which 
by their nature lack definition. Methods that enhance and support control in innovative projects 
may also have relevance in apparently routine projects, which all have the potential to experience 
disruption effects that undermine efficiency. The current project management literature does not 
address those issues. But there is certainly an expectation that management of innovative work lies 
within the domain of the project management discipline.  
Finally, it is appropriate to point out that while most routine projects shun innovation for the 
reasons mentioned above, projects may nevertheless exhibit great creative energy under special 
circumstances, for example when confronted with a crisis. 5 Under these circumstances resources 
will often not be an issue and motivation is normally very high. From this we may conclude that it 
is the skills of the personnel brought to bear on a problem within a known technological/industrial 
context that is the clue to success, not relaxation of controls. In fact the omission of activities such 
as progress control and scope management may be detrimental to the project performance as a 
whole. 
The need for project management techniques to differentiate between the types of project is also 
endorsed by Shenhar, Dvir, Levy and Maltz in their paper Project Success: A multi-dimensional 
Strategic Concept (Shenhar, Dvir, Levy, Maltz ,2002).  
Shenhar, et.al, differentiate between types of projects, grading projects in accordance with the level 
of technological uncertainty and the corresponding level of innovative technological creativity 
embodied in the projects goals. These levels are: low-tech (construction/road-building), medium 
tech (mainly existing base technology, but often incurring some new technology or facility 
upgrades), high tech (mainly new technology) and super high tech (developing new technologies). 
This spectrum of gradations corresponds for both papers. Shenhar et.al. conclude that success 
criteria and management techniques need to be differentiated according to types of project. Much 
                                                 
5  Referring here to the successful project recovery after the loss of the Sleipner A GBS during construction, which 
resulted in serious proposals by some management consultants to stimulate creative energy in projects through 
artificial crisis situations.  
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of the traditional project management literature has treated all projects as the same under the 
assumption that ‘one approach fits all’. It must however be mentioned that the main thrust of their 
paper is to examine the role of projects in a wider strategic context beyond the immediate goal of 
completion within the traditional constraints of time, budget and performance criteria. That 
discussion is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
In some respects there is congruency between the conclusions of the above two papers and the 
position of this thesis in that project management literature does not differentiate between types of 
projects in so far that the control elements may need to be differentiated as a project progresses and 
for different types of project and for different elements. In other words, the “one approach suits all” 
approach is unsuitable. As an illustration many routine projects are initiated as studies often 
requiring a high degree of innovation (in terms of technology, or method of construction, or due to 
constraints in execution, and so on but within a specific field of expertise). These studies may 
progress through several approval decision gates to a construction phase where the control regime 
will be very different to a study. Even so, such a project may retain elements of high uncertainty 
such as prototype equipment that will require an own control regime, and conceivably an own 
budget and risk allocation within the context of the more common elements. For such projects, 
among which modification projects may often be found, the traditional approach alone will often 
be inadequate. In any event the control regime ought to be varied depending on the size, overall 
cost, character and risk of the project, but the paper does not address how this pragmatic issue 
should be handled. 
The problem that remains, however, is how to secure a sufficient degree of balance between 
routine and innovation in the project control and management approach to the special problems that 
cause overruns in routine projects. Routines, such as monitoring of weight development during 
detailed engineering, that can expose latent problems sufficiently early that due action can be taken 
to eliminate the negative effects of surprises, is one of the particular elements that is not addressed 
as part of the project control effort in the industry as a whole. 
2.3.2 Diffusion of knowledge in organisations as a basis for performance improvement  
While on the issue of innovation and creativity it may be appropriate to look more closely at 
Armistead’s and Meakin’s paper A Framework for Practising Knowledge Management 
(Armistead, Meakin, 2002). 
Armistead and Meakin are concerned with the diffusion of knowledge in organisations as a basis 
for performance improvement. The issues are those of tacit versus explicit knowledge, the locus of 
knowledge in individuals as opposed to organisations and the type of processes whereby tacit 
knowledge may be made accessible through codification. Their findings are that the majority of 
knowledge codification processes are ‘prescriptive’ and formalised at the organisational level, they 
are strongly associated with information technology, and rely on the ‘compliance’ of individuals in 
knowledge sharing routines. This approach is seen as mechanistic and control oriented. At the other 
end of the scale knowledge sharing processes are termed ‘adaptive’ on the organisational level and 
‘self-determined’ on the individual level. These latter processes are more diffuse and are associated 
with informal networks and communities of practice and problem-solving interaction between 
individuals and in teams. On the individual level, adaptive knowledge sharing processes are 
associated with specialist roles and individuals empowered to a greater autonomy in the creation 
and use of knowledge. The type of knowledge featuring in adaptive processes is seen to be more 
difficult, and even counterproductive to encode because of its association with individual expertise, 
interactive creativity and its dependence on trust between individuals. That the latter is seen as 
creative and the former mechanistic echoes the main thesis of the Keegan and Turner’s paper 
where control processes are seen as stifling for innovation.       
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Armistead and Meakin are careful to point out that the different categories will serve different 
purposes and that any organisation, having need of both types, will have to accept a trade off of 
disadvantages against advantages dependant on the circumstances of use.  
There are however pragmatic issues that deserve discussion and that may have a bearing on trade-
off, or preferably interaction, between types. It may be that in certain circumstances prescriptive 
processes are imperative to and precede the adaptive processes and that in fact both processes for 
making tacit knowledge explicit may form a continuum of data acquisition, analysis and 
transformation (into information) and ultimately knowledge. Specifically, acquisition of 
performance data falls in this category. The data format needs to be pre-structured for consistency 
and to ensure that the data actually will reflect important functionality in the processes under 
scrutiny and correlate with the right aspects of the product. Reporting of such data needs to be 
mandatory (prescriptive). It is in the ensuing correlations of process and product and analysis that 
the data may be converted into information in forms that can be disseminated widely. But it is 
equally important that this information should be sought out and used on a wider basis if it is to 
increase the total knowledge base and understanding of the processes in which the organisation is 
engaged.  
The above papers all support the observations made in the introduction that project organisations 
are resistive to change of method in the longer term. In the absence of prescriptive measures, the 
resistance may be circumvented by the use of an adaptive knowledge exchange process in the form 
of a heuristic dialogue at base-line updates and at close-out. This dialogue should take place 
between the functional organisation and the project based on an assessment of project performance 
in the light of general experience and performance levels, own expectations and the specific 
experience gleaned from the most recent project. The focus should be on the basis and 
development (concept, scope, cost, schedule, performance) of the projects mandate, the actions 
taken by the project and the utility of the best practice routines in the face of problems experienced 
in the practical world. 
The use of performance reviews in conjunction with base-line updates and close-outs is a routine 
intended to promote the dissemination and understanding of the uses of performance data. These 
data gathering processes are difficult to carry out in projects because they are seen to consume 
scarce resources. Difficulties in setting up and maintaining common data structures result in 
duplication of effort when sector interests hinder the establishment of common structures capable 
of serving several sector interests. Pragmatism may endorse the initial use of ‘prescriptive’ 
processes as pre-requisite for initiating such routines in the absence of voluntary commitment on 
the part of project management. 
2.3.3 Organisational learning processes  
The failure to systematically learn as organisations manage and execute multiple project portfolios 
is the theme of Cooper, Lyneis and Bryant in their paper Learning to learn, from past to future 
(Cooper, Lyneis, Bryant, 2002). 
The paper discusses reasons behind the failure to systematically learn from past experience and it 
presents a project simulation model that facilitates cross-project learning. Principally, the authors 
attribute this failure to learn to four elements: 
a) the misguided prevalent belief that every project is different with little commonality 
b)  difficulties in determining the true causes of  project performance (failure or success)       
c) long project cycles that inhibit systematic experience transfer on the part of project managers  
d)  lack of resources and appropriate organisational structures that practise multi-cycle project 
reviews  
In answer to the matter of non-commonality, the authors present a model for simulating the 
dynamics of a project that facilitates cross-project comparison. The model consists of three 
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important structures underlying the dynamics of a project, a) the rework cycle, b) positive and 
negative feedback effects on productivity and quality of work and c) positive and negative inter-
action effects between overlapping phases of the work. These concepts are illustrated below in 
Figure 2.1. The model applies the effects of multiple time-varying conditions such as staff 
experience levels, work sequence, schedule pressure, progress monitoring, concept changes, 
quality, productivity and so on to performance in the rework cycle. The authors claim great success 
with the simulator as an ongoing learning system for managers through recycling of experience. 
 
Figure 2-1: Feedback effects of the rework cycle (Cooper, Lyneis, Bryant, 2002) 
The four factors affecting the failure to learn from experience support the conclusions of this 
dissertation. But the approach to experience transfer is much simpler being in essence based on two 
elements: a) ongoing quantitative benchmarking of performance using a set of preset parameters at 
a level of detail capable of highlighting all core activities, and b) ongoing qualitative analysis of 
benchmarking results at the interface between the functional organisation and the project 
organisation. Deviations from expected levels of performance can be established with reference to 
quantitative performance data that also provide a point of departure for qualitative discussions 
regarding the reasons for deviation and possible remedies. There are similarities in approach in so 
far as both recycle data, both understand the importance of a multi-cycle approach and both have 
routines for explicating experiences and improving best practices on an ongoing basis. Dialogues 
concerning issues affecting project performance would in any event feature elements frequently 
encountered, such as access to qualified manpower, specification stability, conceptual changes, 
schedule pressures, etc as listed in the above, in so far as they had a bearing on the problems 
encountered. A freer approach has the advantage of potentially picking up special items peculiar to 
the specific project under discussion, but also the disadvantage of being less rigorous. Both 
approaches could be supported by other means to overcome weaknesses.  
2.3.4 Benchmarking as basis for improved performance in projects 
Understanding how the benchmarking concept can be related and adapted to the unique working 
environment of the construction industry as a basis for performance improvement is the theme of 
the paper by Sherif Mohamed titled Benchmarking and Improving Construction Productivity 
(Mohamed, 1996).  
The construction industry looks to the manufacturing industry for innovative precedents, among 
which the success of benchmarking has considerable appeal. But the construction industry has been 
slow to adopt benchmarking techniques which can be attributed to several factors: 1) 
misunderstanding of the benchmarking concept; for many practitioners it means measuring 
everything, 2) confusion surrounding benchmarking procedures regarding what and how to 
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measure, 3) lack of reference data due to problems associated with the collection of data especially 
related to field based operations and 4) benchmarking requires radical changes in the way 
information is documented.  
Mohamed sees a complete benchmarking program existing on three levels, internal, project and 
external. Internal benchmarking addresses the organisations overarching business practice of doing 
business through projects using traditional measures such as customer perspective (service, cost, 
quality), business evaluation (market share, successful/failed tenders, conflicts) and finance 
stability (turnover, backlog, return), and also covers comparison with other operators in the same 
industry. The project level of benchmarking provides measurement of performance of projects in 
which the organisation is involved using a common set of benchmarking measures consisting of 
productivity rates, allocated resources and cost analysis, in order to track performance at selected 
stages in the project lifetime against own expectations and initial estimates. This project level of 
performance feedback is seen as operational both in the short-term of the project cycle 
(improvement of efficiency and profit/basis for corrective action) and in the longer term internal 
multi-cycle context of feedback to the success or otherwise of actions arising from internal 
benchmarking. It also provides validation of estimating databases and qualitative feedback on 
technical, managerial and operational aspects to design and construction professionals alike. Two 
central issues regarding measurement of construction efficiency are awareness of the importance of 
the rework cycle and constructability and metrics aimed at measuring such effects should be 
incorporated into the common set of measurement parameters. External benchmarking is seen as 
adaptation and transfer of successful practices from other types of industry such as manufacturing. 
Typical examples are team design, simultaneous engineering and design for construction. 
This paper is principally a very close parallel to the conclusions of this dissertation, especially 
regarding the views on interrelation of project and internal benchmarking. The perspective of this 
paper regards projects as a sub-element in a larger context, that of doing business through projects. 
Projects are not benchmarked in isolation but as a basis of overall business efficiency. 
Implementation of actions arising from benchmarking is recognised as taking place in the long 
term through the medium of the long term business organisation.    
The extent to which estimating, monitoring and revision of quantities is included in the scheme is 
not entirely clear. Construction contracts are often based on preliminary assumptions regarding the 
quality and quantity of certain types of work that can be critical for the outcome of a project 6. In 
such cases re-measurement would seem to be a central requirement of scope management and 
closely coupled to project economic success. There would thus be a basis for the establishment of 
ongoing practice of production performance monitoring in both relative (own goals) and absolute 
(general levels of performance) terms in the individual projects as a basis for internal 
benchmarking between projects. This routine is seen as a prerequisite for successful benchmarking 
against other operators in the same industry.     
Regarding the matter of measuring everything, it is a fact, particularly in the oil and gas industry, 
that vast quantities of information are recorded as a consequence of the administrative routines. 
The challenge is to know what information is available, whether it is easily accessible in 
intelligible formats and how to correlate it in meaningful contexts. 
                                                 
6  Two examples:  
a) A contract for civil work on a refinery was based on incorrect assumptions regarding the number and nature of the 
various types of concrete foundation work. The contractor’s price was based on M3 concrete which did not take 
into account the large number of small footings in the process area which only became apparent to the contractor 
after release of detailed drawings resulting in a large loss for the contractor. 
b) A contract for a well-known railway tunnel was let on the expectation of small amounts of leak sealing and wall 
reinforcement. It subsequently became evident that this assumption was incorrect, resulting in large budget 
overruns due to the fact that the contractor’s price for this type of work was very high.  
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2.3.5 Performance measurement as a basis for improvement 
This theme of performance measurement is the subject of Peter Kueng’s paper Process 
performance measurement system (PPMS): a tool to support process based organisations (Kueng, 
2003). 
Kueng’s thesis is that despite dramatic changes wrought in the business environment by the 
application of concepts such as business process reengineering, “ …. most enterprises do not have 
an integrated holistic system of gauging their business process performance on a regular basis”. 
Most enterprises assess their performance mainly through financial measures and thereby fail to 
relate performance to processes. This inhibits understanding of the processes involved and thereby 
limits the insight necessary for improvement.  
Kueng proceeds to describe and discuss several methods proposed for alleviating this shortcoming 
such as Balanced Scorecard, Self-assessment, Workflow-based monitoring, Statistical Process 
control, Activity-based costing (ABC) systems and ISO 9000 certification. None of these fully 
satisfies the criteria (work flow based monitoring and ABC systems come the closest) of Kueng’s 
proposal for an appropriate process performance measurement system which 1) focuses on 
processes rather than business units, 2) measures performance holistically by measuring qualitative 
as well as quantitative aspects, 3) compares current values against historical and target values and 
4) disseminates the results (such as current value, target value, gap, trend) to the process actors.  
For the rest the paper identifies certain operative constraints and discusses premises for the 
selection and functionality of performance measurement parameters.. Of these the most important 
are the acceptability of the chosen indicators to the actors involved and the commitment and 
empowerment of managers at all levels to the institutionalisation of process performance 
management into management thinking and the daily practices of an organisation. Finally, Kueng 
concludes that while performance measurement in itself does not show which actions can be taken 
to improve a process, it does give a review process a clear direction, it provides a comprehensive 
performance evaluation and it identifies areas of weakness, all of which can direct attention to 
relevant facts that may otherwise not have been visible in the absence of a PPMS. 
Moving on, another paper that endorses a systematic measurement-analysis approach in quality 
improvement processes is Søren Bisgaard’s paper The role of scientific method in quality 
management (Bisgaard, 2000).  
Bisgaard’s concern is that the role of scientific measurement and analysis processes as fundamental 
components in a system of modern quality management, have not received due emphasis in recent 
expositions on quality management. Hence the article, which sees the potential to apply scientific 
method in the form of data collection, analysis, modelling and verification to everything we do as 
an efficient, effective and systematic process of learning and discovery 7.The paper further provides 
historical case histories in order to document applicability in differing contexts, terminating with 
perspectives for the future.     
These two papers do not specifically address projects as such, but rather processes in general. 
Projects are time-limited processes, but not repetitive in the short term like manufacturing 
processes. In contrast to projects, the above papers have a longer perspective in mind. However, 
project life cycles comprise a few significant and interrelated processes (or phases) such as 
engineering, procurement, fabrication, installation etc, which are all crucial to the successful 
outcome of a project. In order to bridge the gap between the limited life span of the individual 
project and the longer term perspective addressed in the papers, projects may be viewed as batch 
processes in a long term process for implementing capital investments like oil and gas field 
developments, or facility upgrades, by use of multiple projects. At present individual projects are 
                                                 
7 This parallels the theme addressed by Latour (Latour, 1987) and discussed in Chapter 7.5.6 
  31
largely measured in relative terms (in terms of project specific goals) such that cross project 
performance comparison in absolute terms is not available in the long term. For this to be possible 
it is essential to establish a standardised basis for objective measurement of project processes in 
absolute terms. With regard to projects, this translates into the need for a long term multi-project 
cycle of reviews using indicators that provide valid cross-project comparison and review processes. 
Such an approach limits the range of comparison to specific types work in specific industries 
2.3.6 Data structures 
The papers reviewed so far all present perspectives on project management improvement in general 
terms without providing any guidelines on how to go about the task beyond that of initiating some 
sort of Plan-Do-Study-Act cycle (the Shewhart-Deming cycle articulated by Dr Walter Shewhart 
and Dr W. Edwards Deming) of measurement and performance review. There is one exception. 
Cooper, Lyneis and Bryant present a computer simulation model based on a ‘rework cycle’, but 
this does not measure and compare in absolute terms. Mohamed suggests what should be 
measured, at the same time pointing to problems concerning data gathering and field work. Kueng 
points to the predominance of accounting systems as a basis for measurement, but which generally 
fail to record data that permit the correlation of performance with processes and product 
characteristics. The review has so far not identified any case- or project-specific models.     
Seeking case-specific models, one may look to the cost engineering article reviews only to find, 
however, that the data structures which can support experience exchange and cross project 
comparative processes, and indeed experience exchange processes themselves, are not a focus of 
interest in the papers. What is a recurrent theme is the issue of cost reporting versus cost 
engineering, the latter being the alignment of engineering insight with economic and financial 
insight in support of rational decision making processes at all stages of project development, the 
former being the preparation of cost reports which are seen as primarily of value to financial issues 
and of limited support to project management (Drake, Falconer, 1988; Leese, 1986; Muir, 1986; 
Nunn; 1986). The perspectives of this thesis align with the latter, namely cost engineering. While 
the issue of historical data features in the discussions, none of the papers addresses the process in 
any detail or as a platform for periodic or close-out reviews, performance analysis and experience 
transfer. 
The data structures in the articles (Beguinot, 1988; Bungard, 1988; Kok 1988; Leese, 1988; Neil, 
1987) concern the build up of estimating, monitoring and reporting requirements of the individual 
project and are based, at the lowest level of detail, on correlated cost, time and resource elements. 
This is consistent with normal practice in the industry. These elements in fact provide a basis for 
the necessary performance and process correlations in so far as the material quantities are included. 
But the use of these elements for performance comparison would be unduly complex since the 
elements exist at the lowest level of detail. However, aggregation of all the detail elements up to 
levels appropriate for performance comparison, such as the major activities in any project, is 
unduly complicated due to inconsistent metrics and the lack of a unifying data structure. The result, 
in keeping with normal practice, is that the materials elements are not aggregated along with the 
man-hour and cost elements. Thus only relative performance and not absolute performance 
comparison is possible, in the absence of suitable metrics (such as materials quantified in tonnes) 
which would permit correlated systematic aggregation of all relevant resources such as costs, man-
hours and quantities and calculation of typical absolute performance parameters such as man-hours 
per tonne.  
The above papers reflect a situation dated by 20 years. Nevertheless, the situation is deemed to be 
currently valid apart from the fact that computer applications have developed enormously since 
then. Indeed, one might have expected that extension of computer capability would have facilitated 
structuring of the vast quantities of data generated as a natural consequence of the project 
administration processes.  
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An example of such a uniform data structuring system is the Standard Cost Coding System 
(NORSOK, 2003) prepared by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate in cooperation with two 
Norwegian oil companies, Norsk Hydro and Statoil. There are no equivalent systems in the UK or 
other sectors of the oil industry. The system consists of 3 code concepts, namely the PBS code 
(Physical Breakdown Structure), the SAB code (Standard Activity Breakdown) ands the COR code 
(Code of Resource) of which the PBS would code the type of work 8, the SAB 9 the major 
processes and the COR 10 the type of resource.  
It is generally presumed that the SCCS coding will provide a good basis for the gathering of 
experience data. The system, however, suffers from elements of inconsistency which, if applied 
unaltered, inhibit good correlation of performance and product, eg costs, man-hours and material 
resources. This inconsistency applies primarily to the correlation of materials and labour which do 
not have a matched breakdown structure. In addition the COR codes do not always align well with 
the SAB codes, such that process subdivision does not break down consistently when applied to 
engineering and construction processes and also cannot be applied with equal facility to all contract 
formats.11 The consequence is that some contractors have developed their own coding structures 
and some adhere in broad terms to the SCCS system. The lack of a standard coding system for 
reporting of experience data may result in duplication of systems, it inevitably increases costs and 
undermines experience exchange processes. The issue is compounded by the fact that experience 
data reporting structures do not align well with current monitoring and control practices, not to 
speak of the constantly changing structure of contract compensation formats. The metrics for the 
proposed data structuring system for modification work, put forward in this thesis, are built on the 
basic precepts of the SCCS, but changes have been necessary to eliminate the above shortcomings.  
The data structure is presented and reviewed in the succeeding chapters.  
An article published in a commercial trade paper which addresses the issue of absolute rather than 
relative metrics is Henning Flingtorp’s article titled Cost control using weight calculations 
(Original title Kostnadskontroll gjennom vektberegning) (Flingtorp,1999).  
Flingtorp describes a database system for weight estimating and project screening using building 
block principles and based on systematic collection and analysis of historical weight and 
performance data. He points to inadequate scope definition as a result of poor weight estimating 
practices as a major cause of project cost and schedule overruns. Flingtorp’s approach is to 
estimate the total project scope on the basis of the historical data and the early phase inputs rather 
than the simple sum of the specified components. A necessary foundation for such systems is 
access to a broad basis of systemised weight and performance data combined with the necessary 
expertise and insight to use the early phase design inputs in holistic combination with the historical 
data. 
The system will of necessity require a consistent and systematic breakdown of weight, man-hour 
use and costs in order to provide a basis for cross project comparison, but the paper gives no 
indication of the breakdown structure or the building block elements which comprise the system. It 
is accordingly not possible to assess whether the intermediate levels of aggregation will provide a 
suitable set of parameters by which to evaluate a projects performance holistically.     
                                                 
8 PBS (Physical Breakdown Structure): elements such as  topsides, substructure, pipelines, marine operations, etc 
9 SAB (Standard Activity Breakdown): Elemenst such as management, engineering, prefabrication, installation. etc  
10 COR (Code of Resource): Elements such as labour or materials by discipline and sub-discipline 
11 The SCCS aligns well with the conrtractual philosophy from early NS oil and gas projects which comprised an 
owner’s management team, a project service contractor which included engineering and long lead procurement and 
series of fabrication and installation contracts some of which also include elements of engineering. Other contact 
strategies do not fit equally well, amongst these the EPCI form of contract much used in modifications. A clearer 
generic basic structure applicable to all forms of contract with varying contents of management, engineering and 
fabrication would greatly facilitate processes of structuring of data.  
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It should be mentioned that Leese’s article Factorial estimating and the “Factest” system -
developed within ICI PLC (Leese, 1988) concerning estimating practices in the chemical industry 
also bases the system on analysis of historical data.  
The basic approach utilises 1) ratios of equipment costs to total costs sub-detailed by system and 2) 
cost ratios for major disciplines (such as piping) to total costs sub-detailed by system. The basis for 
this system is the detailed analysis of records from a considerable number of widely differing 
chemical plant projects. 
This system too will of necessity require a consistent breakdown of historical records. It should be 
noted that the equipment costs are defined by item (this is input derived from early process 
studies), while the associated discipline components are defined as cost ratios. This approach, in 
contrast to that of Flingtorp, provides no data for assessing performance in absolute terms such as 
man-hours per tonne, and is therefore not suitable for cross-project performance comparison. 
2.3.7 Knowledge management 
No papers were found that address applications of kmowledge management in the specific context 
of the issues addressed in this dissertation. As previously stated, vast quantities of data are 
generated as a natural consequence of the project administration processes, such as material 
administration, payroll administration, weight reporting, work planning and control and reporting 
processes. This data resource seems currently under-utilised in so far there is some consensus in the 
literature that data are often not available from previous projects due to the weakness of close-out 
procedures in many organisations. Data that will provide a sufficient basis for absolute comparison 
between projects in the form of performance measurement and benchmarking are normally 
accessible. The necessary small format realignments of existing registers in order to serve multiple 
needs represent a potential added value as well as efficiency savings to all parties concerned.  
2.3.8 Quality assessment of improvement processes  
To round off the discussion, it is appropriate at this point to briefly refer to Joyce Nilsson Orsini’s 
paper Trouble shooting your activities for excellence (Orsini, 2000). 
Orsini’s short paper focuses on four recurring weaknesses in the quality practices drawn from 
assessments of the quality efforts of 23 different companies in the USA. Of these the most 
important relate to process improvement. Orsini’s findings indicate that the ‘Study’ part of the 
Plan-Do-Study-Act cycle is often neglected in improvement processes. This is compounded by the 
pressure to ‘do something’ so prevalent in many organisations and often resulting in suboptimal 
quick fixes. Orsini’s findings also include system inconsistencies resulting in duplication and 
destructive internal competition between departments with uncoordinated procedures, amongst 
others.  
Orsini’s findings may be applied in a project context. In accordance with current practice the post 
project review cycle is either non-existent or takes a suboptimal form in that the project by itself 
conducts a review of own performance based on relative measures and subjective assessment of 
what went well or badly. The absence of absolute measures means that it is not possible to identify 
and focus areas of particular importance for performance evaluation. For example, firstly, whether 
the levels of performance were consistent with the specific characteristics of the project, and 
secondly, whether deviant performance such as a man-hour overrun for a particular process was the 
result of original underestimation, poor performance or altered circumstances ! No other outcome 
can be possible since absolute measures of project performance that relate process and product are 
not common practice in the industry. The result of such a review is passed on in the form of a 
report which the next project may or may not review as part of its own experience review start-up 
procedures (recommended good practise). There are often no organisational elements in place that 
participate in close-out reviews and analyse and recycle the results on a systematic long term multi-
project cycle basis. Although many organisations use some form of database for recording of 
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experience, there seems to be a general consensus that the database approach is not an unmitigated 
success story. 
It is incompatible with the projects task to also have responsibility for experience transfer and 
associated organisational learning processes. This may be seen as a system inconsistency. 
Other system inconsistencies are the source of conflicting sector interests and lack of coordination 
which leads to duplication of effort, causes confusion, increases cost and undermines commitment 
to experience exchange processes and the data gathering effort needed to support them. Amongst 
the effects of these sector interests will be found contract compensation formats and WBS 
structures that conflict with the requirements of performance measurement and thereby inhibit the 
application of performance measurement techniques in project control processes. 
2.4 Summary and conclusion 
In general it may be said that the incidence of articles concerning experience transfer, 
benchmarking techniques and performance measurement as a basis for improvement processes is 
much lower for projects than for manufacturing processes. This may simply reflect a perception of 
the project which is in line with the findings listed in the next paragraph, namely that such 
techniques are not considered appropriate in a project context.  
The review clearly indicates the existence of a body of research that perceives the shortcomings of 
the current one-approach-serves-all project management methodology to handle all types of 
projects Aspects of the project modus operandi that restrain learning processes to emerge from the 
review are: 
- standardisation of project management methodology  
- perception of non-commonality between projects 
- the short term goal oriented nature of project work  
- prevalence of relative measurement formats 
 
Consistent with the perspective of this thesis, the review clearly indicates that there is a body of 
research that endorses the adoption of performance measurement and benchmarking techniques as 
improvement routines in the management of projects. The important elements of a 
benchmarking/performance measurement approach as basis for improvement that emerge from the 
discussion are: 
-  measurement of own performance on an ongoing basis 
-  scope management through quantity and weight estimating and monitoring on an ongoing basis  
-  measurement formats that support performance comparison between projects 
-  measurement formats supportive of different sector interests  
- recycling of data in the short term (project trend analysis) and in the long term (experience 
transfer, close-out performance reviews, multi-cycle trend analysis, organisational learning) 
- routines for making tacit knowledge explicit  
- routines for experience transfer across the interface between the functional organisation and the 
project organisation  
- commitment of management 
 
These themes are reflected in the subject matter of this thesis and will be addressed in the 
following chapters.  
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3 DATA STRUCTURES AND METRICS  
 PRINCIPLES OF DATA STRUCTURING IN PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT OF MODIFICATION PROJECTS 
3.1 Introduction 
The discussion in the preceding chapters expressed the conviction that some form of standardised 
measuring system, capable of defining performance in the absolute terms (resource use in terms of 
the product of the work being performed), may provide an alternative (and holistic) basis for the 
central project control functions of estimating, risk evaluation, scope monitoring and forecasting. 
In addition, such a measuring system may be supportive of benchmarking practices aimed at longer 
term performance improvement by providing an objective basis for evaluating performance and 
identifying performance deviations as a point of departure for qualitative performance reviews.  
This chapter presents formats for defining and collating the weight, cost and man-hour elements 
that form the basis of the proposed data structuring system for collection of experience data for 
modification projects. These formats provide a basis for estimating methods, monitoring of scope 
quantity and complexity development and generalised use as reference for other project control 
purposes (WBS, contract compensation formats and reporting). 
The chapter also includes description of specific characteristics of modification projects arising 
from the metrics of the measurement formats and a case study demonstrating the nature of the 
performance reviews arising from performance deviations in the projects life cycle data.  
3.2 Data structures 
In the previous chapter it was noted that not one of the papers that were reviewed had presented 
any form of data structuring system for the recording of performance data. In the author’s view a 
representative data structuring system is an essential ingredient of any performance measurement 
system, and as an aid to understanding the follow-up discussion in the subsequent chapters, a brief 
summary of the proposed data structuring system will be presented here.   
The data structures are presented in a tabular format for convenience of overview. 
The breakdown structure is hierarchical and reflects an increasing degree of detail.  
3.3 Properties of the performance measurement data structure and metrics  
A system for performance measurement with benchmarking capability will need to:  
- take due account of the nature and characteristics of the individual project and at the same time 
have validity for a large range of projects of differing scope, size and complexity 
-  have a clearly understandable applicability to clearly identifiable activities in current industrial 
practise for the organising of project work  
-  have appropriate metrics for the activities to which the performance measurement applies 
-  be based on data generated in the course of current practices for planning and control    
- provide a structured multi-level hierarchical basis for analysis of performance deviation which 
enables identification of the source of the deviation (which will often be found in  project-
specific detail) 
 
This has been achieved in the proposed method by use of the following principles: 
- one-to-one correlation between cost, man-hour use and material quantities  
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- activity breakdown corresponding to current industrial  practice (in Norway this corresponds 
closely to the SCCS SAB 12, but some adaptations are deemed necessary to achieve a 
modification specific breakdown with wide applicability)  
- activity breakdown by discipline consistent across all activities (supplemented by sub-
discipline data)  
- material volumes (define project characteristics) expressed in consistent units (weight is used as 
a consistent basis in order to facilitate aggregations across discipline boundaries)  
- an appropriate degree of simplification to permit overview balanced with sufficient detail to 
adequately describe the core processes in all modification work  
 
The resulting set of parameters for performance measurement is illustrated in Table 3-1 below and 
is presented in a compact matrix format intentionally in order to provide an overall picture of all 
the essential core processes. This set of parameters in Table 3-1 provides a basis for performance 
measurement at several levels of aggregation, each parameter addressing core functions of 
relevance to overall project performance.13 
 
Table 3-1: Table of performance measurement parameters 
These core functions have been grouped by category in the matrix: 
-  Norms of performance at discipline level for each core activity 
-  Cost performance correlated with weight of installed materials (cost per tonne)  
-  Materials content defined by the discipline mix of materials (discipline percentage of total) 
-  Direct man-hour performance correlated with weight of installed materials (man-hour per 
tonne) 
-  Indirect man-hour performance correlated with direct man-hours supported (man-hour ratios) 
 
                                                 
12 Reference to the NORSOK Standard Z-104 Standard Cost Coding  System Standard Activity Breakdown 
13 Noting that the values in Table 3-1 are drawn from a range of projects, they do not always ‘add up’ as values from 
one specific project would. As examples the Discipline Balance value for Integration Offshore would be 51% if the 
above were values from a specific project and the sum of Labour and Materials MNOK/Tonne values would equal 
the Total MNOK/Tonne value. This may be checked by comparing with the values in Table 3-2. 
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Due to the variation in discipline mix, performance is best measured and compared at discipline 
level, which is facilitated in the above matrix. Considering the wide diversity of modification work, 
it may indeed be difficult at all to find projects that have a sufficiently similar discipline mix at all 
levels to permit realistic comparison at a total (project multi-discipline) level of aggregation. It is of 
course necessary to acquire some understanding of normal levels of performance as reference 
against which to judge performance, but the necessary diversity can be acquired by considering 
results from different projects at discipline level independently. 
The matrix of parameters has been simplified by incorporating indirect costs and subordinate 
activities, such as painting, within the scope of the relevant discipline. This simplification has been 
deemed necessary for the sake of overview and to reduce complexity.  
The picture of the modification process provided by the matrix, although still relatively complex in 
spite of the simplification, requires an additional degree of detail, namely the sub-discipline detail, 
which reflects the characteristic nature of the work scope of each discipline. As mentioned 
previously, the nature of the work scope can vary widely from project to project, both in terms of 
relative content at discipline level and at sub-discipline level. The sub-discipline detail is necessary 
and characteristic with regard to modification work in order to provide a complete basis for 
comparison and is likewise necessary when developing estimates. In the interest of overview, sub-
discipline detail will be addressed separately later in this chapter. The breakdown conforms 
hierarchically to the above set of parameters. 
The data presented are median values taken from a wide range of projects of all sizes. Median 
values have been chosen, rather than the normative practice of averaging, as they are less 
susceptible to the effects of extreme values in the records. It is however important to mention that 
the results of analysis of size effects has shown that the parameter values correlate with size of the 
project overall and with the size effects at discipline level which in turn are aggregate effects of the 
sub-discipline complexity. The values presented in the matrix are thus most representative of size-
wise mid-range projects.  
3.4 Cost, man-hour and weight summary 
The basic principle for structuring the data is 1:1:1 correlation of cost, man-hours and weight 
elements. This structure is reflected in the Cost, Man-hour and Weight Summary Table in Table  3-
2 below.  
The main products, core activities and main performance parameters are listed vertically in the 
column on the left. The remaining columns include the total and main discipline values. Note that 
painting and insulation and other smaller activities are aggregated into the main discipline elements 
in the interest of simplicity and overview.  
The parameters in italic text are the basic set of core performance measurement parameters used, a 
set of cost per tonne, man-hour per tonne, weight parameters at total and discipline level for each 
core activity and a corresponding set of weight distribution parameters. The parameters are derived 
directly from the cost man-hour and weight data in the respective columns in the tabulation. These 
core parameters correspond with Table 3-1 above and they are discussed in detail later in this 
chapter.  
The reference weight is the total installed weight that includes all new items, temporary 
installations and moved items. 
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Table 3-2: Cost, man-hour and weight summary table 
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3.5 Weight elements 
The weight data and the relationships between the various sub-elements define the characteristics 
of the concept under review. Thus weight monitoring procedures are essential during the study and 
the detailed engineering phases of the work as a basis for estimating, planning and project control 
(monitoring concept quantity and complexity development), and similarly for close-out data as 
basis for assessing actual performance in terms of the characteristics of the work performed and 
recycling as basis for estimating. For these project control purposes a greater degree of detail will 
be required than is normal with weight monitoring for purely technical purposes. The detail is 
necessary in order to define the complexity of the work and to register the many small items of low 
total weight, but which generate a large proportion of the offshore installation man-hours. The 
weight basis should also be updated more frequently, at least quarterly, during detailed engineering 
in order to ensure good trend lead time, and finalised at close-out. 
Principle weight breakdown structure: 
- Separate totals per module and for total offshore integration 
- Each module and total integration to be split by discipline  
- Each discipline item split into sub-discipline components 
-  Reference weight is total installed weight  
 
In addition identify: 
- Materials temporarily installed (Temp) 
- Materials moved (Move) 
- Materials demolished permanently (Perm Demol) 
- Dismantling for moving and removal of temporary installations (Temp; Move)  
- Material volumes subject to special installation methods such as hot work 
- Upgrading of equipment components in-situ (Revamp) 
- Basis for procurement (has relevance for New Permanent and Temp weights) 
 
The general formatting principles are illustrated in the tables below. The sub-discipline detail is 
particularly relevant with respect to defining the complexity of the offshore integration work.  
The reference weight for offshore installation is the total installed weight consisting of the new 
permanent, temporary, moved and revamped weight components and is used to calculate reference 
parameters at aggregate level such as overall engineering man-hour per tonne. Note that the 
tabulation also includes handled weight, which is used by many actors as a reference weight. 
Handled weight includes the weight of an article every time it is installed or removed. This means 
that temporary weights will be included once for installation and once for removal, or more often, 
should they be reinstalled in new locations. Handled weight has the disadvantage as a reference 
weight that the resource use per weight unit for both engineering and installation is generally much 
lower for demolition tonnage than installed tonnage. In circumstances with large demolition 
tonnage this practice leads to large distortions in the man-hours per tonne and cost per tonne 
parameters. This is particularly problematic regarding engineering, which is estimated either on the 
basis of man-hours per tonne or as a factor of the fabrication man-hours. The fact that demolition 
man-hours are often not distinguishable in the recorded expended man-hours aggravates the 
problem. This problem can easily be circumvented however, by registering and estimating 
demolition weights as separate items thus rendering them visible such that they can be taken into 
account when assessing performance and when estimating, in accordance with the cost, man-hour 
and weight breakdown structure shown in Table 3-2. 
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3.5.1 Discipline and product weight summary format 
A standard format for discipline and product related weight breakdown is shown in the table below. 
 
Table 3-3: Discipline and product weight summary table 
 
3.5.2 Sub-discipline weight summary formats 
Standard formats for sub-discipline breakdowns are presented in the tables below: 
Piping: Breakdown by material quality and size (diameter) preferably also split in piping/manual 
valves/instrument valves/pipe supports. See table below. Note that instrument valves are 
considered part of the piping discipline. 
Piping hot work: Definition of the installation methods, especially the extent of hot work, can be 
very important in defining norms of performance and assessing performance. This may be defined 
by a separate listing of the offshore hot work quantities defined by weight of the welded-in spools 
and grouped by material quality and by diameter.  
Piping Insulation/Painting: Definition of the insulation and painting volumes can be very 
important, particularly insulation of the integration piping that must be done in the field (offshore), 
due to the fact that insulation work is highly man-hour consuming and can have a large impact on 
offshore man-hour requirement if extensive insulation is required. This can be done by identifying 
the weight (or the length) of the lines to be insulated, preferably grouped by diameter. Painting can 
be handled in a similar manner. Engineering line numbers may be useful for isolating this 
information especially since many systems include a painting and insulation code in the line 
numbers.  
Normative practice in the industry is to measure painting, insulation and fire protection scope in 
weight terms at aggregated levels. The author regards this as little representative for the nature of 
the work to be performed and a poor basis for defining the performance in absolute terms such as 
man-hours per tonne, hence the proposals above for alternative units for measurement of insulation 
and painting for piping. The insulation of steelwork is not so easily resolved. 
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Table 3-4: Piping sub-discipline weight format 
Consistent with the principles of the product breakdown, separate tables should be prepared for 
piping in modules and integration piping. 
Separate tables for offshore hot work piping should be prepared.    
Steelwork  
The steelwork sub-discipline complexity is very important regarding the integration work offshore 
(structural reinforcement, field-erected support structures, etc). The man-hour norms (mhrs/tonne) 
are very sensitive with respect to the size of the individual items. This complexity can be defined 
by grouping the individual installation items by size (wt) and in accordance with the installation 
method (ie welded or bolted) and may advantageously be combined with installation engineering 
activities. 
The sub-discipline complexity is defined in the table below. 
 
Table 3-5: Steelwork sub-discipline weight format 
Separate tables should be prepared for steelwork in modules and integration steelwork. 
Separate tables should be prepared for integration hot work. 
The Weight Category breakdown is relevant to integration steelwork and is not required for module 
steelwork. 
Electrical and instrument bulk materials 
Electrical and Instrument bulk materials are in total a relatively small part of the total installed 
weight but include many small items of low weight, that are highly man-hour intensive. This is 
partly due to the small size of the items, but also a significant weightless component of work, such 
as termination and testing of cables. Having low overall total weight these items are often 
neglected in the technical weight estimation, but they are of great importance in weight estimation 
performed for project control purposes such as estimating and performance evaluation.  
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The sub-discipline complexity is defined in the tables below: 
 
Table 3-6: Instrument sub-discipline weight format 
 
 
Table 3-7: Electrical sub-discipline weight format 
Separate tables should be prepared for electrical and instrument work in modules and integration. 
Note instrument valves are normally included with the piping. 
 
Equipment 
The equipment sub-discipline breakdown follows the same pattern as the structural breakdown. 
 
Table 3-8: Equipment sub-discipline weight format 
Separate tables should be prepared for equipment in modules and integration equipment 
3.6 Cost and man-hour elements 
The breakdown shown in the Table 3-2, the cost, man-hour and weight summary table, is further 
detailed out by discipline and sub-activity in the cost and man-hour tabulations laid out below.  
The breakdown is generic, intending to reflect all the basic functions required to perform the work 
irrespective of the form of contract. It is presumed that the level of detail reflects the level of detail 
any project control system would require for adequate overview of the work and activities to be 
performed and that the data will be readily available from the weekly and monthly reports. 
The form of contract may impose hindrances regarding the type of information available such that 
information at detail level is not available in the specific format laid out in the tabulations. 
However, the objective is to produce a set of core performance parameters corresponding to the 
cost, man-hour and weight related parameters of Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 above, and this may be 
achievable by reporting at higher levels of aggregation than those shown in the tabulations. 
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3.7 Metrics of performance measurement  
3.7.1 Cost efficiency  
The aggregate effects of size on the cost performance parameters are illustrated in the Figure 
3-1 below. The overall Cost per Tonne values for an array of projects plotted on the left axis 
correlate with the Total Installed weight plotted on the right axis. Note that, consistent with  
 
Figure 3-1: Effect of scale on the cost per tonne performance parameters 
the scale effects commented earlier, small projects will generally exhibit higher values while 
large projects have lower values as can be seen referring to the trend lines EPCI Total Cost 
per Tonne and EPCI Labour Cost per Tonne. The range of the EPCI Total Cost per Tonne 
trend line, from highest to lowest, has an order of magnitude of +26/-22% with respect to the 
median value. It should be noted that although the trend is clear, there is considerable 
variation in the reference material of an order of magnitude of +50/-30%with respect to the 
median value, emphasising the importance of project specific characteristics in assessing 
performance and in preparing estimates.  
Cost performance is measured primarily in three cost per tonne parameters which reflect the 
cost per installed material unit (tonne) overall and with separate measures of labour content 
and materials content. Referring back to core parameters in Table 3.1 and the effects of scale 
in Figure 3.1 above: 
- Total excluding Operations is the Total EPCI Cost per Tonne excluding the client 
company’s management, logistics and marine operations costs.  
- Labour Cost is the EPCI Labour Cost per Tonne and includes the contributions of 
contractor management, engineering, fabrication and installation activities  
- Material Cost is the Total Cost per Tonne of installed materials both temporary and 
permanent 
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- System Cost is the Total Cost per Tonne referred to the weight of the system components 
(includes equipment, piping, electrical and instrument materials, but excludes steelwork) 
 
 
Figure 3-2: EPCI cost efficiency (cost per tonne) with split of labour and materials 
For performance comparison purposes materials cost will reflect the nature and complexity of 
the concept and is to a large extent outside the influence of the contractor, often dictated by 
the characteristics of the reservoir, often by LCC 14 considerations, often by sheer weight 
considerations. Labour cost, however will reflect the efficiency with which the scope of work 
has been executed and directly reflects the technical competence and the organisational skills 
of the contractor (performance) as well as the complexity of the work itself. Variation 
between labour cost and materials cost elements at the highest order of aggregation for the 
total project (EPCI Total Cost per Tonne) is illustrated in the diagram above (Figure 3-2) in 
the form of a stacked bar chart (note that Total is the sum of Labour and Material Cost). 
Noting the large variation in the height of the bars for both material cost and labour cost, it is 
apparent that both material cost and labour cost parameters should be taken into account when 
assessing overall performance because overall aggregation may mask the relative 
contributions of material cost and labour performance. The variation is relatable to several 
factors, the discipline mix, the complexity of the individual discipline, the size of the project 
and the circumstances of execution of the work.  
In addition to labour and material cost-per-tonne parameters, Table 3-1 includes the System 
Cost parameter, which is measured only at overall project level. System cost is intended to 
provide a measure of the overall cost per tonne required to install the operative systems. 
System cost is accordingly measured as overall cost/system weight 15 and provides a high 
level measure of the efficiency of the installation solution adopted for the project, for instance 
integration solutions compared to modularised solutions. The System cost per tonne has been 
plotted in to Figure 3-1 above (green trend line) and can be seen to increase with overall size. 
This parameter may also provide a basis for comparison of greenfield work with modification 
work. Greenfield work is generally considered more cost effective than modification work, 
but this may be due to inconsistent use of metrics to evaluate relative costs. It is sufficient to 
                                                 
14 Life Cycle Cost considerations may often dictate the use of high grade materials to offset corrosion 
preventative maintenance even in circumstances where the medium is not particularly corrosive. This is an 
added consideration in circumstances where high strength and the elimination of corrosion allowances is 
advantageous from a sheer weight saving point of view.  
15 System weight is the weight of equipment and piping, electrical and instrument bulk but excludes steelwork. 
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point to projects that have elected to refit as a cost-effective alternative to module installation 
or installation of a new jacket to support new equipment. Examples of such projects can be 
found in the data. 
The parameter Total including Operations covers both the EPCI cost and the costs covered by 
the client company for owner management, logistics, heavy lifting services, flotel services, 
marine operations and other costs outside the EPCI scope of responsibility. It is necessary to 
keep these costs separate and evaluate them separately due to the large project-to-project  
variation, especially regarding flotel and heavy lift costs, since these costs will be relatively 
higher for smaller projects when compared to the overall cost. These items could be excluded 
for greater consistency, but important cost elements would then be excluded from the cost 
picture. Since there is no advantage in taking averages for these costs items as a group, better 
then to include all the cost items, but accept to evaluate them on a case specific basis.  
3.7.2 Discipline balance 
Discipline balance is a measure of the mix of material content unique to the project, defined 
by the breakdown by discipline of the total weight that constitutes the scope of work. In 
addition, the scope of work breakdown includes two essential sub-elements, specifically the 
quantity of materials built into modules and the quantity of integration materials. This 
differentiation is particularly important as an aid to structuring the material, man-hour and 
cost content to achieve correct correlation between man-hours and materials particularly with 
regard to the offshore integration scope of work. If the integration man-hour content is not 
carefully correlated with the integration material content, the resulting performance parameter 
will be completely non-representative. Similarly, with regard to onshore fabrication, if 
materials and man-hours for fabrication of modules and fabrication of components for piece-
small integration offshore respectively, are not registered  separately, it will not be possible to 
extract accurate and meaningful measures of performance from the data.  One might expect 
that project control requirements would naturally result in a product based follow-up, but such 
is apparently not the case judging by the frequency with which poorly structured data are 
encountered in practice. Accordingly one might ponder how it is then possible to maintain an 
adequate level of project control over these two important material streams.  
It has been found convenient to define modules as pre-assemblies of such a weight and size as 
to require heavy lifting services for offshore load-in. Correspondingly all integration materials 
are defined as lift-able by platform cranes, of which the bulk integration materials are the 
most important as they determine the offshore man-hour volume.  
Both concept cost and labour cost will be influenced by the mix of materials in the scope of 
work, for which reason the ‘discipline balance’ has been included as an essential reference 
parameter. The reason for this will become apparent when comparing the relative size of the 
cost per tonne parameters for the different disciplines in Table 3-1 above. As an example 
consider a project with a high content of steelwork where the low material cost of steel will 
reduce the overall cost per tonne, when compared with a project with low steel content. 
Clearly, direct comparison at project level of aggregation will be potentially misleading as a 
measure of performance if the mix of materials is not taken into account. Refer to Figure 3-3 
below for an illustration of the variability of the material mix in a selection of modification 
projects. The projects are not aligned in any particular order. 
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Figure 3-3: Discipline balance - Percentage distribution of total installed weight   
Considerations of discipline balance may explain why modularisation is often considered 
more cost efficient than in-situ construction as a consequence of the higher overall content of 
steel in the concept, resulting in an overall lower cost per tonne if measured at high order of 
aggregation only. In reality the modularised concept will incur much extra cost on the extra 
steelwork labour content onshore and incur a penalty cost for heavy lifting services. The 
result is that the total cost per tonne for installation of the revenue earning processing 
equipment and bulk materials may be of the same order of magnitude as for wholly integrated 
solutions. This effect can be observed in the plot of the System Cost per Tonne trend line in 
Figure 3-1 which increases with size consistent with the increase in steelwork content due to 
the cost of the steelwork but not the weight of the steelwok being included in the parameter 
calculation. Modules are seldom self-contained and contain a high proportion of equipment, 
which is normally relatively cheap to install in terms of labour cost per tonne. Thus the main 
advantage of modularisation lies in the provision of new area for installation of new 
equipment and it may indeed provide the only solution on congested platforms. Examples can 
be given of projects which have discovered the advantages of optimising the degree of 
modularisation with respect to integration. In one case involving a floating production 
platform, weight limitations led to layout optimisation studies and it was found possible to 
reduce long two-way loops of large diameter heavy wall pipe and break up the single large 
module originally planned. This reduced superfluous structural weight and led to a reduction 
in the amount of offshore piping integration in addition to the reduced material costs, but 
unfortunately cost an additional year of development studies. Two separate cases involving 
congested jackets where the base case was the installation of a new bridge-connected jacket, 
were optimised to a fully integrated solution in the one case and a small piggy-back module 
with extensive integration in the other.  
High steel content may also explain why greenfield work is considered more cost effective 
than modification work, due to the distorting effects of extra steelwork required for new 
construction, if not accounted for in the parameters used for comparative purposes.  
Cost performance parameters at discipline level thus permit performance comparison where 
comparison at project level would be misleading or irrelevant due to unequal weighting of 
discipline content overall. Considering the high degree of variation in modification work, 
breakdown by discipline provides a broader range of experience data for analysis, comparison 
and estimating purposes, because data by discipline can be interchanged between projects. In 
this way the discipline cost parameters can also provide a rough basis for estimating, given 
that reasonably accurate material quantities are available for each discipline.  In the parameter 
table (Table 3-1) median cost per tonne parameters for the primary disciplines, equipment (all 
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disciplines), and the bulk material disciplines piping, electrical, instrumentation and steelwork 
illustrate this point.  
It should be noted that differences in the material mix at sub-discipline level will need to be 
taken into account when evaluating performance at discipline level in a similar fashion to 
comparing performance at project level.  
While material mix effects will apply directly to material costs, effect on labour performance 
costs can also be considered in the man-hour performance context of production efficiency.  
3.7.3 Weight modelling  
Records of the discipline weights and the mix of disciplines defined by the discipline balance 
can also be used to support early studies. For example, to provide a basis for building models 
for weight estimating of bulk quantities on the basis of equipment content, or modelling the 
effects in early conceptual studies of different installation scenarios by the sizing of module 
and integration content.  
The chart below, Figure 3-4, is a plot of the relationship between the main discipline balance 
elements from Table 3-1, the equipment content (trend line B), the system bulk (piping, 
electrical and instrument bulk) content (trend line C) and the steelwork content (trend line D), 
with respect to the total installed weight. The source data, the actual weights from the array of 
projects, have been included in order to illustrate the variance underlying the trend lines. Note 
that the dark columns denote modularised projects and the light denote integrated projects. 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Discipline weight ratio trend lines for modifications 
From the chart it can be inferred that the equipment content and the related system bulk 
content decreases with increasing size while the steelwork content increases. The trend lines 
from these weight ratios can be used for purposes of modelling bulk materials in early phase 
conceptual estimating by using the equipment weight (trend line A) as input value.  
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Alternatively, the ratios of Equipment and System bulk weight (piping+electro 
bulk+instrument bulk) and the Steelwork and System Total (equipment +piping+elektro bulk 
+instr bulk) may be used for modelling bulk weights. The Equipment/System Bulk ratio 
(E/Bs) is relatively flat but increases with size indicating that the E/Bs parameter may be 
influenced by the peripheral location of the modules. Individual values vary considerably 
about the median of 77%, particularly regarding the smaller projects, ranging from P10 at 
41% to P90 at 108%. The ratio of piping, electrical bulk and instrument bulk is relatively 
stable and may be used to define the discipline content of the system bulk content.  
The steelwork content increases with total size and for the larger projects is related to 
modularisation content. The effects of modularisation are thus incorporated in the weight 
ratios and the cost per tonne parameters with sufficient accuracy for early studies with low 
degree of definition. Thus it is really only useful to model modularisation when the equipment 
block layouts provide a basis for modelling module content on the basis of well known 
discipline factors from greenfield work. Integration content follows from the total installed 
weights defined on the basis of the above chart by subtraction.  
It is important to remember that weight, man-hour and cost data should be collected 
separately by module since modules may have variable discipline content and will be 
sensitive to effects of scale.  
3.7.4 Production efficiency  
The activities included in the matrix of Table 3-1 are considered to be the core activities 
comprising modification work. Performance in these major project execution activities is 
measured in man-hours per tonne, with the exception of Management: 
- Management (defined as comprising all management and administration activities 
including procurement and planning)  
- Engineering (defined as direct and multi-discipline engineering activities including field 
support) 
- Prefabrication (defined as workshop fabrication onshore of materials for integration 
offshore that can be lifted by platform crane – ref. integration below) 
- Module/pre-assembly (defined as fabrication and assembly of modules and large pre-
assemblies for installation offshore by external lift vessel) 
- Integration (defined as comprising all piece-small installation items that can be lifted by 
platform crane)  
- System Testing (initial part of Commissioning activity)  
 
The metric for all activities (with the exception of management) is man-hours per tonne and 
the activities are split by discipline consistent with the cost parameters above. Man-hour 
performance comparisons contribute to explaining deviations in cost performance, which may 
be related to deviation in one or all of the core functions overall or in individual disciplines. 
The use of directly measured man-hours per tonne for offshore integration work contrasts 
with the normative estimating practise in many organisations of applying offshore factors to 
norms of performance derived from onshore module construction. The approach above 
reflects conditions in the field (offshore) directly, thereby avoiding the use of offshore factors 
which are, at best, subjective  judgements.  Similarly, prefabrication performance and module 
fabrication performance are measured directly and can be used directly, in contrast to 
normative practice which is to split onshore module fabrication norms into two components, 
fabrication and erection. The prefabrication norm components are applied to both 
prefabrication for integration and prefabrication of module sub-elements prior to erection at a 
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separate site. This mixing of material streams is unfortunate since the products of the work, 
which have very different control requirements, are obscured.   
Another consideration supporting the use of direct measurement in the field is the difference 
in method of installation applied to offshore work. Offshore work relies to a greater and 
greater extent on bolted type connections while onshore module fabrication relies on welded 
construction, and the norms of performance are significantly different. For these reasons one 
may perhaps be excused for assuming that organisations that use offshore factors for 
estimating do not actively measure performance on an ongoing basis.  
The activity split between Prefabrication and Module construction requires explanation as it 
reflects the general construction logic employed in the industry, but not necessarily the 
monitoring logic reflected in the WBS structures of many projects. The chosen split is 
necessary in order that the calculated parameters accurately reflect the actual man-hour and 
tonnage relationship relevant to the activity. Thus it is important that the quantity of materials 
installed respectively as integrated or in one or several modules should be separated into 
separate entities and correlated with the actual man-hours required to perform the work on 
each item.   
The prefabrication activity concerns only the materials to be installed (integrated) offshore 
piece-small (hook-up and tie-in infrastructure) and includes onshore workshop fabrication of 
primarily piping spools, steelwork components and sub-assemblies and, though to a much 
lesser degree, small multi-discipline skids. All are presumed optimised size-wise suitable for 
installation offshore by platform crane and in order to minimise platform erection man-hours. 
The breakdown will naturally include a size gradation of appropriately sized sub-assemblies 
which is reflected in the sub-discipline breakdown formats shown earlier in this chapter. In 
contrast, the module/pre-assembly activity reflects both the fabrication and assembly 
activities of module construction, the module being loaded in offshore as a complete unit. 
But as mentioned earlier, it is by no means given that separate treatment of these two very 
different material streams will be set up naturally as a logical consequence of the project 
control requirements. Of course this is not a problem where there are no modules to consider, 
as is the case with the majority of modification projects. 
Figures 3-5 and 3-6 illustrate the performance parameter variations for steelwork engineering 
and offshore integration, plotted as man-hours/tonne for engineering and integration activities.  
The integration production efficiency is measured in terms of integration weights while 
engineering efficiency is measured in terms of the total installed weights, which will include 
module weights if relevant, due to the difficulty of separating module engineering effort from 
the overall engineering scope. As mentioned previously the values in Table 3-1 are median 
values in contrast to averaging, which is the normal practice for deriving a norm from a 
dataset. Examination of the charts in Figures 3-5 and 3-6 indicates a high degree of variance 
with respect to the median. Note that the medians can be seen in the charts on the extreme left 
hand. These norms have not been arranged in any particular order and at first sight one might 
assume that variance represents a performance variability applicable to any modification 
project. In fact, though the performance span is almost always relatable to the sub-discipline 
character of the work, there is a significant degree of scale effect present in the data sets. 
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Figure 3-5: Performance variation steelwork engineering  
 
Figure 3-6: Performance variation offshore integration steelwork 
In order to demonstrate this phenomenon of scale effect, the man-hour/tonne norm data from 
Figures  3-5 and 3-6, which have not been sorted in any particular order (but are in the same 
sequence in both charts), have been re-arranged in the chart in Figure 3-7 below. The man-
hour/tonne values (left axis) have been correlated with the corresponding total integration 
weights (right axis) for each project in the array. This correlation permits sorting by size, 
which brings to light this effect of scale. Note that the Engineering man-hour/tonne trend line 
lies very close to the integration man-hour/tonne trend line; accordingly, the integration trend 
line has been drawn as a dotted line.   
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Figure 3-7: Integration steelwork effects of scale 
Several interesting size-related properties can be read from the chart. First, the marked effect 
of size on the norms can be seen in the trend lines. Second, there is a large variance of the 
actual performance values with respect to the trend lines. Third, the ratio of prefabrication to 
integration increases with size (the larger the project the greater the prefabrication content). 
This property has also been plotted into Figure 3-6. Fourth the ratio of the engineering norm 
to fabrication is also stable, at least for wholly integrated projects. Note that fabrication is the 
sum of the prefabrication and integration. This property has also been plotted into Figure 3-5. 
All the parameters from Table 3-1 may be used to compare norms. It follows that effects of 
size must be taken into account when judging expected levels of performance. Equally, it 
follows that the normative practice of using averages or medians for deriving norms for 
estimating from a dataset is an unreliable practice. It must be stressed that the effects of scale 
demonstrate a trend that complexity increases inversely proportional to size, but finally it is 
the sub-discipline complexity that should be considered if a suitable level of detail is 
available.  
Here again the treatment of modularisation requires special mention. Engineering of modules 
cannot effectively be isolated from the engineering of the integration work so that the quantity 
relation is based on the total installed quantities including both module and integration work. 
The natural consequence of this is that modularised projects generally exhibit a lower man-
hour/tonne value for engineering overall and for steelwork overall, but not necessarily the 
other disciplines. In Figure 3-7 only the integration weights have been shown in the interest of 
simplicity. This implies an inaccuracy regarding the plot of integration norms and 
prefabrication norms for the modularised projects on the right hand side of the array. The 
inaccuracy has little overall effect on the trend lines. This aspect will be discussed later in 
section 3.8 in this chapter, in relation to dealing with the sub-discipline complexity.   
Since the sub-discipline characteristics of the individual projects in the above array are 
known, it can be stated that the variance of the source data about the trend lines can, in several 
cases, be linked to the sub-discipline character of the work. Sub-discipline considerations will 
be handled in detail later in this chapter. Some cases can however be linked back to 
inefficiencies arising out of execution circumstances, in some cases inefficiencies can be 
linked to organisational issues and in some cases several effects are in play. 
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Similar weight related effects of size, with the exception of the piping discipline, can be found 
throughout the parameters in Table 3-1 as can be observed in the charts for each discipline 
that have been laid out in Figure 3-13 at the end of the chapter. The piping discipline has, 
however, weight related scale effects coupled to diameter, the man-hour per tonne norms of 
performance decreasing with increasing diameter. But the material cost driver seems to be the 
material content, the materials cost per tonne increasing with increasing content of high grade 
steel in the material mix. The scale effects are not as marked for piping as the other 
disciplines. More detailed discussion is referred to the later sections of this chapter dealing 
with sub-discipline complexity.     
3.7.5 Man-hour ratios 
Management  
Weight metrics are not considered suitable for activities such as project management and 
administration because they are only indirectly related to the quantities of materials embodied 
in the works. These activities, being supervisory in nature, are accordingly measured as a 
function of the labour man-hour volume in the measurable activities (ie are based on 
quantities of materials or some other physical production). In practice it is often convenient to 
measure Project Administration cost as a function of Total EPCI labour Cost as shown in the 
Chart below, Figure 3-7. In a similar manner the Company Management is more markedly 
influenced by the effects of scale, which is understandable in view of the fact that Company 
Management is not supervisory, being rather more functional in nature. It will be found that 
the Contractors Preliminary/Facility costs display similar trends since they have a large 
component of man-hour related overhead costs.  
 
 
Figure 3-8: Management and administration cost - effects of scale 
Indirect Production Support 
The volume of indirect production support man-hours, being only indirectly related to the 
material quantities, is similarly measured as a function of the volume of the direct man-hours 
supported. However, the indirect volumes, while displaying a high variance, appear largely 
independent of scale effects 
Engineering Effort 
Man-hour ratio parameters relating engineering effort to production effort and onshore 
prefabrication effort to total fabrication effort, have been included in the charts of Figure 3-4 
and 3-5 shown on the right axis. The same effects can be seen in the relationships between the 
trend lines in Figure 3-6 as described above. The reason for showing these properties is the 
fact that many actors often estimate engineering effort as a simple factor of fabrication effort 
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(prefabrication + integration) most likely based on averages. Judging by the steelwork trend 
lines, this relationship appears stable and confirms this approach to be reasonably reliable, at 
least regarding fully integrated projects, given that the fabrication effort is correctly judged in 
the first instance. However, the factor is normally applied at multi-discipline level. 
Considerations of the high variability of discipline mix in modification projects suggest that 
engineering effort should be evaluated on a discipline basis.  
Prefabrication for Integration 
Prefabrication for integration of steelwork is seen from the steelwork curve to be very 
sensitive to size. This same effect is not apparent in piping where the effects of scale are 
manifest as sensitivity to diameter which appears to be the dominant factor influencing norms.  
Prefabrication may relate to integration as a measure of performance due both to the 
complexity of the work situation and the nature of the work. For instance, access conditions 
may limit the size of sub-assemblies that can be handled, thereby forcing a greater degree of 
on-site erection, which naturally limits the degree of prefabrication possible. Or the nature of 
the scope may entail large quantities of small items, or structural strengthening requiring 
welded construction, both of which require much in-situ work and are not conducive to 
extensive prefabrication. The ratio of prefabrication to integration is a useful post hoc 
measure of performance, but unfortunately such influences are difficult to identify in advance.   
Normative practice for deriving norms is often based on onshore module fabrication norms 
assuming a fixed split between the onshore prefabrication part and the offshore erection part 
of the work. Offshore factors are then applied to the erection part. This approach does not, 
however, pick up the size effects manifest in the trend patterns and is at best relevant to larger 
prefabrication items. In addition it must be added that the nature of the work is decidedly 
different now compared to some years ago, considering the preference for bolted construction 
in contrast to onshore module fabrication which will naturally utilise welded construction. 
These effects will change the balance between prefabrication activities and erection activities. 
An added complication is the subjective nature of the offshore factors, which are presumably 
derived by comparison of offshore erection man-hours per tonne with onshore erection man-
hours per tonne. This approach must surely be subject to the same general shortcomings 
mentioned above. 
Field measurement of actual man-hours correlated with actual installed quantities avoids all 
the above pitfalls and is a perfectly feasible alternative approach requiring no extra effort 
beyond the correlation of information already available within the project registers.   
3.7.6 Conclusion regarding the metrics of performance measurement 
The set of performance measurement parameters defined in Table 3-1 provides a basis for 
measurement of each core activity and each discipline separately in absolute terms of resource 
use correlated with properties of the products. For direct activities this takes the form of 
weight and man-hours. For indirect activities this takes the form of man-hour ratios related 
back to the core weight related activities. Consistent units permit multidiscipline hierarchic 
aggregation. The curves demonstrate that the metrics are sufficiently detailed to demonstrate 
adequately the existence, magnitude and location of performance deviations, but not 
necessarily to explain the reason for such performance deviations, be they positive or 
negative.  
The nature of modification work is such that there may, in the individual project, exist special 
aspects at sub-discipline level that are related to concept complexity and that override the 
generalised basis of taking averages or medians and even trending with respect to size. This 
can be seen from the variance about the trend lines even after the effects of scale, which are 
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themselves aggregate effects of sub-discipline complexity, have been taken into account. For 
this reason insight into the effects of sub-discipline complexity can be very useful.  In the 
following section hierachical sub-discipline detailing downwards in consistent metrics and 
essential characteristics that are definitive for performance will be discussed.  
3.8 Sub-discipline complexity 
Comparisons at discipline level need to be supported by sub-discipline data with which to 
qualify and, if needed, quantify performance measured at discipline level. This is consistent 
with and similar to the way in which discipline level information qualifies performance 
measurement at project level. Generally three levels of detail, the overall level, the discipline 
level and the sub-discipline level will be required to fully analyse the performance of any 
given project quantitatively. To exemplify, the values of the parameters at overall project 
(multi-discipline) level are determined largely by the relative weightings of the discipline 
material content. Similarly the parameter values for any one discipline will be largely 
determined by the complexity and material mix at sub-discipline level. To exemplify, 
consider the effects of impact of a high content of large bore pipe on the discipline 
characteristics compared with a high content of small bore piping. 
 In so far as changes in sub-discipline complexity will influence the man-hour requirements, 
without any corresponding overall weight change, project control would benefit by 
monitoring of sub-discipline complexity, as a supplement to overall weight change. This is 
particularly relevant in the period of detailed engineering during which significant detail that 
may affect the resource requirements will be defined. This applies particularly to structural 
steel details resulting from detailed installation planning. These details often include many 
small items of low total weight, but that require high installation man-hours. Instrument and 
electrical detail is often underestimated in studies due to the low overall weight impact, but 
also here detail requires high installation man-hours. This lack of focus on items of low 
weight that require high installation man-hours is probably a consequence of weight 
monitoring generally not being a feature of the project control practices, while traditional 
weight estimating practices have a technical focus that tends to regard small low weight items 
as negligible.   
Considerations of sub-discipline complexity may explain, on an intuitive basis, the effects of 
scale. It follows on a general basis that the smaller the overall weight of the work concerned, 
the larger the content of small items. Since small items are more man-hour demanding than 
large items, the aggregate effect will be higher norms. Small projects may nevertheless 
consist of a few large items or a multitude of small items, with the resulting variance about 
the mean value defined by a size-related trend line. Similar considerations apply to large 
projects which may include a large component of small items with resulting high 
prefabrication and integration man-hour requirements. 
It would follow from the above that measurement of performance should take place at a 
greater level of detail than the discipline level, in order to provide the basis for norms of 
performance at discipline level. However, a comprehensive measuring system that includes 
both weight and man-hours at sub-discipline levels of detail requires rigour and discipline 
with regard to data recording. Thus, while it is impractical to institute such a level of detail in 
every project, it may be done from time to time, given willingness in the organisations 
concerned. It remains however to decide on an appropriate level of detail.  Norm sets at 
considerable detail exist, for instance Page (Page, 1991), and are extensively used for the 
purposes of man-hour estimating at detailed planning task level, such as cutting, grinding, 
bevelling, welding or bolting of individual items. Such a level of detailing is only available as 
a result of detailed engineering and the norms are of no use for early phase estimating when 
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such detail is not yet available. And it is practically impossible, in the course of ordinary 
project work, to initiate measurement of actual man-hours at such a level of detail.  
In practice, the level of detail defined in the sub-discipline weight formats presented in this 
chapter has been found appropriate with regard to the information available from early studies 
and reasonable with regard to the level of information that can be extracted from project data 
with an acceptable degree of accuracy. Even with the fairly low degree of detailing chosen, it 
is by no means sure that actual man-hours will be available at the same level of detail from 
every project. But it is sufficient if this can be done from time to time, as was done in the 
studies on which this work is based. Given that some performance data at the same degree of 
detail exists, much can be achieved by monitoring man-hour data at discipline level while 
collecting weight data at sub-discipline level in order to provide the necessary insight into 
sub-discipline complexity. Some organisations practice the use of control objects in detail 
registers to facilitate the tracking of steelwork sub-assemblies and piping spools. These items 
individually often form the basis of single job-card task used in the detail planning and 
against which actual progress and planned and actual man-hours are reported. This potentially 
provides a means to measure performance on a more regular basis at a sub-discipline level 
equivalent to the sub-discipline formats shown earlier in this chapter particularly if single 
discipline task formats are used.  
Collection of weight data at sub-discipline level is easily done, using sorting tools built into 
modern PC software and supplemented by an appropriate coding system. Good discipline, 
regarding coding, from the very start while building up the weight registers will promote 
quality, efficiency and usability. 
3.8.1 Principles of sub-discipline breakdown 
Closer examination of the sub-discipline weight tables reveals two types of elements in the 
breakdown structures, ‘type of material’ on the vertical axis and ‘component weight’ on the 
horizontal axis. Both these types of elements will be found in other breakdown structures such 
as SCCS and Page,  but neither provide a matrix type breakdown incorporating both size and 
type elements, unless on a very detailed basis. For early phase estimating extreme detail is 
unusable16. For collection of experience data on a general basis extreme detail is impractical, 
17 although it is theoretically possible to aggregate up to appropriate levels of detail for early 
phase estimating and performance measurement. In a project context the detail work orders 
are estimated on the basis of detailed norm sets like Page but ‘actual man-hours’ as a 
performance measurement metric will only normally be available for the work order as a 
whole. These job cards are a useful measuring point since they are also used to measure 
earned value. For modifications, job-cards are most often system-related and of a limited size 
consisting of discrete items such as a single equipment component, a steelwork element such 
as a foundation or a ladder, a single pipe spool or short run of pipe in the same system, a run 
of cable, and so on. This provides a very convenient basis for defining the content in terms of 
both size and type of work as well as planned and actual man-hours for each task sheet and at 
an appropriate level of aggregation in a manner consistent with current industrial practice. 
However, some organisations prefer to operate with fewer multi-discipline packages as 
control objects. Such an approach would naturally render the whole process more difficult to 
follow through. 
In the introduction it was stated that weight was used as a basic unit of measurement since it 
permits hierarchical aggregations in consistent units. In a weight context size considerations 
translate generally into weight categories. 
                                                 
16 At early stages of concept development information at equivalent levels of detail is not yet defined. 
17 It is impractical and inconsistent with current industrial practice to measure man-hours at such levels of detail. 
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Modification work is very variable and some idea of the sub-discipline complexity is 
necessary in order to understand the performance and to be able to estimate. However, some 
degree of aggregation is obviously necessary not to drown in detail while studies must be able 
to deliver a similar degree of detailing for estimating purposes. These complementary 
requirements are deemed satisfied in the sub-discipline breakdown formats presented in this 
study. 
3.8.2 Steelwork sub-discipline   
To elaborate in the interests of clarity, consider steelwork. Greenfield topsides estimating 
practices normally consider only three classes (ie types) of steel work, primary, secondary and 
outfitting, where the physical differentiation is primarily the size of the cross-section. 
Modification work on the other hand may consist of several subcomponents of very different 
size (weight category) and type and in addition may include other items such as the 
strengthening of existing structures, and temporary installations such as landing platforms, 
skid-beams and lifting aids. Modification also includes demolition of both temporary and 
permanent works as well as seafastenings that may have come on board in modules. A 
consequence of this is that the size elements are of greater significance than type elements in 
defining the offshore man-hour requirements. 
A complicating aspect is the fact that demolition is seldom defined on separate job-cards and 
demolition man-hours are accordingly included in the integration man-hours for each 
category. Demolition quantities need to be registered in order to have a measure of the total 
volume of such work, both for estimating purposes and for performance evaluation.   
Analysis of job-cards indicates, as might be expected, a strong effect of size on norms of 
performance, but also provides a measure of man-hours per tonne of the different size 
categories. A plot of the results of such an analysis is shown in the chart Figure 3-9 below, 
where the norms of performance are plotted as lines on the left axis while the columns plotted 
against the right axis show the size range distribution by weight category.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     
 
It is easy to see a parallel in the shape of the man-hour per tonne norm curves to the effects of 
scale shown in the previous chart, Figure 3-6, the effects of scale at discipline level. The 
aggregated value from the array on the right axis aligns with the value corresponding to 
discipline total weight in the Figure 3-9 chart above. Given that the component of small 
steelwork, as an example, showed signs of growth, this would be a variation and a signal that 
Figure 3-9: Steelwork sub-discipline weight breakdown and norms of performance 
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considerations of sub-discipline complexity justify a need for more man-hours. Knowing that 
it is in the detailed engineering that most of the small items are defined, this makes a case for 
monitoring sub-discipline complexity as part of the project control scope monitoring effort. 
Illustrative of the order of magnitude effects of small items in the total scope, the case 
depicted in Figure 3-6 where the small items require up to 50 % of the total integration man-
hours while comprising only 10% of the total installed weight, are not untypical. 
The size element is reflected in the weight categories in the breakdown formats for steel work 
while the type of work is reflected in the primary/secondary/outfitting categorisation similar 
to the greenfield breakdown, where the modification specific categories, such as temporary 
installation aids are also included. It has been found that the size category is the most 
significant but it also appears, at first sight, to be the most difficult to isolate. This is due to 
the fact that the sub-assemblies installed offshore are generally not defined in the MTO 
registers as discrete items, but rather as individual subcomponents prior to prefabrication. 
However, most modification studies include an installation study, part of which is to 
determine the optimal degree of prefabricated sub-assemblies consistent with minimising the 
number of offshore man-hours. Such studies naturally define the sub-assemblies, and it is a 
very natural step to further define each sub-assembly as a control object for controlling the 
production process in terms of drawings, materials control, task sheets, prefabrication 
progress, offshore delivery times and the like. In spite of this, and due to the lack of such 
routines, it remains a problem to define the weight and category of the individual sub-
assemblies from the MTOs. This may be a consequence of the normative project control 
practices of using standard man-hours that disregard the nature of the work. 
This process of identifying steelwork sub-assemblies within different size categories is 
consistent with the principle of separating large modules from integration work and an added 
differentiation of the nature of the integration work.   
Noting that the man-hour per tonne norms of performance associated with the low weight per 
item categories are very high, it is appropriate to mention that ‘weightless work’ will naturally 
tend to accumulate in the lowest weight category, which provides an extra component 
apparently inflating the small category norms. In this way high norms function as a sort of 
contingency for the type of small work that inevitably turns up in the field, but is seldom 
defined on the drawings. This sort of work is conceptually equivalent to the ‘small bore’ and 
‘bolts, nuts and gaskets’ type of allowances applied to piping weight estimates and suggests 
that implementation of similar practices in weight estimating of integration steelwork may be 
appropriate.  
3.8.3 Equipment sub-discipline format 
The discipline sub-division of equipment falls naturally into a weight categorisation similar to 
steelwork. The assumption here is that the norm covers installation and alignment of the 
equipment items while hook-up to piping, electro and instrument bulks is covered by the 
piping, instrument and electro disciplines. For equipment items delivered as skids all the 
multidiscipline elements in the skids are considered part of the equipment package.  
The Master Equipment Lists (MEL) produced as standard documents in all studies provide a 
natural supplement of sub-discipline detail since they include detail such as weight, size and 
cost for each equipment item making it an easy matter to define the weight categories and 
type categories in the sub-discipline weight breakdown table. Note that the type categorisation 
has been reduced to a categorisation by discipline since the type categorisation in coding 
systems such as the SCCS provides no intermediary levels of aggregation. For all practical 
purposes discipline-based type categorisation can be ignored for the purposes of assessing 
installation man-hours per tonne.  
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From the equipment cost per tonne and man-hour per tonne plots in Figure 3.13 it can be 
observed that also the equipment is sensitive to effects of scale in aggregation with regard to 
both material and labour costs. Care should be observed regarding use of the trend line for 
assessing equipment material costs due to large variation in cost per tonne for different types 
of equipment, particularly regarding small items.    
Under normal circumstances priced equipment lists will be produced by the engineering 
disciplines based on either own in-house data or quotes from vendors. For estimating 
purposes this source is normally the best information available. As has been pointed out 
earlier, the overall cost of materials may be controlled by project specific circumstances to the 
effect that materials costs and labour costs should be evaluated separately. 
3.8.4 Piping sub-discipline format   
Piping sub-discipline breakdown falls into a somewhat special category using both type and 
weight categorisation, but which is nevertheless suitable for differentiation using weight 
metrics. The traditional approach to piping in detail codes, such as Page, has always been to 
subdivide in accordance with diameter, wall thickness and material quality. This approach has 
been maintained in the sub-discipline weight formats presented here, but the split is at a 
higher order of aggregation into piping, valves (both manual and instrument) and pipe 
supports and expressed in weight metrics for the convenience of hierarchical multi-discipline 
aggregation.  
Typical sub-discipline diameter related norms derived from job-card analysis for carbon steel 
piping, are shown plotted as lines (hot work uppermost) against the left axis in the chart in 
Figure  3-10 below. The columns plotted against the right axis define the size profile for any 
particular project under consideration in terms of weight per diameter category split into 
piping and valves. The project depicted in the figure is seen to have rather high valve content. 
 
Figure 3-10: Piping sub-discipline weight breakdown and norms of performance 
Comparison of the sub-discipline piping norm curves (Figure 3-10 above) with the discipline 
based scale effects curves in Figure 3-13 indicates similar trends, although the trend line is 
much flatter. Note that in contrast to the equipment, steelwork, electrical and instrument bulk, 
plots of piping man-hour per tonne and cost per tonne norms show no marked effects of scale 
with regard to discipline weight. In fact the content of high grade steel in the material mix is 
seen to be the cost driver for both materials and labour, but the curves are very flat. And 
indeed the diameter seems to be the man-hour driver exhibiting marked trends that are not 
visible in equivalent cost per tonne curves. These low effects of scale may be due to the 
particular multi-variate nature of the piping work scope. The piping work scope consists of a 
highly variable content of piping and valves, different material mixes, different degrees of hot 
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and cold installation methods, and so on , all of which have strong effect on the norms so that 
the effects of one property may cancel the effects of other properties. Typically bolted 
installation methods are more efficient than welded construction in terms of man-hours per 
tonne, both direct and indirect, so that high valve content may cancel the effects of welded 
construction. Bolting of piping spools will tend to lower the overall man-hour per tonne 
norms both in terms of pure efficiency, but also as a result of the increased weight per spool, 
due to the flanging. In a similar manner considering cost per tonne, high valve content will 
increase material cost per tonne while lowering labour cost, due to bolting. High grade steels 
will increase material costs per tonne even more not only as a consequence of the higher 
material cost, but also as a consequence of the lower weight for equivalent units. It can be 
seen that piping is a very complex discipline and it is probable that these multi-variate effects 
tend to mask any effects of size that might intuitively be expected, judging on the basis of the 
piping norm curves in Figure 3-10 above. Alternatively, it may be argued that there is no 
particular reason why piping should have a scale effect similar to that of steelwork since 
spools sizes are primarily limited by length with respect to diameter and secondarily by such 
considerations as access conditions and local complexity. In other words the distribution of 
size elements for piping, such as spool sizes, may be physically limited in a way that 
disciplines such as steelwork sub-assemblies and equipment are not.  
Examination of the performance norms for individual projects reveals nevertheless that 
projects with certain special characteristics can be identified in the array of reference projects. 
Particularly large diameter piping is visible due to low norms. This specific effect may be 
observed directly in the man-hour per tonne piping charts in Figure 3-13. Several projects 
have low values relatable to large diameter or high content of straight run piping when judged 
on the basis of the norms of Figure 3-10; however with the notable exception of some known 
underperformers. This effect is also observable in the aggregated EPCI cost per tonne charts 
Figure 4-3 and 4-4 in the next chapter (referring to the projects labelled C). These particular 
projects are characterised by a large content of large diameter piping.   
It is thus to some extent possible to isolate projects on the basis of known characteristics such 
as large diameter versus small diameter, or hot work versus cold work, or high or low valve 
content, or carbon steel versus high grade steels, using medians or averages as a basis for 
expected levels of performance. However, in order to be reliable, since the above categories 
are by no means clear cut, this approach requires sub-discipline data from a broad array of 
reference projects and must be used with care. It follows that for piping in particular, 
discipline aggregate norms derived on the basis of sub-discipline detail are more dependable 
than norms derived from effects of averaging or the effects of scale.  
It should be noted that the man-hours for painting and insulation have been included in the 
norms on which the curves of Fig 3-13 are based but not the curves of Fig 3-10. Insulation in 
particular may require high offshore man-hours, depending on the volume of insulation, and 
is an additional item in the multi-variate nature of piping work that should be taken into 
account. Thus it is important to verify the volume of insulation requirements specifically 
rather than uncritical use of average-based factors. 
In the same way as mentioned above in connection with the steelwork section, the inevitable 
weightless field work elements that are seldom defined on drawings, tend to inflate the small 
work actual performance norms and thereby act as a buffer for this type of work in the 
estimates. In this category the man-hour effects of insulation work may be included. 
3.8.5 Electrical and instrument bulk materials sub-discipline format 
Electrical and instrument work is characterised by the ‘type’ subdivision of elements rather 
than size consisting of a mixed bag of electrical and instrument subcomponents, supports, 
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cabinets, cables and trays, penetrations, instrument tubing, and so on. Included is also a not 
insignificant weightless component of work in the form of the termination and testing of 
cables and on occasion control room upgrades. Rather it may be said that all components are 
of small size, falling into a single weight category when compared to the weight categories 
adopted for equipment and steelwork, and accordingly have low overall weight. The 
exception here is cable that has a variable length-related dimension, in addition to the number 
of cores that will strongly influence the termination requirements. The net effect of the low 
weight is a high man-hour per tonne norm, so much so that many regard the use of weight 
metrics as inappropriate for these disciplines, preferring the use of signals as a metric. This 
alternative approach is not without validity, but, as has been stated previously, weight metrics 
permit hierarchical aggregation in consistent units like no other metrics. As long as weight 
metrics provide a reasonable measure of performance, they may however be used, if that 
provides overriding advantages. To judge by the effects of scale plots though, referring to 
charts in Figure 3-13, the instrument and electrical bulk norms for engineering and integration 
display an equivalent degree of consistency, when compared to other disciplines, even though 
they are perhaps even more multivariate than piping.  
There is no reason why weight metrics may not be supplemented by alternative metrics that 
are more appropriate for use as more precise measurement units, but as yet none have been 
found that perform adequately in all phases of work. Indeed, where this is possible, it is 
recommended to establish alternative metrics that more characteristically express the nature of 
the work, such as number, length, and so on, for all disciplines, not only the instrument and 
electrical disciplines. Success with the use of sub-discipline norm and weight data will in any 
event depend on due diligence being exercised in registering of all the subcomponents in the 
scope of work and more or less irrespective of the metrics used. And as discussed previously 
all items must be registered in the MTOs for purposes of procurement, making it a relatively 
easy matter to generate weights estimates and appropriate categorisation automatically. That 
the total weights of the small electrical and instrument components do not enjoy the same 
attention as steelwork, equipment and piping, may be due to the fact that they are of little 
consequence for structural loadings and stability considerations, hence of small impact on the 
technical weight monitoring for structural and stability purposes. 
Instrument valves are often included in the instrument weight for the reason that they are 
generally specified by the instrument engineering discipline, in spite of the fact that the valves 
are normally physically installed as part of the piping discipline scope of work. This 
convention is not used here for two reasons, firstly, the wish for correlation of material scope 
with labour scope 18 and secondly, due to the disproportionate ratio of the valve weights with 
respect to the instrument bulk materials. Elaborating, instrument valves are primarily part of 
the work scope of the piping discipline both in terms of engineering and in terms of 
installation, although there is a component of instrument engineering to be taken into account. 
More important, especially with regard to representative metrics, is that the weight of the 
valves, being approximately tenfold that of the instrument bulk, normally dominates so totally 
that resulting norms would be entirely without meaning for the instrument bulk part of the 
work. Regarding the valve installation part of the work, the bulk instrument man-hours would 
normally be much higher than the valve work scope alone, to the effect that the resulting 
norm is also non-representative for the valve work scope. This point may be illustrated by 
comparing the relative size of the median piping  and instrument man-hour per tonne norm 
shown in the parameter table, Table 3-1.Better then to define instrument valves as piping, 
accepting a small inaccuracy regarding instrument engineering, and noting the need to ensure 
that instrument valve costs are included in the piping material costs. 
                                                 
18 Consistent with the principles for data structuring outlined in paragraph 3.3 
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Both electrical and instrument work exhibit marked effects of scale and a large variance, 
which, with respect to the trend line, is greater for the smaller projects. The effect of scale 
may be attributable to the nature of the work in smaller projects, which often include 
revamping, short cable runs and larger termination and testing content. Control room 
upgrades are another form of weightless work that may contribute to the high variance, 
particularly with regard to larger projects. Also the extent to which cabling can be installed on 
existing trays, is another common factor contributing to the large variance.  
3.8.6 Summary of sub-discipline effects 
Given the obvious difficulties and uncertainties associated with sub-discipline complexities, it 
remains to ask what the gains are that justify the data gathering effort.  
It is presumably clear from the discussion in the above sections that knowledge of sub-
discipline complexity helps towards better understanding of the nature of the work to be 
performed and hence better estimating of man-hours required. Particularly so offshore, which 
is important considering the time-wise constraints of available beds, manning limitations in a 
production environment, general manpower density related efficiency effects and the added 
costs associated with offshore personnel logistics, particularly if flotell support is required. 
Dynamic tracking of the complexity changes that may occur as consequence of detailed 
engineering provides a picture of the total man-hour requirement, which may be used to test 
established scope assumptions. The formats for sub-discipline structuring described above 
provide a suitable intermediate level of aggregation for estimates of this nature. 
Since all offshore work is controlled under job-cards which include a definition of materials, 
it is theoretically possible to compare the quantities already installed to the man-hour 
performance as a basis for judging performance in a manner that takes into account the 
specific nature of the work. It follows that the basis for predicting the remaining man-hours 
can then be based on the nature of the work to be performed in a similar manner. This is more 
precise than the standard man-hour approach of simple extrapolation of past performance into 
the future on the basis of earned versus actual man-hours and irrespective of the nature of the 
future work.  
This approach of defining the scope in terms of sub-discipline components and characteristics 
echoes the practices defined by Clark and Lorenzoni in their work on process plant 
construction (Clark, Lorenzoni, 1985) and is discussed in more detail later in Chapter 5.  
3.9 Some results of quantitative and qualitative performance review 
The ultimate purpose of performance measurement is the improvement of project execution 
methods both in the short term, the lifetime of a project, and in the long term, experience 
transfer between projects and to future projects. This ambition cannot be achieved solely by 
quantitative analysis of performance, but must also be supported by qualitative identification 
of the causes of any given result such as the physical installation methods, organisational 
structures or administrative methods adopted by the individual project. The quantitative 
measurements can, however, be used to guide a process of review that investigates the sources 
of deviations from expected results as an experience transfer process, a process akin to 
benchmarking. This approach may be used at all stages of a project execution, transferring 
experience by benchmarking from the base organisation to the project during execution and 
vice-versa after close-out. In this way many experiences from the project will already have 
been formulated (made explicit) before close-out thereby resolving some of the problematic 
issues related to experience transfer in projects after close-out when many key personnel have 
already remobilised on new projects.    
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A case study will serve to illustrate the procedure which entails tracking the development 
history of selected performance parameters through the whole life cycle right from early 
estimates and evaluating performance at regular intervals against planned or anticipated 
performance. This is of course superficially similar to project control practices based on 
relative performance measurement, but in addition evaluates the effect of material quantities 
and work complexity development on the man-hour needs. This is by no means common 
practice.  
A project life cycle analysis 
The main features of the case study are laid out in Figure 3-11 below, which brings together 
the reported weight, and labour and materials costs from the project baselines, for purposes of 
comparison and analysis.  
A major anomaly can be noted by comparing the growth history of the materials costs, the 
labour costs and the weight development curve. The labour cost forecast (the upper section of 
the stacked bar) increases from the target cost value (TC) at each base-line update (BL1, BL2, 
BL3, BL4) throughout the project life cycle and including the final close-out value (CO), in 
successive large increments for the full project duration (14/ 90/195/148/49). In total this 
makes up 56% growth with respect to the TC, but only 22% with respect to the Study 
estimate. In contrast the material cost increments (the lower section of the stacked bar) flatten 
out early after only 33% of the duration (140/49/18/0/49). In total this makes 68% with 
respect to the TC, but only 30% with respect to the Study estimate. In contrast to the cost 
development, the reported weight curve (W1) increases by 17% and only 6% with respect to 
the TC and the Study estimates respectively. Note the lack of correspondence between the 
weight profile and the cost profile, particularly the initial decrease from Study to TC and the 
marked jump (3031 to 3824 tonnes) at BL3 (50% duration). The jump is reflected in the 
labour cost growth at BL3 and BL4 but is not reflected in the material cost development 
profile. How is this to be interpreted ?  
 
Figure 3-11: Case Study - Cost and weight life cycle development 
The materials cost prediction was 82% of the final value within the first BL period ! At the 
same point in time the labour cost prediction was only 65% of the final value. The material 
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costs are directly MTO related implying that the MTO basis for a good weight estimate was 
available, but was not worked into the weight estimates until they were updated at BL3 for the 
first time since award of contract. This effect is illustrated in the curves W2 and L1 on the 
chart. The curve L1 is based on a reconstructed labour cost prognosis based on the materials 
cost development profile and close-out (CO) values and illustrates a hypothetical total cost 
prognosis profile.  
Comparison with the tops of the bars illustrates the labour prognosis shortfall. The curve W2 
indicates the equivalent reconstructed weight development curve, meaning the weight content 
equivalent to the estimate value. Comparison with the reported weight curve W1 illustrates 
the weight shortfall. Noting that the reconstructed labour cost and weight development curves 
have markedly different profiles from the reported profiles, it may be deduced that the project 
was in possession of the correct weight data, but apparently made no use of the information in 
setting up labour cost prognoses.  
The materials cost growth is unlikely to have provided any signals to the project since this is 
not a monitoring point in normative practice. Had a properly updated weight estimate been 
used as basis for updating the estimates, a labour estimate would most likely have achieved a 
similar degree of accuracy and the project would have received an early warning of potential 
overruns already at BL1. It is certain that weight estimates were not the basis for the labour 
estimates since the project at no time used weight tracking as a basis for project control. This 
was established by informal communication with project personnel.  
It is evident that the methods used to update the labour estimate were not particularly 
accurate. That the project lacked a reliable basis for estimating resource requirements is 
evident from the chart below, Figure 3-12 that illustrates piping life cycle man-hour and 
weight development. The most striking feature is the continuous rise in piping engineering 
man-hour forecasts throughout the project life cycle; in contrast the piping weight estimates 
are relatively stable. A normative level of performance would be about 270000 man-hours 
corresponding roughly to the prognosis at BL3. Thus a weight based estimate would have 
indicated from the start that that the engineering resources were too low. One can only 
presume that such methods were not used.  
 
Figure 3-12: Case Study - Piping man-hour and weight life cycle development 
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The low manning stems from the fact that the contractor severely underestimated the resource 
requirements initially, but subsequently refrained from resourcing adequately up-front due to 
the low target cost. As can be seen from the diagram, the contractor continually increased 
manning, but evidently too little too late, presumably lacking a good basis for estimating 
likely resource requirements19. As a result the project was perpetually behind schedule on 
piping engineering with resulting stress on all downstream activities. This had a marked effect 
on the overall efficiency, which was well below comparative work.  
The overall root cause may be traced to the contractors’ belief that their design would result in 
a significant weight saving compared to the existing concept. This is reflected in the low 
weight and cost of the Target Cost (TC). As can be seen from the chart, this was achieved, at 
least regarding the module piping, but not for the integration piping, which is a major cost 
driver. However, this implied the possible need for some front-end conceptual re-engineering 
for which the target cost had obviously not been resourced. Yet it appears that no special 
action was taken to ensure adequate resourcing up front and to mitigate the negative effects of 
quantity and complexity changes.  
There is more to this case, but as this case is discussed in more detail in Appendix 1: Case 
Study 1, it is sufficient for the time being to point to the anomalous ‘roller coaster’ shape of 
the Integration Man-hour curve when compared to the flat weight development histogram in 
Figure 3-12.  
This case provides an argument for the use of weight development monitoring as a basis for 
project control during detailed engineering in line with the Clark and Lorenzoni BOQ update 
procedure. Weight monitoring would in this case have provided useful project control 
insights, even in the absence of a broad base of reference data on which to base labour 
estimates. Given the large discrepancy between the study estimate and the contractors target 
estimate (TC), in terms of both weight and cost, one might have expected that the owner’s 
team would have been on the lookout for discrepancies in the project basis and would have 
initiated mitigative action. One might perhaps be justified in concluding that the overall 
underperformance is largely an organisational issue.  
Finally, it is interesting (and symptomatic ?) to note that although the poor engineering 
progress and low engineering manning was well known in the project, this problem had not 
been addressed in the experience reports.  
3.10 Conclusion   
The discussion in this chapter has described the basis for the breakdown structure and metrics 
chosen for modification work. Further, some of the characteristics of modification works 
derived from analysis of data from several projects have been presented. Amongst others, the 
high degree of variance of both project characteristics and levels of performance has validated 
the high degree of detail in the data formats for performance measurement of modification 
projects presented in this thesis. 
The set of performance measurement parameters defined in Table 3-1, some of which are 
illustrated in the charts of Figures 3-13, 3-14 and 3-15, and supplemented by sub-discipline 
weight information, provides a measurement point for each core activity and each discipline 
separately. The breakdown is sufficiently detailed to demonstrate adequately the existence, 
                                                 
19 Since it is known that the contractor’s in-house base organisation has fully adequate estimating competence, 
this suggests rather that the lack of insight was limited to the contractor’s project organisation and the nature 
of the methods for forecasting used in the project. This in turn raises issues of an organisational nature such as 
communication between the contractor’s base organisation and the contractor’s project organisation, which 
apply equally to the operator’s project team. 
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magnitude and location of performance deviations with respect to median industrial levels of 
performance, but not necessarily to explain the reason for such performance deviations, be 
they positive or negative. Insight provided by the supplementary sub-discipline weight detail 
provides additional information regarding the specific nature of individual project complexity 
and may contribute to explanation of specific levels of performance that deviate from the 
trend patterns. 
There remains however a residual element of performance deviation that often cannot be 
explained in terms of product characteristics as such, and that may be related more to the 
project execution circumstances and how they might affect the levels of performance, such as 
the drop in efficiency often associated with overrun circumstances. Depending on the order of 
magnitude of the deviation, the identification of expected levels of performance using sub-
discipline characteristics may assist in identifying the presence of such effects in the recorded 
performance data. 
The case study and procedure presented briefly in section 3.8 demonstrates that quantitative 
performance measurement processes can support qualitative enquiry and that the breakdown 
structures and metrics presented here are of sufficient sensitivity to expose significant detail 
that may otherwise not come to light using other methods. This is due to the fact that the 
analyses are based on historical data recorded at regular intervals during the project life cycle 
that may highlight a pattern of performance deviations over time that supports enquiry as to 
the qualitative nature of observed performance deviations. 
The discussion above is primarily directed at the evaluation of performance in relation to the 
selected breakdown structure and associated metrics. However, considerations of estimation 
also feature in the discussion which is logical in so far as estimation is based on the correct 
assessment of product characteristics and appreciation of the normative levels of performance 
achieved by the industry. Equally, estimation processes need to take into account the range of 
variability in the product characteristics, and the variability in levels of performance 
attributable to properties of the product, or to the circumstances of execution.  
The above conclusions point to applications of the performance measurement approach to 
project control with regard to estimating, assessment of risk and benchmarking practices 
aimed at long term improvement processes. These applications will be addressed in the 
following chapters. 
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4 PROJECT CONTROL APPLICATIONS/ESTIMATING 
THE APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES AND METHODS BASED ON PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN PROJECT 
CONTROL OF MODIFICATION PROJECTS  
4.1 Introduction 
The term ‘project control’ contains an ambiguity, namely an ambiguity of understanding that 
exists between the terms ‘project control’ and ‘project management’.  
For the general purposes of this discussion, the term project management may be understood 
to mean the administration of the processes whereby a concept is first developed to an 
acceptable level of technical, constructible, economic and social feasibility for sanctioning 
(planning phase), and thereafter constructed and brought into operation within the planned 
constraints (execution phase). 23 
In a likewise manner, the term project control may be seen as the quantitative and qualitative 
processes concerned with establishing measurable baselines by which to verify that the 
project during the execution phase conforms to the resource framework, established during 
the project planning phase and which is the basis for sanction. Project control functions may 
be involved in both the establishing of baselines through processes of estimation and 
controlling of conformance/deviation during execution through monitoring and reporting 
processes. On this basis, project control activities are essentially processes of measurement, 
estimation and planning, followed by successive cycles of re-measurement, re-estimation and 
re-planning. These processes naturally include corrections for any deficiencies that may exist 
in the original planning basis, as well as the problems associated with the logistics of 
execution that inevitably arise, in order that the project satisfies the initial overall technical, 
economic and social  objectives related to its conception. The project control function is thus 
a central project management support activity and project control methods are central project 
management tools, among which estimating methods are central to project control success. 
Unfortunately, experience has shown that the project control methods have not always been 
successful in providing early warning to management of impending overruns thus inhibiting 
the effectiveness of mitigating action due simply to lack of time to assess alternatives. This 
thesis contends that this deficiency is largely due to the absence of formal estimating 
processes from the standard array of project control tools normally applied in the execution 
phase. The case study summary presented in the previous chapter has demonstrated the 
manner in which formal measurement functions (monitoring of scope development) as a basis 
for re-estimation might have provided the project team with the necessary insight to predict at 
an early stage the necessary resource basis for efficient execution.  
By what standards should performance be judged ? 
Project success is normally measured with reference to the success with which the project 
object as such is in fact executed within the planned constraints, normally expressed as within 
schedule, under budget and in conformance with the specified quality. This is a fairly narrow 
view, though traditional and highly within the project control domain. In the oil and gas 
industry however, conforming to schedule normally has the greater priority, even if this is 
often achieved at a cost to efficiency. The cost to efficiency is a consequence of suboptimal 
manning levels, overtime and multi-shifting in addition to other problems such as rework. In 
the case of modification projects, this may also take the form of hire of expensive offshore 
accommodation rigs, or the extension of planned shutdowns, resulting in the postponement of 
                                                 
23 Many authors wish to extend the range of the project management function to include the operational phase. 
As the tools and methods addressed in this thesis only have applicability in the planning and execution phases, 
the operational phase will not be a matter of any consideration in this thesis. 
 72
revenue. On the other hand project success may be judged with reference to the success with 
which the project meets the longer term overall economic and social objectives for which it 
was originally conceived. Oil price development has normally ensured that projects seldom 
result in a loss. 
Estimating as a project control function has applications from the earliest conceptual 
evaluations and as long as conceptual development is still taking place, and even during the 
detailed engineering phase. Conventional wisdom, or in any rate current practice, seems to 
judge otherwise since high aggregate estimating methods used prior to project sanction, are 
normally discontinued during the execution phase.  
4.2 Other project control applications - holistic relations  
The use of a standardised generic format as a reference for structuring of data may benefit 
project control practices on a wider basis than the narrow performance measurement and 
estimating context with which data structuring formats are often associated. The major reason 
for this is naturally that the use of similar data structures for contract compensation formats 
facilitates the use of historical norms of performance to support other project control 
activities. Thus, wishing to promote ease of use of performance data, it should be borne in 
mind that the structures of the compensation formats dominate reporting requirements to a 
large extent and often irrespective of other administration requirements that may be included 
in contracts.  
Experience shows that many projects do not see the need to consider the performance 
measurement reporting requirements when establishing the project control basis because these 
are seen as relevant only for close-out data. This view is compounded by the general lack of 
understanding regarding the role of estimation processes as project control tools.     
The following aspects and activities are relevant to consider. As mentioned in the 
introduction, most of these activities fall into the category of estimating processes in one way 
or another:  
Compensation Formats and Performance Incentives 
The performance measurement perspective suggests that compensation formats should be 
structured to facilitate project control processes that focus on quantities and related resource 
use. Production efficiency incentives should be aligned in a consistent fashion. The 
production efficiency incentives may take the form of man-hours per tonne per discipline 
corresponding to the core activities in Table 3-1. The basis for compensation is adjustable on 
a measurable basis while historical performance data provides a basis for verification of 
realism in the performance goals. Target costs may thus be based on the assumed final 
weights of the concept as defined in terms of Table 3-3 and be adjustable on the basis of final 
measured quantities. This ensures alignment between committed contract values and the 
project control basis.  
A disadvantage regarding committed norms of performance as incentives, is the need to 
consider that changes in the sub-discipline complexity as a result of concept development may 
effect the committed norms. To this end some form of definition of the sub-discipline basis 
for the norms will be required, for which purpose the sub-discipline weight Tables 3-4, 3-5, 3-
6, 3-7 and 3-8 have a suitable degree of detailing. 
A particular aspect of a weight based approach is the concept of changes that do not result in 
weight or complexity changes. 
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Evaluation of  Tenders 
The performance measurement perspective provides a basis for verification, normalisation 
and sensitivity evaluation of tenders using standard methods of estimating that seek to predict 
the final value of the tenders and quantify performance risk. For the sake of consistency the 
tenders should be evaluated and aligned with the project’s internal budget estimates as a basis 
for verification and ranking, thereby simultaneously eliminating the need for separate bid 
check estimates. Such processes would be facilitated by the consistent structuring of 
compensation formats on a generic basis, as mentioned above. 
It follows that for ease of overview, highly detailed quantity definitions should be avoided. 
The breakdown structure of Table 3-3, supplemented by detail equivalent to Tables 3-4 to 3-8, 
is considered adequately detailed. One disadvantage associated with highly detailed quantity 
definitions is the inability to quantify undefined weights at such an early stage of concept 
development. These undefined weights often have the character of small complex items that 
are defined during the course of detailed engineering and the resulting norms are non-
representative of the final work scope while the contract value is often too low by a large 
margin.   
Project Control Reporting and Forecasting  
Universal formats focus core activities appropriate for detail monitoring of ongoing project 
work at levels of detail corresponding to Tables 3-9 and 3-10 but hierarchically consistent 
with above data structure and set of core parameters and ensure good alignment between the 
project control basis, the contract reporting formats and the historical experience data.  
This facilitates verification of the commitment frame ie high order verification of contractor 
baselines that are based on detailed estimating methods, by the use of weight monitoring and 
estimating as detailed engineering progresses. 
Universal formats that focus core processes and key products and roll-up forecasts into 
formats such as presented in Figures 3-13, 3-14 and 3-15 facilitate communication between 
project controllers and project management and client and contractor organisations. 
In the longer term: 
Effectiveness of Forms of Contract and Asessment of General Performance 
Effectiveness of different compensation formats and forms of contact may be gauged by 
analysis of close-out results with regard to final and tender production efficiencies. In view of 
the tendency for project contract formats to change regularly, an underlying standardised 
performance measurement format may facilitate comparison of different contractual 
instruments. Unfortunately, a preference for the inclusion of Lump Sum elements as 
incentives and risk mitigaters, also tends to prevent the acquisition of performance data unless 
the matter is specifically addressed. 
 
Consistent structuring of data for the purposes of performance measurement and comparison 
has already been discussed in the preceding chapter. Ways in which comparison and analysis 
of performance deviations may facilitate investigation into the qualitative causes underlying 
poor or good performance will be examined in a Chapter 6.  
4.3 Estimating applications 
The discourse so far has focused on performance measurement as a basis for performance 
evaluation and improvement processes. The estimating processes as such have only been 
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briefly or indirectly addressed in the discussion on metrics in the previous chapter, regarding 
the characteristics of modification work that were highlighted as intrinsic elements of the 
estimating process. 
Estimating processes based on performance measurement are essentially a reversal of the 
performance evaluation perspective, but the estimating perspective is a central consideration 
when deciding the measurement breakdown structure. The question of ‘what to measure’ may 
be answered by considering the task of the estimator and the nature of the development 
processes through which a concept is brought to maturity by engineering study. In other 
words, the performance data derived from measurement programs must be applicable to the 
information that can be drawn from the conceptual studies. This may at first sight seem 
obvious. However, monitoring of quantities does not have a central role in normative project 
control practices compared to the monitoring of resource use such as man-hours and cost, and 
is thus not readily available. In the absence of quantity or weight data to correlate with 
resource use, the resource data are of little value to an estimator. Formats for collection of 
data must, accordingly, be set up specifically with this purpose in mind. In this light, the 
introductory statement seems somewhat less obvious.   
Beyond this, the breakdown structure must be generic in order to have validity for as broad a 
range as possible of types of modification projects, all types of execution strategies and 
contact formats and over a lengthy time period. Such a breakdown structure is a prerequisite 
for a broad and representative base of data which can be used with any confidence. 
The breakdown structure proposed by this study and already described in detail in the 
preceding sections, is deemed to have these qualities.  
4.3.1 Synthetic estimating methods 
In much of the reference literature (Clark, Lorenzoni, 1985; Granli, Hetland, Rolstadås, 1986; 
Leese, 1988; Rolstadås, 2001; Westney, 1985), reference is made to relational and factor 
estimating techniques based on extrapolations from past projects of the form COST =A*S^n 
where A is some constant dependent on the character of the facilities in question and S is 
some characteristic property such as size or capacity of the facility to be estimated. These 
techniques are intended for use in very early conceptual evaluations of greenfield projects. 
There is accordingly some general expectation that methods of the above character also may 
be applied to estimating of early phase modification concepts. Normally, however, it is not a 
practical proposition to estimate modification concepts on the basis of capacity due to the 
highly diverse nature of the work, and which normally includes only parts of a facility or 
system and seldom whole facilities or systems. Estimating techniques have normally focused 
on tonnage by factor estimating of discipline weights, possibly split as module or integration 
work, on the basis of total equipment weights, which are the first quantifiable data available 
from a new concept evaluation. Analysis of experience data has focused these relationships. 
Cost per tonne or more detailed norms (mhr/tonne, cost/mhr, etc) may then be used to prepare 
estimates. Estimating at total project level of aggregation is not considered accurate enough, 
especially considering the very small additional amount of work required to work at discipline 
level. It is nevertheless of interest, in a general and in a quantitative benchmarking context, to 
investigate the cost-weight relationship of the above format. 
To this end the relationships between 1) total cost and equipment weight, 2) total cost and 
total installed weight, 3) total cost per tonne and equipment weight and 4) total cost per tonne 
and total installed weight have been investigated, based on the selection of projects in the 
experience data portfolio. Note that the company management, logistics and marine 
operations costs are not included in the cost or the cost per tonne parameters. The results are 
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presented in the Figures 4-1, 4-2, 4-3 and 4-4 below, respectively. The charts include trend 
curves from Excel trend analysis functions, 
 
Figure 4-1: Total installation cost vs equipment weight 
 
Figure 4-2:  Total installation cost vs total installed weight 
It is evident from the charts that the deviation from the trend functions is substantial both for 
the equipment relation and the total installed weight relation as well as for large and small 
projects. For the sake of clarity, note that the charts on the right expand the range of the small 
projects. 
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Figure 4-3: Total installation cost per tonne vs. equipment weight 
 
Figure 4-4: Total installation cost per tonne vs. total installed weight 
As with the cost-weight charts, the data do not fit the trend functions particularly well, but in 
the cost per tonne cases it can also be seen that the trend functions exhibit a marked scale 
effect. The potential margin of error of estimates made on the above charts may be judged by 
the deviation of the reference data from the trend lines. As can be seen from the charts, the 
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margin of error is best defined on the cost per tonne based charts and largest for the small 
projects.  
The large deviations from the trend lines have various contributory causes, primarily the 
particular nature of the work (such as the relative content and character of each discipline) and 
the particular executional and organisational circumstances (such as the case study of chapter 
3) affecting the execution of the work, sometimes both.  
To illustrate the above for qualitative benchmarking purposes, it should be noted that most of 
the projects above the trend lines (labelled A) are projects that did not perform optimally for 
various reasons. In some of the cases, the concepts were immature requiring scope 
development in the detailed engineering phase and suboptimal work flow as a result. In some, 
suboptimal work flow was a consequence of schedule stress arising from external 
circumstances beyond the control of the project. In some suboptimal work flow was the 
consequence of internal dispositions in the project. In several cases, however, higher costs 
were simply a consequence of the discipline mix, but in others also associated with sub-
discipline functional requirements, such as the use of high cost materials, or equipment of a 
special character. Similarly, the projects below the trend line (labelled B, C and D) have 
specific qualities. The C projects are all large diameter or simple straight run carbon steel 
piping with low valve content and low equipment content of unsophisticated character. The B 
projects are of normal complexity, but were all executed under an advantageous labour cost 
regime. The D project is not in fact a modification project at all, but a single topsides jacket-
mounted module used as a calibration and benchmarking reference project for large module 
modification projects with low integration content. In addition, application of corrections for 
known properties of the individual cases may be considered. For example, the three A cases  
in the midrange from 2000 T to 4000 T, are higher than normal partly due to sub-optimal 
performance, but also partly due to high cost per tonne high-grade piping materials content 
compared to the others.  
In view of the fact that equipment weights based on process studies are the first reliable data 
to emerge from early concept studies, it seems logical to attempt to estimate total costs 
directly in terms of equipment weights. The results of such an analysis are presented above in 
Figure 4-1. The picture that emerges is much the same as in the chart in Figure 4-2 based on 
total installed weights. The dispersion is of the same order of magnitude and increases for the 
smaller projects. In the light of the above the relationships appear unsuitable for all but very 
rough estimates, although they may be useful as a form of quick ‘ball park’ check on orders of 
magnitude, if the nature of the shortcomings are understood. Better quality estimates must be 
sought in the better project specific detail available from discipline and sub-discipline levels 
of definition. At the same time, it is evident that any estimate based on normative 
performance will be subject to a high degree of execution uncertainty.  
It has been found more appropriate by most actors to model bulk weights on the basis of 
equipment weights using weight ratios of the type presented in Chapter 3.7.3, Figure 3.4. 
Estimates may be produced by direct application of discipline cost norms drawn from the 
charts of Figure 3-13, 3-14 and 3-15 and applied directly to the discipline weights, or even by 
the application of man-hour per tonne norms. The more detailed approach may provide a 
more correct estimate due to the fact that characteristics of the product, if known, can be taken 
into account  when selecting norms at discipline level. In general however, estimates based on 
equipment definitions alone will be subject to the above degree of uncertainty.   
4.3.2 Development Phase 1 
The first studies to be performed in a conceptual development process of a satellite tie-in 
project, for instance, are process and utility studies, which provide some quantitative 
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definition of the equipment requirements in the form of equipment lists with the weights of 
the individual items. These studies focus on the reservoir processing requirements against the 
process and utility capacity of the existing equipment on the platform, seeking to optimise the 
use of existing equipment and facilities. These equipment requirements are thus the first basis 
for defining an estimate which needs to include a lot more, namely the surrounding 
infrastructure which is not defined at this stage. Clark and Lorenzoni address this type of 
problem through measurement and normalisation of the piping, structural, civil, electrical and 
instrument infrastructure surrounding individual equipment items, such data being available 
from previous projects as a result of good and extensive ongoing performance measurement 
programs. While Clark and Lorenzoni may apply this approach, with an acceptable degree of 
accuracy, to reasonably standardised process plants, the congestion and layout constraints on 
offshore platforms, along with the highly variable nature of modification work, suggest the 
use of a simpler generalised approach, but which is principally similar. This generalised 
approach is the use of the historical weight data to provide typical ratios of equipment to bulk 
items as a basis for modelling the overall bulk requirements. Typical weight values for each 
discipline can be defined in similar fashion. Cost estimates may then be calculated using the 
appropriate parameters, namely the overall EPCI, or separate labour and material cost per 
tonne parameters at discipline level, as shown in Table 3-1 and in the charts in Figure 3-13, 3-
14 and 3-15. An advantage of using discipline weights is the scope this gives to select norms 
from similar work based on qualitative information concerning the nature of the work. The 
variances associated with each item in the statistical material provide a basis for assessing the 
uncertainty range of the resulting estimate. Contractor overheads and project administration is 
included while Company costs are factor estimated at this stage. 
A plot of three central weight ratios was shown previously in Figure 3-4, the equipment 
weight, the system bulk weight (piping, electrical and instrument bulk) and structural bulk, 
each with respect to total installed weight. A characteristic of the graphs is the arrangement by 
size, expressed as total installed weight, in order to highlight the effects of scale which were 
discussed in detail earlier. The uncertainty associated with weight variation, based on extreme 
weight ratios and median overall cost per tonne per discipline, lies typically within a range 
variation of -40/+60%. Bulk weights may be estimated from the curve in Figure 3-4 using the 
equipment weight trend line (labelled A) plotted against the right axis of the chart.  
There is of course an additional component of uncertainty related to performance variance. 
The high uncertainty can be reduced in the first instance by selecting discipline material and 
labour cost per tonne norms based on size, using the trend lines shown on the graphs in Figure 
3-13, 3-14 and 3-15. Alternatively, and particularly with respect to piping, one may use 
qualitative information regarding for example, the nature of the piping in terms of material 
quality, average size, and so on, to select parameters from known projects. This latter 
approach, however, requires insights into the nature of the individual projects in the portfolio, 
an overview which is not easy to maintain over time as the portfolio grows, nor easy to 
transfer to newcomers not familiar with the portfolio. As a last resort, in the absence of any 
definitive information regarding the sub-discipline nature of the work, medians or averaging 
may be used to define norms of performance for piping.  
It should be noted that there are many types of modifications of which many do not have 
equipment content of any significance. Many projects find a high degree of equipment re-use 
by revamping equipment components. Such projects will normally not be able to develop any 
factor-based weight estimate of bulk quantities without doing development phase 2 type of 
work on which to base MTOs and weight estimates.  
Estimates at this level provide the basis for sanctioning of further development.   
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4.3.3 Development Phase 2 
The logical next step in a conceptual development process is to initiate layout studies to 
define and develop the platform-specific constraints regarding space requirements and 
infrastructure for the planned new installation. This naturally starts with equipment block 
layouts and the associated piping layouts, including a broad brush installation study to 
establish the need for major steelwork support structures as well as an evaluation of the 
capacity of the support frame. The result of these reviews will be layouts on which to base the 
measurement of quantities of bulk materials as input values for calculation of cost and man-
hour estimates. In parallel, other documents, such as PIDs, are being developed that provide a 
basis for quantification of specific items, such as valves. 
Since the layout work normally only includes the major elements and major pipe runs at this 
stage, many items within each discipline remain undefined. Indeed, some items will remain 
undefined until all detailed engineering is completed. Even then there are still elements of 
work that are encountered in the field. These undefined elements are usually defined 
provisionally by the addition of technical allowances at discipline level to cover for details 
that will only be specified at a later stage. The size of the allowances used is intended to 
provide an estimate of the expected weight at completion and they are based on experience 
within the weight estimating community. It must be said that many of these factors are drawn 
from experience with greenfield work and may not necessarily be applicable to modification 
work, especially that of a more extreme character. 
Not all disciplines are subject to layout studies at this stage. Electrical and instrument bulk are 
often factor estimated based on piping or equipment weight, using weight ratios such as 
described above for the Development Phase 1 type estimates.  
Cost and man-hour estimates may be built up on a more detailed analytic basis, using the 
man-hour per tonne type parameters in Table 3.1 applied to each work phase or product along 
with the appropriate man-hour rates. Materials cost may be calculated using the materials cost 
per tonne parameters. In such estimates the uncertainty in the bulk quantities is significantly 
reduced compared to earlier phases, but performance uncertainty remains and may be reduced 
by selecting norms in the same manner as described above. An additional possibility remains, 
however. Due to the definition inherent in the layouts, sub-discipline weight detailing can be 
used as a basis for calculating norms at discipline level by use of the type of sub-discipline 
norms of performance indicated in Figure 3.10 and 3.11 and typical of steelwork and piping.  
Estimates for Project Administration and Preliminary/Facility costs will need to added, as 
well as the Company Management and Logistics and any Marine Operations required. But 
now man-hour estimates are available, the better to define the personnel logistics costs and 
need for flotel and the like. Company Management and Contractor Project Administration 
will still, however, need to be factor estimated using estimated man-hours or estimated labour 
cost as the basis, referring back to Figure 3-8. 
Estimates at this level provide the basis for concept selection and sanction for further 
development.  
4.3.4 Development Phase 3 
The natural progression in concept development leads to detailing of layouts to include 
electrical and instrumentation bulk disciplines as well as further development of other 
engineering documentation and provides a firm basis for measurement of quantities for these 
disciplines. Cost and man-hour estimates are built up in the same way as described 
previously, but now on a wholly analytic basis.  
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Estimates at this level form the basis for sanction of project execution and evaluation of 
engineering or EPCI contracts prior to award. In circumstances where separate construction 
contracts are let these estimates often form an initial basis, subject to later update based on 
detailed engineering data, for evaluation of construction contracts prior to award. 
During execution, estimates at this level of aggregation are suitable for owner estimates 
seeking overview, verification of commitment and updating budgets. Verification of 
contractor baselines and resource dispositions are an important element of this verification, 
but, in addition, provide a basis for management intervention in the event that should be 
required. This applies particularly during the period of detailed engineering while the concept 
is still subject to development. Detailed engineering has often exposed flaws in the concept 
evaluations performed in earlier phases, which may have adverse effects on the commitment 
frame of execution.  
Highly detailed information from detailed engineering MTOs will need to be rolled up in 
accordance with the tabulations in Chapter 3. 
4.3.5 Development Phase 4 
Development phase 4 is the detailed engineering that defines the basis for execution. 
Contractor estimates are embedded in the detailed planning processes and are based on detail 
from MTOs using manuals similar to Page. It follows that these estimates will not be fully 
complete until completion of detailed engineering.  
 
Since these estimates in aggregation form the control basis for the execution phase, it follows 
that higher aggregate estimates, such as the Phase 3 estimates described above, will be 
required to bridge the gap pending completion of the detailed planning basis.  
 
Detail-based estimates cannot easily take into account special project-specific conditions of 
installation and method. This speaks for an additional verification role for high aggregate 
estimates that are based on historical performance, even after completion of the detailed 
planning basis. 
  
4.3.6 Estimate classes 
As outlined above, conceptual development proceeds through progressive stages of detailing 
often with several concepts being developed in parallel. It is characteristic of modification 
work that layout work starts much earlier in a development cycle than equivalent greenfield 
topsides development work. This is natural since the infrastructure already exists and 
constructability is a central consideration in modification work. It follows that MTO based 
quantities are available for estimating purposes much earlier in a development cycle and 
ought thereby to increase the quality of the estimates. However, there are many aspects of 
uncertainty in modification work that override this apparent advantage.  
As described in earlier chapters, there is a great degree of variation in modification work, both 
as to the mix of disciplines and the sub-discipline character of the work. The major problem 
of the estimator is to select the right norm for estimating the man-hour needs to perform the 
work.  It follows that sub-discipline norms cannot be used until the necessary sub-discipline 
detail is available. Until such time the best indicator is provided by taking the scale effects 
into account rather than using averages based on the whole array, which is the normative 
practice passed on from greenfield work. The effects of size may be seen as an aggregated 
effect of the sub-discipline content. However, in circumstances where sub-discipline detail is 
available this information may be used to override the norms taken from effects of scale trend 
lines. Even in cases where only a little information is available, it may be sufficient to permit 
a selection of norms from group characteristics directly. Piping is a challenge in this regard 
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being affected by many variables such as installation method (welded/bolted), size (diameter), 
material type, valve content and the extent of insulation, to name the most important. But 
knowing for example, that the piping is mostly small diameter (information available from 
PFDs), high grade steel, and bolted construction would permit selection of norms from similar 
work, provided that this sort of information has been preserved in the performance data from 
previous projects, and with a better degree of accuracy than the use of averages.  
Not all projects have equipment content on which to base factored estimates of bulk 
quantities. It follows that some form of layout work must be performed in order to provide a 
basis for quantification. Typical in this regard are some tie-ins that mix well streams directly 
without any form of separate processing and require little more than a riser and pigging 
equipment. It follows for such concepts that development phase 1 type relational estimates are 
not practical. Accordingly, the first reliable estimates can only be achieved in accordance with 
development phase 2 study requirements of piping layout and associated installation study.  
From the above can be seen the manner in which the degree of detail in the technical studies 
defines the basis for estimating and a consistent expectation regarding the accuracy of the 
resulting estimate. This is the basis for defining estimate classes and is broadly coupled to the 
degree of layout definition. Returning to the question of what to measure in performance 
measurement processes, the above has described the way in which technical elements defined 
in study at progressive stages of development dictate what elements in close-out data need to 
be measured in order to provide a basis for estimating. The parameters in the array in Table 3-
1, supplemented by sub-discipline weights and norms, provide a consistent basis for 
estimating at progressive degrees of detailing for all classes of estimates from concept until 
well into the construction phase.  
While making the above statement, it should be mentioned that many Estimate Class 
gradation systems include an initial ‘’Development Phase 0’’ type of estimate class which 
normally has no defined accuracy expectations. Such an estimate class may include a field 
development cost based on high order relational estimating, using high aggregation 
parameters such as the correlation of total installation costs and equipment weights discussed 
initially in this section 4.3.1 of this chapter. 
4.3.7 Baseline updating, Earned Value analysis, and forecasting  
In the introduction to this chapter, the discussion pointed to the estimating nature of the 
project control applications arising out of performance measurement processes. The efficient 
functioning of earned value analysis is dependent on the correct dimensioning of the control 
basis.  
In much of the normative literature and in keeping with current practice in the industry, 
baseline updating is based, more or less exclusively, on the logging of the impact of change 
orders on the original scope of work. The underlying assumption here is presumably that the 
control estimate, which was established as the basis for sanctioning, will not change unless 
additional scope is introduced or the design basis is altered. This is all logical and natural in 
so far as the control estimate establishes the project’s formal budget with regard to original 
scope of work. However, control estimates have a major function as a management tool 
primarily giving forecasts of negative trends, which require management action. For this 
purpose the forecasts need to include the effects of internal scope development with respect to 
the original control basis. This scope development classically takes the form of bulk material 
volume growth or increases in complexity, or both, or reductions, and impacts man-hour 
resources and material costs and ultimately threatens durations, milestones and overall 
efficiency. This is a natural consequence of concept development during detailed engineering, 
but does not represent additional scope of work. Traditional practice provides no basis in 
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baseline adjustment for such internal concept growth since this internal growth is not 
addressed by change orders. A consequence of this is that many projects and contractors do 
not have routines for updating 24 their estimates after award of contract while detailed 
engineering progresses. This is anomalous since a lot of development can take place during 
detailed engineering, a major information blackout period, as emphasised by Clark and 
Lorenzoni, which may have consequences for both owner and contractor. Under normal 
circumstances these extra volumes will be defined as the detailed plans are developed in 
parallel with the progress of detailed engineering and the full extent will only be clear at the 
completion of detailed engineering. 
Clark and Lorenzoni’s proposed method for this important update of the ‘definitive’ estimate 
is based on BOQ updating taking place during detailed engineering. Clark and Lorenzoni 
propose the use of sampling of initial layout drawings and interpolating the results to provide 
a basis for comparison with the estimated quantities in the early definitive estimates. Reliable 
trend data can in this way be available as early as 20% completed detailed engineering, and 
backed up later using the 70% complete MTO. In reality , this is merely a continuation of the 
quantity based estimating process which started with the semi-detailed estimates where the 
bulk quantities are factored on the basis of physical properties of the equipment items and or 
aspects of the plant as a whole. The whole process is finalised in commodity reviews for each 
discipline at approx. 95% complete. The results form the basis for the QAB (Quantity 
Adjusted Budget) on which the planning and control of the construction phase is based even 
though the final QAB update will be after construction start due to overlap.    
Unreliability of MTOs and weight estimates at the early stages of detailed engineering is often 
given as justification for not updating the definitive estimates until detailed engineering is 
completed. This is anomalous considering that MTOs are an essential basis for procurement 
processes that must be executed in parallel with the detail engineering. Continuous updating 
will be required as detailed engineering proceeds in order to support the material procurement 
processes. Thus a basis exists within the normative practices of project administration for 
estimate updating. All that is required is for the same information to be harnessed for project 
control purposes as a basis for estimate updates.  
Onshore plants do not have the same weight and stability concerns as offshore platforms and 
accordingly lack the sophisticated weight estimating routines of the offshore industry. 
Onshore plant estimates are mostly based on BOQs, equivalent to the development phase 4 
estimate discussed above. This is a more complicated process due to the lack of consistent 
metrics which facilitate aggregation. In the offshore oil and gas industry the above 
MTO/BOQ processes form the basis for technical weight estimating processes, which are also 
a normal part of the work. This provides a basis for estimate updating using weight based 
methods. It is clear that MTO and weight estimate updates will also pick up the extra work 
and changes introduced through VOs in a more accurate and effective fashion than poorly 
defined VO based estimates.  
Not the least advantage arising from this estimating cycle is the feedback it provides on the 
correctness of the allocated engineering resources. Engineering work can also be measured in 
man-hours per tonne; it follows that quantity updates may also be used to re-estimate the 
engineering resources in an ongoing routine. Traditionally, engineering resource estimates are 
based on factors of installation man-hours or more or less subjective assumptions regarding 
the number of documents to be prepared. It follows from the above that weight updates 
                                                 
24 A distinction must be made between updating of estimates on an overall basis and the preparation of the 
detailed planning basis which is an ongoing activity supplemented on an item by item basis as work is defined 
by the detailed engineering processes. 
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provide a basis for correction of the engineering resource estimates in a way that factor based 
estimates cannot match. 
Forecasting practice based on earned value analysis will be of little value if the overall control 
basis is inaccurate, as emphasised by Harrison (Harrison, 1985). This approach extrapolates 
the performance deviation resulting from comparison of planned and actual costs (or man-
hours) for a given quantity of work, as though it applied to all the work to be performed. It 
follows that the accuracy of the interpolation will depend on the accuracy of both the total 
scope estimate and the planned scope of work to cut-off. Clark and Lorenzoni point to an 
additional element of inaccuracy inherent in simple extrapolation which does not take into 
account the varying nature of the work over time. This problem is resolved by Harrison by 
limiting the number of cost centres and the size of work-packs subject to extrapolation. Clark 
and Lorenzoni focus discipline–wise on products and activities using historical production 
curves accompanied by detail planning prepared in the field offices. Overall performance is 
then aggregated in both cases by weighting in accordance with relative man-hour content. The 
scope of work to cut-off most likely will be defined accurately enough, and this sort of 
performance comparison is useful to gauge efficiency relative to the norm basis for estimating 
the work content of the task sheets or work-packs. But forecasting may be seriously 
underestimated due to the presence of undefined work in the overall scope, which will not be 
picked up by the procedure.  
One might ask what the consequences are of the deficiencies in earned value analysis as a 
forecasting procedure? In the absence of signals regarding internal scope growth or man-hour 
growth due to complexity derived from verification estimates, the contractor will be 
dependant on the aggregated result of the completed job-cards, which are produced 
progressively as detailed engineering proceeds. Due to overlap between engineering and 
fabrication, this signal may arrive too late for effective corrective action. The managers’ only 
recourse at this later point in time is to man up, but the remaining work will now have to be 
completed at a greater rate than previously assumed. This may incur overtime, flotel cost or 
non-optimal manning. It is evident that if the signals regarding too few man-hours totally 
could be received earlier, more efficient means of acceleration and avoidance of crashing may 
be possible with minimisation of schedule stress and other associated disruptive elements to 
work flow. Case studies suggest that a year of lead time may be acquired in this fashion.  
Uncertainty associated with potential scope growth will exist at least as long as detailed 
engineering is in overlap with fabrication. A logical basis for updating would be found in the 
MTOs taken from the detailed engineering drawings at regular intervals as a basis for updated 
weight estimates consistent with the practise from concept development studies prior to 
project sanction. Such MTOs are in any event required for purposes of initiating material 
purchasing at early stages of detailed engineering, a process requiring regular updates as new 
detailed planning task sheets are prepared.  
Modification projects are particularly subject to this sort of development due to the more 
diffuse interface between the modification scope and the rest of the facility and difficulties 
identifying complexity prior to detailed engineering. Greenfield work, both onshore and 
offshore, is also latently exposed due to the increased overlap between detailed engineering 
and the follow-on activities of procurement and fabrication prevalent in current execution 
strategies. The late initiation of detailed layout work in the development cycle, compared with 
modification work, may also play a part. One may argue that all the work to be done will 
ultimately be incorporated in the reference baseline by the end of detailed engineering when 
all the tasks have been documented. But management will have lost valuable lead time to plan 
effective compensatory action that may be required.  
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Prevalence of latent undefined volumes of work, if not identified, will also have general 
schedule impact such as delayed engineering causing delays in deliverables to the detriment 
of follow-on activities and thereby negatively effecting the orderly progression of the work, 
which can be very detrimental to performance.  
VOs have other disadvantages that make them unsuitable for updating control estimates. This 
is due to the fact that VOs often take a long time to be approved since they are, strictly 
speaking, only instruments for contract administration and appropriation of additional funds. 
In addition they are normally poorly defined as estimates and hence of low accuracy. Finally, 
it is not effective to maintain separate monitoring of VO costs and quantities, as many do, in 
order to improve the basis for adjustments to the contract. In circumstances with EPCI 
reimbursable compensation combined with performance-based incentive mechanisms based 
on quantity updates, such as modification contracts often are, VO approval may be based on 
order of magnitude estimates in order to speed up approval without further VO handling. 
Contractual adjustments can be built into the incentive mechanisms which are adjustable in 
terms of the final quantities. In this way additions to scope, through VOs and internal 
development, can be followed up by the same routine, that of quantity monitoring at regular 
intervals during detailed engineering.  
The type of weight-based scope verification routines described above, that pick up additions 
to the scope of work as well as concept growth elements, can easily be incorporated in the 
CCE updates without affecting the basis for the MCE adjustments, which can continue as 
before, being based on variation orders.  
4.3.8 Network planning 
The above discussion regarding the efficiency of the earned value analysis as a forecasting 
tool is also affected by another consideration, that of the network planning. The schedule 
forecasting based on earned value analysis relies on exact planning at task level, if the size of 
the tasks is such that inaccuracies arising from subjective progress reporting are to be avoided, 
in other words to ensure the correctness of the planned resource use which is the yardstick.  A 
measure of the total scope cannot be achieved by these means until all the tasks have been 
documented and incorporated into the overall logic of the network, which will not be 
effectuated finally until the detailed engineering is completed. This will inevitably create a 
planning vacuum which has to be filled by interim activities, and a formidable task to update 
if the interim plans are very detailed (Bungard, 1988; Harrison, 1985; Nunn, 1986). The 
theory appears not to adequately address the fact that the detail network basis has to be 
developed while work is ongoing due to the overlap between engineering and construction.   
Here again is an argument supporting control estimate updating in order to ensure that the 
interim assumptions reflect the full scope of work as well as possible while the detailed 
control basis is being developed.  
A real life case may serve as an example of how these issues may appear in current practices. 
In the case in question, the contractor made up the difference between the defined work and 
the assumed total scope by including dummy activities in the plans. The dummies were 
dimensioned on the basis of the total man-hours in the contract (the owners estimate) minus 
the accumulated man-hours in the completed task sheets. The contractor refrained from 
estimating the volume of the dummy in real terms, or updating the overall estimate, in spite of 
indications that the quantities were increasing with respect to expectation. Note that the 
quantity growth was tracked by the owner not the contractor. The result was poor correlation 
between the owners estimates and the contractors forecasts. The contractor was finally forced 
by the owner to initiate a serious re-assessment of the total volume of work. The volume of 
work had, in fact, increased considerably due to large volumes of permanent, temporary and 
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demolition work associated with the development of the installation concept, in addition to 
changes in the design basis. The completion milestones were achieved, but at the cost of the 
use of a flotel 25, very high offshore manning, extensive overtime, multi-shifting (with 
inevitable safety and efficiency impact) and the postponement of all non-project related work 
on the platform.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has directed attention to the project control applications of the performance 
measurement methods described in this thesis, mostly in the form of estimating applications 
aimed at constantly re-assessing the scope of work with respect to the resource framework for 
performing the work.  
Even in the absence of re-estimation, comparison of contractor assumed norms of 
performance with normative levels of performance in the industry will highlight potential 
under-resourcing. This sort of basis of comparison can be established by applying the 
performance measurement procedures defined in Chapter 3.9 to the contractors forecast data. 
Such comparisons would not normally only function as indicators not able to pick up the 
discipline and sub-discipline variation and should accordingly be followed up with 
independent estimates.  
This sort of comparison would be facilitated by the use of consistent breakdown structures in 
contract reporting formats which would limit the extra work that would otherwise be 
necessary in converting data from one format to another. 
At the end of the day however, and especially in circumstances that disrupt the orderly 
progression of the work, levels of poor performance are sometimes experienced that are 
unexplainable in terms of growth, complexity or characteristics of the product. Some projects 
overrun on all functions, others only on some functions. Some projects do not overrun in spite 
of potential disturbances such as growth or conceptual re-engineering. Conversely, some 
projects overrun despite the absence of any such the pressures. Deeper investigation has 
uncovered organisational dispositions that, in some cases, may have precipitated the poor 
efficiency. In other cases no firm explanation is available. Such cases represent a dilemma to 
the estimator but must be taken into account in some manner or other, due to the high order of 
magnitude of such effects can have. 
The next chapter, Chapter 5, addresses the risk situation which confronts modification 
projects and presents a risk model that adequately addresses the indeterminate risk picture 
described above, based on the analysis of performance data from some overrun projects.  
The following chapter, Chapter 6, addresses the way in which performance measurement 
processes can support benchmarking processes aimed at identifying the qualitative nature of 
the indeterminate risks described above and the means of managing them.    
                                                 
25  The full capacity of a flotel can normally not be used while the platform is operational due to limited lifeboat 
capacity and manning densities constrained by general safety considerations, such that flotel hire to support 
extended periods of offshore work for modifications on operational platforms will be less efficient than the 
equivalent as applied to greenfield work.  
 86
 
 
 87
5 COST RISK EVALUATION  
APPLICATION OF PERFORMANCE  MEASUREMENT PRINCIPLES IN THE COST RISK EVALUATION OF OFFSHORE 
MODIFICATION PROJECTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The performance measurement principles presented in this thesis can also form the basis for 
objective performance risk evaluation. This application of performance measurement 
principles in the development of a generic cost risk simulation model for modification work   
is the theme of this chapter. 
Risk and uncertainty are aspects of management that all project management personnel are 
confronted with at regular intervals. Particularly the evaluation of cost estimate uncertainty is 
an area of expertise that is not particularly transparent, but still cannot comfortably be 
relegated to the domains of technical expertise. Understanding of the performance risk 
exposure is a central aspect of project management strategy, but performance expectations are 
very often based on subjective assumptions26. Risk quantification and qualification by use of 
performance measurement principles may provide documentation and better understanding of 
the nature and magnitude of risk exposure, leading to better understanding of the mitigation 
actions required to reduce risk. 
The discourse includes, 1) the organisational and technical uncertainties inherent in capital 
cost estimates (CAPEX) for modification projects, 2) associated uncertainty assessment tools 
and procedures as applied in the context of modification projects in the oil and gas industry, 
3) analysis of historical data from some known overrun projects, 4) a cost risk simulation 
model for modifications. The model, which has been developed as part of the work 
underpinning this thesis, uses inter-relation effects based on experience data from analysis of 
the development history of some under-performing projects. The discussion regarding the 
model itself is presented in Chapter 5.6. 
The arguments are presented against a case background of a large and complex offshore 
modification project in a remote environment.  
5.2 Risk evaluation 
The range of norms in the performance data and weight content discipline ratios provides an 
alternative source of extreme value parameters for risk analyses based on quantitative results 
rather than relative subjective assumptions regarding risk maxima and minima. However, the 
range of variance in the performance data is due to the complexity variation attributable partly 
to the specific complexity and partly to circumstances of work in the individual project.  
Measures of sub-discipline complexity provide a quantitative means of assessing whether 
measured performance is solely a consequence of complexity or whether there are anomalies 
present that indicate influence of other factors on performance that have to be taken into 
account. This approach may provide a basis for understanding the range of variances 
associated with normal performance due to complexity in comparison to the range of 
variances associated with disturbances to the orderly progression of the work that might arise, 
for instance, from concept immaturity.  
In this chapter risk and uncertainty in modification projects and cost estimates is considered in 
detail in the context of developing a generic cost risk simulation model specific for 
                                                 
26 Typically the prescribed levels of contingency associated with estimate classes are seldom documented but 
have their roots in historical experience. Likewise perceptions of the magnitude of risk are subjectively linked 
to bad experiences and the normative expectation associated with these prescribed levels of contingency. 
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modification work and where such considerations are taken into account. For all practical 
purposes, the range of uncertainty at early stages of development will need to include the 
technical uncertainty associated with concept as well as the uncertainty arising from other 
influences such as organisational, installation or market related issues, since the full range of 
uncertainties will need to be considered until at least the detailed engineering is well 
advanced. For this purpose the range of variance defined with respect to the trend lines in the 
effect of scale charts (Figure 3-13, 3-14 and 3-15) may be regarded as an adequate measure of 
the uncertainty of performance, provided a sufficiently broad range of projects is available in 
the portfolio. Similarly, the variance in the weight ratios of Figure 3-4 may provide a measure 
of the technical uncertainty of all early phase estimates. 
5.3 Summary of the case background 
The chapter is based on practical experience acquired as a representative with responsibility 
for topsides modifications cost in a partner operated project with regard to the quantification 
of risk in the sanction estimates.  
In practice it was found that the results of the risk simulation by the operator did not seem to 
align with the ‘common sense’ expectations of the partners, who perceived the risk effects of 
a potentially poor performance to be underestimated. The source of the risk of under-
performance was the contractual strategy put in place by the operator combined with 
complexity aspects of the concept itself, as well as conditions surrounding the installation 
circumstances. A consequence of the operator’s low estimate of the potential cost impact was 
that the partners believed the operator would perhaps not take the risk potential seriously 
enough to introduce real mitigating activities. This, amongst other matters, delayed the 
sanction processes, which in turn is potentially aggravating to the orderly progression of the 
work, particularly in circumstances where the completion milestones remain unchanged. 
A workshop was called with the express purpose of aligning stakeholders’ expectations and 
achieving endorsement of the operator’s estimates by: 
- review of concept development status 
- pooling of experience data from the partners on which to base the simulation  
- common participation in the development of the model  
 
The partners advised to radically reduce the complexity of the risk model (from about 250 to 
about 100 activities) and introduce interaction effects between core activities in order to 
establish a common platform of reference. However, the results of the exercise still failed to 
satisfy the partners’ expectations.  
In order to verify (order of magnitude) the low estimate internally, a simpler model (approx. 
17 core activities) was constructed. Interaction effects were modelled using equations that 
coupled core activities and correlation factors derived from historical data from 
underperforming projects. Since the interaction effects are mainly relevant under conditions 
of stress, it was found appropriate to apply the equations asymmetrically in such a manner 
that the coupling effects were only activated in the event of over-run situations. This model 
gave results that were more in line with expectations, but they were still lower than historical 
data might suggest. 
The essence of the problem appears to be that the expected values (medians or averages) 
derived from simulations do not align with the expectations as defined by experience. In the 
absence of a consistent historical data record, expectations are likely to align with worst case 
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experiences. The ambition is to find a model that functions well enough when compared to 
experience and at the same time has a coherent theoretical base.  
The contractor finally adjusted the model to include a separate prescribed contingency 
element to the deterministic base estimate in the simulation input data, thereby providing a 
contingency factor of 10-20% with respect to the base estimate in the simulation output. The 
size of the input factor is prescribed by the estimating class as described in the previous 
chapter. Simulations assumed independence. While this approach may provide an adequate 
contingency, the simulation contributes nothing to defining the nature, range and size of the 
uncertainties confronting the project, in order that appropriate mitigating action may be 
initiated. 
5.4 The risk assessment process 
As a generality it may be stated that the risky nature of oil and gas production suggests that oil 
companies’ procedures for uncertainty management are likely to be ‘state of the art’. Review 
of corporate governing documentation reveals a hierarchy of procedures, which includes 
prescribed levels of control and review, guidelines for best practices, predefined acceptance 
criteria, etc, which can be said to be generic to all oil companies. This does not mean that the 
practice of risk management always coincides with the formal requirements of the procedures.    
Within the realm of project management, uncertainty management is a central management 
function to be applied continuously at all relevant levels in the organisation. With regard to 
estimates and in the assessment of contingency and/or reserves deemed necessary to cover the 
associated cost risks, all elements of risk and uncertainty have to be taken into account,. 
Different aspects of the work are normally handled by different domains of competency, 
which are all brought together in the commercial evaluations. By this is meant that, for 
example in the case of a satellite tie-in, the topsides modifications, the subsea infrastructure, 
the operating expenses and the drilling/workover costs respectively, will normally be 
estimated by appropriate competencies. All elements are brought together and analysed in 
several payback scenario evaluations, conducted by the commercial analysts, which in turn 
are governed by predefined acceptance criteria such as ROI or NPV and based on predefined 
assumptions regarding product price variations, currency exchange rates and the like. Each 
element will be based on the special technical nature and the latent uncertainties pertaining to 
performance of the specific concept. The specific nature of the uncertainties being evaluated 
is very diffuse at such an order of aggregation. 
5.4.1 Technical uncertainty 
Risk and uncertainty issues are addressed in the course of project development through the 
technical requirements for concept development work in the form of prescribed activities to 
be defined in the scope of work. Likewise, during the execution phase, risk and uncertainty 
issues are addressed through technical requirements for the detailed engineering. These 
requirements include for instance installation engineering, the preparation of detailed work 
procedures, safe job analysis processes, prescribed constraints and procedures for certain 
types of work as well as prescribed technical solutions and guidelines for certain types of 
potentially hazardous or pollutive activities. This means that the technical and operational 
elements of the work contributing to risk will normally be worked to an acceptable level of 
confidence based on technical acceptance criteria in the course of the engineering 
development work. The engineering development work is in turn a result of the guidelines 
identifying the elements that shall be included in the technical studies. Finally, the quality and 
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consistency of the work is subject to review at all sanction milestones at all relevant 27 levels 
of technical and managerial competence.  
5.4.2 Estimation requirements  
The extent and content of the development work is coupled to the estimate class requirements 
that identify acceptable levels of accuracy and confidence and often prescribe recommended 
levels of contingency for each development stage. These class requirements and 
corresponding levels of accuracy and confidence are business requirements associated with 
sanction of further investment needed to reach a higher state of concept development, 
ultimately leading to full implementation, or, alternatively, stopping further investment. 
Normally these decisions to proceed or stop will be based on evaluations of the project 
payback, but may also on occasion be based on elements of unacceptable technical risk28. 
However, at the end of the day most elements of technical risk will have been converted into 
some form of physical installation and translated into cost elements. As mentioned previously, 
at each stage of development the concept will be subjected to review 29 in order to ensure 
compliance with procedures, completeness, quality, consistency with respect to acknowledged 
practice and alignment with corporate objectives and capacity. The estimator may to some 
extent rely on the fact of approval by technical review in accepting conformance to class 
requirements and the prescribed contingency levels. The prescribed contingency levels are 
deemed to include the risk associated with normal 30 concept development as well as 
organisational risk elements, which are inherently manageable. Radical changes in concept or 
the unmanageable risk associated with freak environmental conditions, extreme market 
fluctuations and political disturbances are not included. Risk elements of such a high order of 
magnitude will normally fall outside the mandate of the individual project. As an example, 
currency exchange rates may be preset for the purposes of capital cost estimating and project 
accounting and will not be the concern of the individual project. 
There remains a requirement to perform a cost risk analysis in order to ensure that project 
specific issues are duly taken into account in the assessment of risk and that the evaluated risk 
lies within the range of the predefined acceptance criteria. This task is the responsibility of the 
cost engineer. A risk simulation performed on a base estimate using historical performance 
data will normally give a result well within the range of the recommended levels, which result 
may be reliable if the concept is appropriately mature and is not subject to disruptive 
disturbances. However, most operators have experience of overruns with modification 31 work 
and the recommended contingencies associated with each estimate class are aligned with this 
experience. Typically, predefined contingencies may add a non-specified monetary 
contingency to cover all elements of growth and complexity while others may add a quantity 
contingency to the base estimate in the form of a growth reserve in addition to a pure 
monetary reserve.  
                                                 
27 Geoscience/Reservoir , Drilling/Wells, HSE, Facilities, Procurement/Logistics, Project Management, 
Cost/Schedule, Operation/Maintenance, Commercial 
28 Such cases are handled separately by the technical disciplines in accordance with own procedures and 
acceptance criteria (such as FAR values or assessment of technical functionality) and is seldom subject to 
equivalent cost evaluations – in other words technical criteria are established independently of cost 
considerations; cost considerations will only feature in the overall acceptance criteria for the project as a 
whole. If the project itself is motivated by safety considerations, cost effective solutions may be sought within 
the same procedural approach but all solutions will initially be subject to technical acceptance criteria. 
29  Briefly, approvals are subject to peer review by product at discipline levels, multidiscipline reviews and 
corporate review at all decision gates followed up by internal project reviews at strategic approval points.  
30 ‘Normal’ here implies that radically different modification scenarios will be treated as separate cases.  
31 The same experience applies to grass-root projects especially in the wake of the NORSOK experiences, 
possibly of a lower order of magnitude (NOU, 1999:11). 
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Finally the estimate itself will be subject to review in the same fashion as the technical and 
planning reviews previously mentioned. Included in this review will be the basis for 
assessment of contingency and benchmarking of the concept with respect to historical data.  
In the case in question, it is clear that there was poor alignment between the partners as to the 
nature of the additional elements beyond the median or average simulations of the risk 
analysis performed on the base estimate32 . As previously mentioned, this was a consequence 
of the concept and execution complexity, the management philosophy and the contractual 
strategy put in place by the operator, but was inherently difficult to define and quantify in the 
estimates or in the risk analyses.  
5.4.3 Benchmarking 
BM is currently a requirement of the estimating procedure in many organisations. A form of 
quantitative benchmarking of estimates that can be supported by the performance 
measurement processes described in this thesis using the sort of background performance 
defined in the charts of chapter 4, typically Figures 4-1 to 4-4, but seldom as detailed as 
Figure 4-13, is fairly common practice. Benchmarking at too high levels of aggregation may 
not be meaningful, while too much detail clouds the issue.  
An element of benchmarking is the range of variance defined by the reference data from 
previous projects and the risk that this represents for the project at hand. For this to be of any 
real value, a definition of the nature of the problems contributing to the variance is required in 
order to document appropriate levels of contingency and the nature of mitigating action 
required. This sort of qualitative information can only be provided by analysis of historical 
performances. Benchmarking may thus be considered as documentation of the link to 
historical data.  
The range of variances defined by the reference data from previous projects may be used to 
define risk quantitatively in risk analysis models but only on a qualitatively general basis.  
5.4.4 Performance uncertainty 
One of the most observed sources of project overruns is the growth of quantities and 
complexity in the work to be performed, but this is inherently manageable given the right 
project control procedures and due awareness of the potential threat this might have on the 
orderly progression of the work. Modification projects are considered to be more susceptible 
to complexity growth than grass-root projects. This has its source in the nature of the work. In 
grass-root projects the full range of complexities will normally be included in the scope of 
work and accordingly be included in the historical norms of performance. Similar ‘mixes’ of 
work will be experienced from project to project and averaged norms may thus be used with 
confidence. Modification work may experience very differing complexities from project to 
project and the mix should be taken into account when establishing discipline norms. As 
mentioned previously, there are no routine project control practices that monitor the 
quantity/complexity issue as the project develops. These complexity issues, being defined in 
the course of detailed engineering, thus surface later in job-setting when it is far too late to 
manage in other ways than increasing manning levels, which may be impossible due to 
bedding limitations or other restraints. 
Another organisational element that threatens the orderly progression of the work is that of 
poor coordination across the contractual interfaces where the consequences will also be 
underperformance, except here underperformance need not necessarily include a quantity 
growth element. In the same way as technical concept development is steered by ‘best 
                                                 
32 Current practice amongst the partners varied between use of median (50/50) estimates and expected value 
(average) estimates but all required an 80% confidence level.   
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practice’ procedures, planning and review procedures will normally direct the choice of 
contracting strategy in the individual project along lines that conform to company best 
practice. However, circumstances may dictate a sub-optimal contracting strategy with regard 
to interface issues. It is clear that problems associated with contractual interfaces will be 
aggravated in the presence of quantity/complexity growth. Both these issues are the domain of 
project management.  
These issues are not easy to build into estimate uncertainty and there are no guidelines for 
quantifying contingencies. So there will always be residual elements of uncertainty associated 
with the individual project, which are inherently difficult to quantify. Performance 
measurement background data may provide a solution by resorting to the analysis of data 
from under-performing projects in order to identify interaction effects and orders of 
magnitude of deviation from median or average levels of performance. This is the approach 
that has been adopted here. Some may claim that underperformance arising from the issues 
defined above will be included in the variation in the norms of performance comprising the 
historical data. But these experience norms are normally derived in isolation of any 
interaction effects between succeeding activities that may be present in the historical data. 
Thus the interaction effects will not be activated unless correlation between activities is built 
into the simulation models.  
Current project control practice does not have routines in place for monitoring the quantity 
and complexity development of the scope of work, which inherently reduces the 
manageability of the phenomenon and the predictability of outcomes. Not being part of the 
conventional wisdom, monitoring of the product characteristics as engineering proceeds is 
seldom seen as an option on the manager’s list of risk mitigation activities.  
Given circumstances where a stakeholder has little real influence over the chosen contracting 
strategies or with the management practices put in place to monitor and identify and manage 
the problems that may arise, the basis for assessing contingencies is even more diffuse. In a 
conservative climate the investment acceptance criteria (NPV; ROI, etc) may result in projects 
failing to meet the acceptance criteria if the contingencies are unnecessarily high. But opting 
out of a major development project in a sector where the partner is co-owner is not a realistic 
course of action in most cases, without forfeiting benefits accruing from other activities in the 
same sector. Other issues relate to the role the project might have in relation to achieving 
corporate goals or business objectives, which may influence the motivation to commit to the 
project. In this regard the estimator may experience the same management arguing down the 
estimates and the contingency before sanction in order to gain approval and arguing them up 
again afterwards. As previously mentioned, delay in sanctioning is potentially detrimental to 
the project schedule if the completion milestones are retained unaltered, as is often the case. 
All these aspects constitute a real dilemma for the estimator and indicate the need for 1) a 
realistic basis for assessing and quantifying risk, 2) a sure identification of the nature of the 
risk that should be included in the projects mandate and 3) which risk elements should be 
relegated to other domains of responsibility and higher levels of management. 
This then is the background for considering the assessment of uncertainty and the nature of 
the risk evaluation model presented in this chapter. 
5.5 The nature of the project under review 
5.5.1 Scope of work 
The project for which the risk evaluation is to be done is a satellite tie-back to an FPSO at a 
remote location in waters off a developing country. The project scope consists of the subsea 
facilities and a major topsides revamp. The topsides modification is the subject of this case 
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study and comprises 7 modules of various sizes, totally 3800 tonnes, and 1600 tonnes of 
associated infrastructure. It is one of the largest modification projects on record. The 
integration infrastructure comprises equipment items and piping, electrical, instrumentation 
and structural work. The structural work includes reinforcement of the support frame and 
several of the modules are closely interconnected requiring preconstruction of supporting 
structures as well as bracing and guides against existing structures. All this requires extensive 
welding beyond the duration limits of a conventional shutdown and must be performed prior 
to module installation. 
5.5.2 Field support requirements 
The support requirements comprise a flotel moored off the stern of the FPSO, which will also 
function as a laydown area and workshop, and a permanent fleet of crewboats, helicopter, a 
standby vessel/workboat and transport vessels. Due to the remote location all will be hired in 
for the duration of the offshore phase as will the flotel. The module installation will be by 
HLV. In addition smaller floating cranes will be required for purposes of mobilisation and 
demobilisation of temporary cranes required on board the FPSO as construction support. The 
smaller floating cranes will also be required to install an additional lifeboat and a purpose-
built gangway system between the FPSO and the flotel prior to flotel mobilisation. 
5.5.3 Contractual arrangements 
The contractual arrangements consist of an engineering and procurement contract, responsible 
for all engineering design and procurement of long lead items, and a separate fabrication 
contract, although the fabrication contract also includes some tertiary design. The fabrication 
contract is responsible for module fabrication and installation of offshore infrastructure, as 
well as the subcontracted local content comprising two smaller modules and all infrastructure 
piping and structural materials. A special feature of the engineering contract is the split of the 
design between Europe and India, the Indian design team having responsibility for the design 
of the modules. The remaining contracts cover the flotel and the lifting operations, which 
include the HLV, the installation engineering and module transportation. Interface 
responsibility is in the hands of company’s management team. 
5.5.4 Management philosophy 
The management philosophy identifies the operator’s project team as responsible for overall 
coordination as well as for the detail planning and supervision of the infrastructure installation 
offshore and commissioning. Especially the latter poses a special challenge of interface 
coordination since modification projects require system-based planning worked backwards 
from the commissioning planning, through fabrication and procurement, and back to 
engineering. In addition limited space offshore places special demands on the planning 
systems with regard to maintaining a backup buffer of available work in the case of mishaps 
with pre-planned tasks, in order to maintain progress in the work.  
5.5.5 National authority requirements 
The national authority reserves the right to approve all contractors, both local and 
international. International contractors, who are already operative locally will naturally enjoy 
an advantage and it is advantageous to pre-qualify contractors and assess their strengths and 
weaknesses with respect to the intended scopes of work. 
In addition the regional authorities have requirements regarding local content. This requires 
pro-action on the part of the operator to 1) insure that contractors that have local sanction are 
competent and appropriately equipped to perform the work and 2) identify work of a character 
and volume suited to local fabrication and gain sanction for the local content plan.  
As previously mentioned, the local content includes two smaller less complex modules, 
mostly structural steel and piping, and fabrication of all the integration steelwork and piping 
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spools. Finally, given a pre-knowledge of the bureaucracy tied to local customs handling, 
steps must be taken in the planning, such as adequate lead-time, to ensure smooth flow of raw 
materials into the yards and out again as prefabricata in line with the planned installation 
sequences. The orderly progression of the onshore prefabrication is crucial for the integration 
work. 
5.5.6 Offshore installation 
As previously mentioned the structural steelwork comprises support frame strengthening and 
the module substructures. This work requires welding and the man-hour volume is beyond the 
scope of a normal shutdown. Special work routines that make use of pressurised habitats, 
extensive temporary physical gas leakage barriers and monitoring devices combined with 
automatic welder shutdown devices have been designed and have received the sanction of the 
safety discipline. Nevertheless, the full extent of the work efficiency under such conditions 
will not be known until field experience is available. This activity is critical to the lift-in of 
the modules. 
5.5.7 The challenge 
It is clear that the size and complexity of the task combined with the constraints of locality are 
partly responsible for the contractual setup and management philosophy chosen by the 
contractor. This nevertheless poses a considerable managerial challenge and risk of 
underperformance as a consequence. The question remains how such a complex and diffuse 
risk picture should be priced into the estimates and whether it should take the form of 
contingency or reserve. 
5.6 The relationship of the operator with the partners 
The operator’s approach towards the partners has been very open on technical issues. Regular 
workshops and technical reviews in addition to the regular technical and commercial meetings 
were held. The operator was always available for clarification meetings with partners on an 
individual basis to address special problems and was actively interested in drawing on 
partners’ operational experience, views and contributions regarding technology. 
Unfortunately, and in contrast, the operator was less open about the basis for the estimates and 
particularly rates, norms and quantities and study reports were not made available. This of 
course created greater uncertainty than necessary. Particularly, the lack of integration weight 
sub-discipline detail was problematic because this is a measure of complexity. In addition, the 
content of the reports gives a good idea of what has been addressed and consequently the 
completeness and maturity of the concept.  
5.7 The basis for the cost risk simulation model 
5.7.1 General assumption 
The basic assumption underlying the cost risk simulation is that in principle all technical risk 
issues will either have been worked through to an acceptable technical conclusion in the 
course of the conceptual development and the review procedures put in place prior to all 
decision gates, or they will figure as unresolved issues on the risk management agenda. In the 
first instance these items will be a normal part of the scope of work and will be priced in 
conventional manner. What circumstances are applicable will largely depend on the stage of 
development and accordingly the purpose of the sanction. It is clear that there is a greater 
likelihood of unresolved technical risk elements at sanction points in earlier stages of 
development than at sanction for project execution.  
Similarly, risk elements that are related to organisational aspects are likely to be unformulated 
at early stages of concept development. The residual uncertainty at sanction for execution thus 
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normally comprises elements related to market and performance and any residual technical 
elements not picked up or clarified during the course of the development phases. However, 
these residual technical risk elements will normally be priced partly in the conventional 
manner and partly as part of the normal concept development uncertainty. Exceptionally, 
items on a risk register may be allocated a reserve, which is normally not included in the 
budgets.  
In the case in question the residual uncertainty consisted of the following issues: 
- concept maturity, particularly as it effected complexity development of the concept and 
the potential for quantity growth. The operator’s view is that the layout is frozen and 
internal reviews have not seen any need to comment this.  
- the contractual split and potential for interface mal-coordination leading to 
underperformance 
- the management philosophy and role and task split, particularly the role of the company 
project team vis-à-vis the engineering contractors and the main installation contractor 
- the offshore installation circumstances with regard to productivity, particularly the hot 
work during the critical offshore module preparation phase 
- the remote location and the coordination challenge associated with local content   
 
The central characteristic of the above is that all elements are potentially interactive and in 
one form or another have the potential to disrupt the orderly progress of the work and 
undermine performance in ways that will only come to light as work progresses. They are 
inherently manageable, but require specific monitoring procedures to be established.  
5.7.2 Historical data: Interaction effects in underperforming projects 
Due to the inherent difficulties in quantifying the effects of organisational underperformance, 
historical data was used in order to find a basis for quantifying the magnitude and extent of 
the interrelation effects of underperformance. Three known underperforming projects were 
selected for analysis. The data from these projects are presented in Table 5-1 below. The 
results from these projects have been compared to median values drawn from all the projects 
in the historical data portfolio.  
 
Table 5-1: Interaction effects in underperforming projects 
Case 1 consisted of two modules, one large, as well as a large volume of integration work. 
The platform had not been prepared for future installations in the original design, The 
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contractor seriously underbid the resources required for piping engineering and accordingly 
undermanned consistently irrespective of the accumulative delay in engineering progress. The 
company management was not successful in ensuring adequate resourcing on the part of the 
contractor with the result that the project was in a permanent state of delay and associated 
stress. In addition the contractor split the scope at the module/integration interface between 
two sections of the same organisation, which were on opposite sides of the North Sea. Overall 
design responsibility was in Norway, while module design and fabrication, as well as 
fabrication for integration, was in the UK.  
The data gathered here was useful since the project is organisationally 33 and conceptually 
similar to the case at hand as well as being conceptually similar to an earlier project which 
had performed optimally.  
The results from this project have been compared to median values of all the modularised 
projects in the historical data portfolio. Here it can be observed that all major activities 
overran by the same order of magnitude with the exception of prefabrication, which had a 
slightly lower overrun.  
Case 2 is primarily an integration project, but with a small module. The special character of 
the project is that the modification was performed on a semi brought atshore 34 for hull 
strengthening and increased buoyancy modifications. This was seen as an opportunity to 
perform a large topsides modification atshore, believing this would offer substantially reduced 
costs. The special challenge was the performance of a large scope during a short period of 
time in parallel with the hull strengthening, while the semi was atshore. This work required all 
materials to be ready for installation on the quayside at the start of the work. The problems 
resulted from the project sanction being delayed without an adjustment in the milestones, 
causing considerable stress in the project, especially with regard to engineering. The 
contractor opted for a sub-optimal 35 installation philosophy based on volume and site 
erection. This choice was consistent with the contractor’s experience from atshore work on 
grass-root projects, instead of optimised prefabrication in combination with extensive field 
measurement, which characterises offshore modification work. In this context volume site 
erection represents a complexity increase. The installation philosophy was chosen as a result 
of time pressure. The result was a large volume of clashes and the associated engineering and 
fabrication rework in the field combined with disturbance to the orderly progression of the 
work and consequent drastic underperformance, amongst other factors. 
From case 2 can be observed consistent overruns of all core activities of the same order of 
magnitude as case 1 with the exception of the integration work, which has considerably 
greater overrun. In this case there was a reduction in the overall installed weights compared to 
the original concept. The engineering overrun was largely related to field rework resulting 
from clashes. The installation overrun included a significant degree of rework due to clashes, 
but also a large component related to inefficiencies resulting from high manning densities, 
overtime and poor continuity in the orderly progression of the work due to the clashes.   
Case 3 is an integration project consisting mainly of large bore pipe and steelwork. The scope 
was performed in two partly overlapping phases and consisted of similar work on the same 
platform by the same project organisation. The project did not overrun extensively, but the 
first phase experienced problems getting competent CAD personnel with the result that piping 
                                                 
33 Organisationally similar with regard to the separation of engineering responsibility for the modules but 
dissimilar with regard to the use of an overall EPC form of contract in the historical case. The potential for 
interface trouble is thus more severe regarding the case under review. 
34 Atshore means quayside as opposed to inshore (moored in a fjord ) compared to offshore.   
35 Suboptimal with regard to manning densities and work routines in the field.  
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engineering was delayed. This in turn, created problems for procurement so that 
prefabrication of spools was effected and the offshore installation program had to be 
constantly re-planned. The surface protection could not be completed onshore and had to be 
completed offshore, resulting in more offshore man-hours than necessary and a longer overall 
project period. However, all project milestones were met. 
Since similar problems were not encountered in the second phase of the work, the data 
provides an opportunity to compare the effects of the disturbance in the orderly progress of 
the work on performance in two highly similar projects. It can be observed that the orders of 
magnitude of the disturbances are similar for all activities with the exception of the 
prefabrication of piping in the first phase, which has a much greater overrun. It should be 
noted that the steelwork was of quite a different character in phase 2 compared to phase 1.   
Conclusion from the analysis of historical data: The data presented in Table 5-1 above 
indicates that interaction effects may influence all core activities in a project and by the same 
order of magnitude. Further, it indicates that an order of magnitude of +50% with respect to 
median performance levels is not unusual. Individual activities may deviate considerably 
more or less than the average for all activities. Studies of other projects indicate that 
underperformance may be isolatable to conditions specific to a single work phase. Typically, 
efficiency offshore may be adversely influenced by poor and discontinuous work flow 
resulting from lack of beds. 
Given the fact that case 2 and case 3 did not experience weight growth, the analysis indicates 
that a considerable part of the latent risk is organisationally grounded. This conclusion is 
underscored by the very different execution histories of the three projects in the historical 
analysis. 
5.8 Cost estimate - Simulation of interaction effects 
This section describes the cost risk simulation model for modification projects developed as 
part of the work underpinning this thesis. The model is based on conclusions derived from 
analysis of historical performance data collected as a consequence of the performance 
measurement practices presented in this thesis. The results of the analysis pointed to the 
presence of interaction effects between the main activities of a similar order of magnitude for 
all activities.   
The interaction effects were simulated in two ways; by the use of deterministic sensitivity 
calculations of selected execution scenaria and by simulation using Crystal Ball. The 
calculation basis for the simulation and the sensitivity calculations are illustrated in Table 5-2 
below. 
5.8.1 The deterministic sensitivity calculations 
The sensitivity calculations were performed to illustrate in a step-wise fashion the impact of 
interaction effects with respect to the predefined levels of contingency and in order to isolate 
the impact of specific scenaria. Referring to the columns Sens1 to 6, the values highlighted in 
dark yellow are the driver activities, the activities in light yellow are the affected activities. 
The effects of interaction were calculated by applying the Performance Norm factors shown 
in Table5-2, which represent the P10 and P90 values from the full array of historical data.  
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Table 5-2: Calculation basis for the simulation and sensitivity analysis 
The following cases were modelled in the sensitivity calculations: 
- Sens1 models a full engineering overrun alone, not including any interaction effects.  
- Sens2 models a full integration overrun alone and the associated interaction effects on the 
offshore logistics costs.  
- Sens3 models a weight increase assuming no disruptive effects on other activities.  
- Sens 4 models a bulk complexity increase using the P90 performance norms without any 
associated weight increase and without any associated underperformance effects in other 
activities.  
- Sens5 combines Sens 3 and 4 in a combined quantity/complexity increase.  
- Sens6 applies the effects of an incomplete module fabrication to Sens5 by transferring 5% 
of the module fabrication man-hours offshore as carry-over .  
For all cases, but which will have no effect in Sens1, logistics have been increased by 15% if 
offshore integration man-hours overrun the base estimate by more than 20%, assuming this 
will lead to an extension of the offshore period. This is due to the remote location. Since the 
whole spread is hired for the entire period, it is sensitive to a schedule overrun, but not 
volume variation. Sens4, 5 and 6 each represents combinations of several extreme conditions 
simultaneously. Such circumstances may intuitively be considered unlikely, but are not 
dissimilar to Case 1 in the interaction analysis shown in Table 5-1 above, noting that the P90 
values in Table 5-2 are similar to the overrun factors in the analysis of the overrun 
interrelation effects. The difference between the simulated values and the base estimate is 
shown at the bottom of each sensitivity case with the percentage value related to the base 
estimate. Note that Sens4 has the same order of magnitude as the predefined contingency of 
20% while Sens5 and 6 have the same order of magnitude (30%) as the Case 1 EPCI Lab 
(meaning Labour) overrun in Table 5-1. From this it may be concluded that the deterministic 
sensitivity calculations endorse the assumptions of interaction and the associated order of 
magnitude of overrun. 
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Regarding the likelihood of overrun effects of the above order of magnitude, it was the 
position adopted by the operator that a combination of worst case effects was extremely 
unlikely, and this conclusion was deemed to be supported by the results of the risk analysis 
performed by the operator. 
5.8.2 The simulation model 
The interaction effects that were exposed by the historical analysis and the results of the 
sensitivity analysis were used as a basis for constructing, testing and calibrating a simulation 
model using Crystal Ball. Three models with different degrees of interaction were 
constructed. The calculation basis and the results are presented in Table 5-2 above and Figure 
5-1 below.  
It was found that some of the interactive effects had to be modelled asymmetrically in order 
that the model gave results of the same order of magnitude as the sensitivity calculations 
Sens5 and Sens6. Such an approach can be supported by the following rationale: Individual 
activities may for internal reasons perform well or badly without influencing the succeeding 
activities as long as the deliverables are not delayed. Given a circumstance with delayed 
engineering, or poor interface coordination (for instance a poorly aligned plan basis), the 
engineering efficiency as well as the deliverables to the succeeding activities are likely to be 
affected, thus disturbing the orderly progress of the work. It is presumed that efficient 
engineering that delivers on time will not exercise a positive effect on performance of 
succeeding activities equivalent to the negative effect of non-delivery on time.  
Of course interaction effects may arise between other activities such as prefabrication and 
offshore integration and independently of any other activities. Likewise module fabrication 
may result in carry-over offshore or delays entirely independently of other activities. Offshore 
activities may be adversely affected by poor work continuity due to a lack of beds. So far, 
engineering as the driver of the interaction effects is considered to be the most conservative 
position. Precedence for this view may be found in the analysis of overrun projects. But 
correlation effects are assumed to be progressive in the sense that a mild engineering 
disruption will be associated with a mild disturbance to the downstream activities. 
The individual values were simulated in the columns Sim1, Sim2 and Sim3 using the Base 
estimate values as input along with the Technical/Wt values, the Performance Norm ratios 
and the Rate/Price ratios as shown in Table 5-2 above. The interrelation effects were modelled 
using correlation formulae linking the random values for each activity generated by the 
simulation in the following manner:  
- Bulk Quantity effects: For correlation of effects of bulk quantity variation on the labour 
content the individual Engineering, Prefabrication for Integration, Module fabrication and 
Integration Offshore values were multiplied by the ratio (Bulk Sim)/(Bulk Base) 
- For correlation of bulk quantity effects on offshore Base and Supply Boat costs the 
Base/Supply values were multiplied by the same ratio (Bulk Sim)/(Bulk Base) 
- Engineering underperformance effects: For correlation of Engineering underperformance 
knock-on effects on the succeeding fabrication activities, Prefab for Integration, Module 
Fabrication and Offshore Integration, the individual values were multiplied by a the ratio 
(SimEng)/(Base Eng) applied for all values of (Sim Eng)/(Base Eng) greater than 1. 
- Offshore Productivity Effects: For correlation of offshore productivity effects on offshore 
logistics costs the helicopter and accommodation values were multiplied by the ratio (Sim 
Offsh Integr)/(Base Offsh Integr) 
- For correlation of offshore productivity effects on flotel hire costs, the flotel cost was 
multiplied by the P90 factor for all cases of (Sim Offshore Integration)/(Base Offshore 
Integration) greater than 1.2 assuming an extension of the hire period 
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Note that the engineering knock-on correlation effects and the offshore integration 
productivity effects on flotel hire are applied asymmetrically.  
The range of the bulk quantity variation is also applied asymmetrically (-5/+15%) based on 
the assumption derived from the experience that bulk quantities seldom decrease. The range 
of the bulk quantity variance, +/-10%, is the prescribed level of uncertainty associated with a 
cost uncertainty range of +/-20%. 
5.8.2.1 Results of cost simulation and conclusion 
 
In order to highlight the effects of correlation, simulations were run for three cases that 
modelled increasing degrees of correlation, namely the Sim1, Sim2 and Sim3 cases that can 
be seen in Table 5-2 and the Figure 5-1 below. Sim1 has no correlation effects. Sim2 includes 
correlation between the bulk quantities and the engineering and fabrication labour, offshore 
productivity and logistics costs and effects 
of flotel extension due to schedule delay. 
Sim3 includes the engineering knock-on 
effects as well. A plot of the results of the 
simulations is shown in Figure 5-1 below. 
Note that the Base estimate and the 
respective Pe’s  (Expected Value) have 
been drawn in and labelled in Figure 5-1. 
It can be observed from the dispersion 
profiles in the figure that the range of the 
dispersion increases, the degree of 
asymmetry increases and the difference 
between the Pe and the base estimate 
increases with increasing degrees of 
correlation. Specifically the degree of 
asymmetry is coupled primarily to the 
assymetrical weight distributions and the 
asymmetrical engineering correlation 
effects, noting the marked incremental 
asymmetry in Sim2 and Sim3 with respect 
to Sim1. 
On the basis of the above it may be 
concluded that the results of the simulation 
using the Sim3 model correspond best with 
the historical data. Note that the Sim3 Pe 
satisfies the acceptance criteria while the 
Sim3 P90 value corresponds well with 
historical data and the extreme cases Sens5 
and Sens6. Sim3 is the result of modelling 
full interaction effects between all activities 
and better defines the real uncertainty than 
for example Sim1, in which all the 
activities are treated as independent. In effect, Sim1 permits several activities which are all 
dependent on the same source (volume of work defined in weight metrics), to vary out of 
phase with each other, causing considerable cancelling effects, as is evident from the results. 
Figure 5-1: Effects of correlation 
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Specifically stated, given a weight increase one would expect both engineering and 
fabrication activities to increase synchronously, while the Sim1 model permits engineering, 
bulk material volumes and fabrication activities to fluctuate independently of each other, 
causing cancellation.  
By comparison of the contingency elements in Sim2 compared to Sim3, it can be concluded 
that disruptive organisational effects have the same order of magnitude as the effects of 
weight growth alone. Specifically stated the Sim 2 models the effects of weight growth and 
complexity growth alone while Sim3 includes the effects of organisational disruption as well. 
The Sim3 contingency is twice that of Sim2. 
The Sim3 Pe endorses the prescribed level of contingency (REC = Base +20%). On the other 
hand the Sim3 P90 value is well in excess of the prescribed contingency value. Since the 
Sim3 P90 value is seen to correspond well with the historical cases from Table 5-1 based on 
the norm variation, this must raise doubts whether the prescribed contingency is sufficient to 
compensate for the uncertainty associated with the circumstances of Sens5 and Sens6 for the 
case in question. However, the sensitivity cases Sens5 and Sens6 support the range of 
uncertainty defined by the model. It is also of relevance to note that the overrun analysis also 
indicates that individual activities may overrun to a much greater extent than the average, 
given the adverse integration conditions of Case 2 in Table 5-1, for instance. In order to 
provide illustration of the nature and magnitude of the generic risk elements incorporated in 
the model, these discrete deterministic sensitivity cases have been included as points on the 
dispersion profile frequency chart shown in the Figure 5-2 below.  
 
Figure 5-2: Dispersion profile including generic risk scenaria – Bulk and complexity growth 
It may be concluded from the results that the model above is a better model than the model 
used by the operator referred to in the introduction, which gave results of the order of 
magnitude of Sim1. 
One may see from this that the individual project has a real potential to exceed the limitations 
of the anticipated underperformance as defined by the prescribed contingency on the one hand 
and as defined by the simulated EV and the simulation dispersion on the other. This is 
particularly so under circumstances which lead to disruption of the orderly progress of 
engineering and precipitate underperformance in all follow-on activities.  
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The results of the correlated model endorsed the subjective suspicions of the partners that 
such scenaria are more common than the operator chose to acknowledge and that the real 
level of risk is significantly higher than that proposed by the operator. 
How should the project respond to the risk picture defined by the above simulation? The 
extreme conditions of full correlation may be regarded as low probability high impact risks 
that should not be used to set contingency levels assuming that the conditions that precipitate 
such degrees of overrun are inherently manageable. However the simulation shows that the 
risk and potential impact of such scenaria are high enough to warrant the introduction of 
mitigating measures in the array of risk management procedures available to the project.  
Further details regarding the premises for the model and adaptation for use in successive 
stages of development are discussed in Appendix 3.  
5.9 Conclusion 
The review has presented a tentative model for cost uncertainty simulation which provides 
improved quantitative modelling capability compared to the current procedure.  
The basis for this model was validated by variance analysis of some under-performing 
projects in the historical data. This analysis pointed to a need and provided a basis for 
modelling correlation effects between succeeding activities in the simulation. Simulation 
results were found to coincide well with the historical data and endorse the order of 
magnitude of the recommended levels of contingency associated with estimate classes.    
In order to illustrate the risk evaluation processes as they affect the cost estimating processes, 
the rationale was presented against a case background from a current project. The rationale 
demonstrates that a large part of the uncertainty arising out of the complexity is 
organisationally related and thus indeterminate. Benchmarking against historical data may 
contribute to reducing judgemental subjectivity regarding levels of contingency appropriate 
for the type of indeterminate uncertainties described in the case background and in the 
projects in the historical analysis.  
Performance measurement principles can also be applied in a benchmarking context seeking 
specific explanations for underperformance and in so doing help to define the causal nature of 
the uncertainties, the better to understand appropriate mitigating action.36 One such action that 
points itself out is the implementation of scope monitoring procedures in the standard array of 
project control tools, as presented in this thesis.  
This benchmarking application of performance measurement principles is the theme of the 
next chapter.  
                                                 
36 The type of review referred to is presented briefly in Chapter 3.9 and in the case studies presented in the 
Appendices 1 and 2. 
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6 BENCHMARKING OF PROJECTS  
APPLICATION OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT PRINCIPLES IN BENCHMARKING OF PROJECTS 
6.1 Introduction 
Considering that one of the objectives of this thesis is to promote the use of performance 
measurement as an improvement technique, it is appropriate to address the relationship that 
performance measurement has to the technique of benchmarking.  
While performance measurement is recognised as an essential element pertinent to 
benchmarking success by most practitioners operative in the traditional industrial and 
manufacturing environments, performance measurement in absolute terms has not received 
the same recognition in project related theories and studies or in the realm of practical project 
benchmarking. The quantitative element of much project benchmarking is measured in 
relative terms or at high orders of aggregation. Much project benchmarking is entirely 
qualitative. This approach appears all-pervasive. In certain specific contexts in-depth 
performance measurement in absolute terms may greatly facilitate project benchmarking 
processes by providing insight into own performance and directing attention to areas of 
deviant (good/poor) performance that otherwise may escape attention, thereby directing the 
search for what to benchmark.  
The benchmarking of projects takes place in an organisational context very different to the 
manufacturing industry in which the practice of benchmarking has its roots. This is due to the 
temporary nature of the project and often relatively autonomous position many projects enjoy 
with respect to the owner organisation.   
The objectives of this chapter are to highlight the value in-depth performance measurement 
practices have in facilitating benchmarking of projects, to present documentation for this view 
through case studies, to explore the organisational context in which much project 
benchmarking takes place and finally, to present a generalised process model for 
benchmarking of projects which takes the above perspectives into account.  
6.2 Background 
The practice of BM is grounded in the work of industrial actors who sought improvement for 
their own products and practices by comparing own products, performance and manufacturing 
processes with that of the leading competitors. Great success by the innovator company led to 
the widespread adoption of the benchmarking technique by other companies. Systematic use 
extended the range of search areas for superior performance beyond the immediate arena of 
the competition to include similar industrial functions irrespective of the type of industry. 
Beyond the realm of products and manufacturing processes, it came to include service 
functions, business processes and even strategy. The experience generated by the practice of 
benchmarking has been documented in the literature by several of the pioneer actors 
themselves as a good practice foundation for other potential users, of which the foremost is 
Camp (Camp, 1989). Benchmarking today appears solidly established in industry, the 
business world and academic circles as a technique for improvement with great potential if 
used correctly. Benchmarking is the subject of much research and many publications from 
both academic and functional sources. 
Projects, at least in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea offshore oil industry, less in 
traditional construction industry, have traditionally relied on quality assurance processes, 
ultimately the over-arching TQM approach, as a basis for improvement. This has its roots in 
the techniques of quality control based on statistical sampling as applied to mass production 
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processes 37..TQM extends the role of quality assurance from the domain of controlling organs 
and statistical sampling of production processes to include the involvement of every employee 
in the issues of quality and performance improvement in all the functions and processes in the 
organisation. These principles of pure quality control, as applied to manufacturing processes 
and products, have also been extended, in the guise of quality assurance, continuous 
improvement and TQM, to cover the more intangible products of project management and 
administration. These are engineering, estimating, planning, risk and uncertainty 
management, contractual and scope management, materials procurement processes, financial 
control and budgeting and the several other project management tasks which are intended to 
facilitate the timely and cost efficient execution of the project’s task.  
At times the same principles of quality assurance/TQM have been embodied in the core of 
control legislation, such as the offshore petroleum industry internal control legislation in 
Norway. The internal control legislation defines the duties and self-control obligations of 
industrial actors with respect to conservation of values, such as human safety, prevention of 
environment pollution and the economic value associated with the petroleum facilities 
installed offshore. This legislation has subsequently been extended to the process industry 
onshore and, more recently, to other onshore industry. From the above it is apparent that the 
TQM perspective is well entrenched in the oil and gas industry and without question ensures a 
greater reliability in the industrial production processes and special field operations that 
characterise the industry. 
However, one might justly question that while the TQM approach has contributed to a greater 
uniformity of method and approach and ensured conformity of practice in the individual 
projects with respect to accepted best practices, has it in fact contributed to continuous 
improvement of project management processes 38? Projects still overrun substantially from 
time to time, but also under-perform to a lesser degree on an everyday basis. These overruns 
are generally attributed to underestimation of quantities and complexity, or both, that 
precipitate disruptions in the orderly progress of the work, causing rework and inefficiency 
due to crashing. It is a well known and much debated (but not much researched ?) fact that 
experience transfer, meaning the ability to learn from the experiences of others, between 
projects is a difficult task fraught with obstacles. TQM appears not to have provided solutions 
to these recurrent problems.   
A reason for this failure may be found precisely in the nature of the review routines employed 
in TQM practices which are generally of a single loop character despite ambitions regarding 
the learning potential in TQM practices expressed in much of the TQM literature (Morgan, 
1997). Single loop routines seek non-conformances to established practices and are normally 
satisfied with responses that correct observed deviations. At generic level the review routines 
are guided by a set of rules as defined by standards documents, at project specific level the 
reviews are guided by the project’s own internal procedures, which in turn are based on the 
generic standards documents. The review object, the project, has no requirement to proceed 
beyond the limits of best practice and TQM review has no mandate to demand responses that 
exceed the limits of best practice requirements. 
It is appropriate to note the while much of the original practice underpinning the TQM 
perspective is based on the use of measurement and analysis 39, referring to Bisgaard 
(Bisgaard, 2000) and Kueng (Kueng, 2000) as well as others, TQM review procedures in the 
                                                 
37 Defined in the works of Taylor, Shewhart, Deming, Juran, Feigenbaum, Ishikawa and others. 
38 Used in the sense of single loop corrective action compared to double loop learning processes as expounded by 
Argyris & Schøn. (Argyris, Schøn, 1996). 
39 Referring to Chapter 2 and the literature review (Bisgaard, 2000;Kueng, 2000)   
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oil and gas industry make little use of quantitative performance data, absolute or relative, as a 
basis for directing the focus of their review activities.   
These constraints may have the result that TQM reviews are less responsive to the element of 
‘surprise’ inherent in the search heuristic concept 40 of Nelson and Winter (Nelson ,Winter, 
1982) to which TQM review processes may be exposed, making it difficult to jump the gap to 
double loop performance. In any event, the potential for projects to utilise the insights arising 
from such surprises is inhibited by the organisational context in which many projects operate, 
especially perhaps, the multi-project environment of project-based organisations.  
Benchmarking theory, on the other hand, specifically promotes a mindset that seeks the 
learning and improvement potential inherent to double loop processes. And it is precisely 
learning by experience from others that is the raison d’etre of benchmarking. Thus, and 
inspired by the successes of benchmarking in manufacturing and other ongoing processes, 
academics and practitioners alike have addressed the issue of transferring the technique into 
the environment of projects (Dey, 2002; Emhjellen, 1998; Mohamed, 2002). This area of 
work is also the focus of several professional organisations offering benchmarking services 41.  
Also in benchmarking of projects, as with TQM, there is a trend towards broadening the 
domains that contribute to overall project success, from the traditional execution phase to 
include also the conceptual phase (Andersen, Merna, 2002; Emhjellen, 1998). This, and 
recognising the large degree of commonality between different projects in different industries, 
also leads to a more qualitative perspective of the project on a generic basis that encompasses 
all types of projects in any industrial context (Miller, Lessard, 2000). But, the trend towards a 
largely qualitative approach in the interest of finding unified generalised theories may be 
detrimental to the development and use of traditional methods. Traditional methods are based 
on absolute forms of quantitative performance measurement and associated analysis 
applicable in very specific industrial contexts that characterise benchmarking in the 
manufacturing industry. This trend towards qualitative evaluations in benchmarking may be 
seen as analogous to the non-quantitative nature of the TQM review procedures42 mentioned 
above. In this regard it may be observed that project benchmarking activities in the oil and gas 
industry largely limit the quantitative performance measurement to high levels of aggregation. 
Lack of in-depth measurement is not conducive to understanding and insight in own processes 
and levels of performance, otherwise regarded as a prerequisite of good benchmarking 
practice.  
While not disregarding the legitimacy of the above-mentioned broad-based qualitative and 
generic perspectives on project management success or failure, it is project success or failure 
in an execution context that is the major concern of the majority of project practitioners and 
which receives the most focus in the popular and industry news media. In this context, 
methods, tools and techniques aimed at in-depth insights into the execution circumstances of 
specific types of projects in specific industrial contexts are of central importance. 
                                                 
40 Control routines by one part of an organization may be the source of insights to another part of the 
organization – in a project context this becomes a question of the base organization’s perspective (long 
term/custodian of best practice) as opposed to the project perspective (short term/user of best practice).  
41 IMEC; IPA 
42 Referring to review procedures as distinct from general implementation practices, believing that TQM calls for 
implementation of best practice in the operating routines of projects – thus it is only in the context of reviews 
that insights leading to CI might arise. In spite of the expressed view that CI is an objective it normally lies 
outside the mandate of a project to be innovative beyond the range of its mandate.    
 106
6.3 The organisational context of project benchmarking 
The benchmarking of projects takes place in a special organisational context that has 
implications for the way benchmarking activities are organised to an extent that may be 
definitive for success or failure. 
The benchmarking rationale in general presumes that the process owner both initiates and 
implements the results of any particular benchmarking exercise. But the project is not the 
process owner. Transferring the traditional approach to projects implies that any given project 
benchmarks itself against some other project in its own or some external company and own or 
other industry and implements the results in its own routines. This means treating a project as 
a firm. But the time-limited cyclic nature of projects renders this approach impractical. Owing 
to the cyclic nature and schedule constraints that dictate the priorities of most projects, the 
results of benchmarking a project can only practically be implemented in new projects. But 
this again is practically difficult, since the project organisation will dissolve after completion 
of its task. Thus new practices can practically only be implemented if the same project 
organisation transfers intact over to a new project, which is seldom the case even within 
project – based organisations. Alternatively, BM results may be implemented in new projects 
through championship by empowered individuals. However, in environments with a well 
established base organisation, the implementation of new routines will normally require the 
sanction of the base organisation through the medium of best practice. In conformance with 
the TQM perspective, new routines will normally require implementation in the best practice 
which is defined by the process owner through the functioning of the base organisation. From 
this one may conclude that benchmarking practices in projects can most efficiently be 
executed, and results implemented, if performed under the auspices of the process owner and 
the base organisation, which are operative over a longer time-cycle than projects and can 
therefore bridge the gap between individual projects.   
Since project performance can really only be judged in hindsight, the time-related issue also 
has a bearing on the basis of comparison for assessing performance. The standard sequence 
for setting up a benchmarking program, advocated by many practitioners in non-project based 
industry and services, is to seek proof of good performance before starting to measure the 
activities of the good performer. This approach is impractical in a project context. The 
conclusion follows from the fact that the majority of the key processes in the project life cycle 
will already have passed, and opportunities been lost, to observe and measure, before superior 
performance is confirmed. This time-related problem can be overcome by instituting some 
sort of generic measurement practice in several selected, or all, projects in a portfolio. The 
results from individual projects may then be highlighted against a background of general 
performance, based on the results of several projects, thereby providing a basis for isolating 
deviant (good or poor) performance as a starting point for qualitative review. Such an 
approach will solve all the problems outlined above, but presupposes an appropriate level of 
performance measurement in all projects. 
The time-limited but cyclic nature of project work poses other problems regarding the direct 
transfer of the generalised routines developed originally for application to manufacturing 
processes. Due to the complex nature of project work with its many interactions that 
collectively impact the final outcome of the project, the whole project must be benchmarked. 
Measurement only at aggregate level will pose problems in identifying the specific practices 
leading to collective superior or inferior performance. This circumstance speaks for an in-
depth measurement of performance that facilitates identification of the elements of the project 
organisation that are the superior performers, or the underperformers. Measurements may, in 
addition, need to be spaced out in time through the project life cycle, in order to highlight the 
development of the interaction effects between core processes. In contrast, the traditional 
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benchmarking approach may select an activity, function or process to benchmark,  in isolation 
from other activities, functions or processes, knowing that the process being benchmarked is 
an ongoing process with a definable and controllable routine where both the detail functioning 
and the relationships with the larger context are relatively stable over of time. Recycling of 
lessons learned is practically feasible and can be tested. This continuity is not available to the 
project benchmarker.  
Based on the above rationale, this thesis has two main proposals regarding the use of 
benchmarking in projects: 
1) A suitable background for performance comparison can be achieved using the set of 
performance measurement parameters outlined in preceding chapters. Thereafter, 
benchmarking techniques may be applied in order to identify the qualitative issues 
underlying good quantitative results along the lines of the case studies presented in 
Chapter 3.9 and Appendix 1 and 2.  
2)  A project-related theory of benchmarking will need to address the lack of routines aimed 
at bridging the gap between successive projects and the organisational relationships and 
mandate for experience transfer between projects. These are generally grounded in the 
concept of the project as a unique stand-alone entity, relatively independent of the base 
organisation and the process owner. It may be appropriate to redefine the concept of the 
project as simply a batch (or time-limited cycle in the long-term process) whereby 
stakeholders make repeated use of the project form of organisation to implement 
strategic investments. The shift in emphasis from the autonomous project entity to the 
multi-project organisational environment may be necessary to emphasize this different 
perspective on the issues of experience transfer between projects. It is the process owner 
(who is the project owner) who should have the active role in ensuring experience 
transfer from current projects to future projects. This concept, of the project seen as a 
batch in a longer term industrial context, applies equally to industries making capital 
investments as part of their business strategy (eg oil companies investing in capital 
plants), industries providing services (eg engineering and management consultants) and 
to specialist manufacturers (whole plants, sub-plants, individual items of equipment, 
shipbuilding, etc) providing bespoke products.  
The above discourse has not always differentiated adequately between the benchmarking of 
on-going manufacturing processes compared to the benchmarking of time-limited processes 
inherent to the nature of projects. However, and echoing Mohamed (Mohammed, 1996) as 
mentioned Chapter 2, projects may be regarded as subordinate elements in organisations that 
do business through projects. Projects may thus be likened to large-scale purpose-built 
assembled products and as such are special cases of manufacturing, with a long cycle time 43. 
This in turn suggests that there is no need to address projects specifically when setting up 
benchmarking process models beyond that of taking into account the special nature of the 
processes involved and the organisational dispositions within these organisations regarding 
the way projects are mandated and run. Each individual project is but a repetitive subroutine 
in a broader process that is more extensive over time and that incorporates whole projects as 
cycles of repetition. In this context benchmarking of projects in fact means to benchmark the 
skills of the overarching project owner organisation in utilising the project form of 
organisation as a method for managing capital investment processes or simply as a means of 
doing business, or both. This approach has special relevance for project-based industries 
performing work of a broadly similar nature, such as the design and construction of oil and 
                                                 
43 Meaning that there are large sectors of the industry that operate on a bespoke basis, producing large and 
complex assembled products, rather than off-the-shelf products. 
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gas production facilities, and that wish to employ benchmarking techniques as improvement 
tools.  
Contrary to the apparent general trend away from quantitative benchmarking in the 
manufacturing industry expressed in several papers and publications, the author is of the 
opinion that quantitative benchmarking is an essential element in any benchmarking process 
model intended for use in project-based industries that make extensive use of the project 
mode of organisation. This has particular relevance for oil and gas and other process industry 
that has the means readily available to measure performance on a generic basis, thereby 
facilitating comparison between projects and actors. This view has extensive support in the 
literature, but primarily in the context of manufacturing (Bisgaard, 2000; Camp, 1989; Feuer, 
Chaharbagi, 1995; Kueng, 2000; Mohamed, 1996; Spendolini, 1992). 
This is then the traditional background in which benchmarking as an improvement technique 
in projects will also have to function. This theme is also elaborated elsewhere, in Chapter 2 
and in Chapter 7. Chapter 2 is a general review of the professional press seeking relatable 
research while Chapter 7 is a review of literature and a discussion of the organisational 
theoretical perspectives pertaining to the themes of this dissertation.  
6.4 A process model for benchmarking of projects 
An approach to BM as a special function or tool of TQM, may be fruitful when applying the 
concepts of BM to projects rather than the apparent piecemeal approach that has characterised 
much benchmarking in manufacturing so far, as seen by some researchers (Carpinetti, de 
Melo, 2002; Underdown, Talluri, 2002; Yasin, 2002). This approach is applied holistically in 
the processes and structures that form the core of the proposed practical performance 
measurement applications that are defined as part of this thesis. Central to this approach are 
the following sequential BM process activities: 
-  an ongoing quantitative performance measurement of key activities, functions or 
processes in individual projects and correlation of results (provides a basis for 
understanding own processes and levels of performance) 
-  systematic quantitative comparison of forecast and final performance in individual 
projects in order to detect deviations with respect to norms of performance and project-
specific goals (serves a purpose for project-specific project control purposes as well as 
evaluation and comparison of life-cycle development with other projects) 
-  systematic qualitative review (ongoing and final) of the project performance with respect 
to own goals and general norms of performance and with special focus on the deviant  
processes, activities or functions in order to establish the root cause of the observed 
deviations as a basis for improvement (internal benchmarking) 
- use of findings in individual projects (seen against a background of general performance 
based on performance data from many projects) as a basis for selecting what to 
benchmark in in-depth functional and process benchmarking  
- implementation of the findings in the best practice documents for use by current (where 
possible) and new projects  
- extension of benchmarking effort as defined above to the external domain (performance 
measurement as a basis for review of partner operated projects and other actors in the 
same field) 
 
An essential feature of the above model is the organisational dispositions regarding mandate 
for experience transfer and the roles and duties of the discrete projects. A primary feature is 
the need to promote an enduring practice of measurement, analysis and review as a basis for 
understanding own processes and performance and as a basis for experience transfer. 
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Responsibility for experience transfer should be allocated to an organisational entity that is 
continuous in time in order to bridge the gaps between discrete projects. In this way the 
responsibilities can be better aligned with the functional realities and goals of the 
organisational entities that are involved, respectively the discrete project and the base 
organisation, and ensure cooperative interplay.  
The approach outlined above is considered to rest on the already extant general theory 
founded in TQM 44 (Bisgaard, 2000; Bendell, Bolton, Kelly, 1993; Carpinetto, de Melo, 2002; 
Mohamed, 1996; Ramabadron, Dean, Evans, 1997; Underdown, Talluri, 2002; Yasin, 2002), 
and specifically utilises the strengths of benchmarking processes for the purposes of 
establishing the qualitative root causes of good or poor performance through the processes of 
experience transfer.  
Irrespective of the approach, be it BM, TQM, CI, what ever, there is a general consensus 
(Nelson,Winter,1982; Sørensen,1996; Utterback,1994)  that research is essential in innovative 
organisations as a background to the routine processes utilised in routine tasks. In a more 
general context it may be said that research underpins the understanding of all science and 
science-based processes (Bisgaard, 2000; Kueng, 2000; Latour, 1997). In the context of this 
chapter this research takes the form of systematic collection and analysis of own performance 
and that of other actors in the same or similar fields of operation. The results of such a process 
are better insight and understanding of own processes and performance by providing 
theoretical insights that are anchored in experience. These insights can be continually tested 
and developed in the light of new data and may be translatable into methods, tools and 
formats and other forms that facilitate transfer of tacit knowledge in communities of practise 
by processes of organisational learning 45. 
6.5 Types of benchmarking and characteristics of the benchmarking 
process model 
Closer examination of the generally accepted types of benchmarking indicates that a slight re-
alignment of perspective may be appropriate regarding benchmarking of projects. 
Projects may best be compared by using ‘internal’ benchmarking processes. This is 
particularly suitable in the multi-project environment. Indeed there is hardly any point in 
benchmarking projects in organisations that seldom use the project form of organisation 
unless this is performed by stakeholders such as governmental authorities, project based 
organisations like EPC contractors and research-based organisations that have need of a wider 
view. This is due, as pointed out previously, to the time-limited nature of projects that makes 
it difficult to implement the results of benchmarking in the project under review. Thus the use 
of benchmarking as an improvement tool is only of practical value in a multi-project 
environment. The benchmarking approach proposed in this dissertation, that of routine 
identification and measurement of the core processes in the project life cycle on a 
                                                 
44 As summarised by the Denning/Shewhart Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle. 
45 For instance the accepted norms and rules of thumb used in estimating are anchored in a background of 
specific experiences gleaned from specific projects which may not be known to the estimators (in other words 
the details in the data set from which the typical reference values are derived is not always known to the 
estimator). Given a problem the estimator must revert to first principles for which there is normally not enough 
time available. Previous practice, due to lack of systematic data collection, has been the ad hoc collection of 
experience data from current or recent works without any means of judging the rightness of performance 
levels – systematic collection and analysis of own and other relevant performance data in a form of continuous 
performance measurement and BM circumvents this problem by updating the database with projects known to 
the estimators and which they may have estimated themselves thus enhancing their ability to ‘read’ the data 
holistically. Additionally this speaks for the involvement of the estimators in the later life of ‘their’ projects by 
participation in the data collection and project review processes.  
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standardised basis (performance benchmarking), leads to identification of processes for 
review as a result of performance deviation. This may in turn kick off a process comparison 
with other projects (process benchmarking) especially with regard to deviations that are 
recurrent in several projects. For instance, specific activities or functions may be isolatable as 
suitable for specific process benchmarking along the lines of practise in the manufacturing 
and service industries. In such a case one might benefit by parallel review of the same 
function in several projects as a test of the application of the best practice guidelines by the 
project management.  
Considering the independence and autonomy the project organisations enjoy and the varying 
nature of the project constraints that often require project specific project management 
approaches, one might justifiably argue that there are in addition ‘competitive’ and 
‘functional’  elements in the benchmarking of projects using the proposed methods. Since the 
method provides a standardised set of performance parameters by which to measure 
performance for all the key processes for all projects, real competitive and functional 
benchmarking is facilitated, at least in the world of oil and gas offshore modification projects 
But internal benchmarking processes have the same shortcomings as continuous improvement 
processes that rarely look beyond own organisation. Seeking world-class performance by 
benchmarking of projects in external organisations (e.g. seeking world class partners), the 
benchmarker is confronted with similar ambiguities. There is no reason why one excellent 
project should not form the basis of a world class benchmarking review. But the fact that 
excellence is usually not apparent until the project is complete poses problems for the 
benchmarker because the organisation will disappear. However, project outcomes can be 
circumstantial. Accordingly, an organisation’s track record, established over several projects, 
is a better basis for judging capability. Thus world-class performance in projects can really 
only be judged against a portfolio of projects in the form of consistent good performance. The 
outcome of such reviews is likely to reflect the portfolio of good practice tools and techniques 
available to the managers, understanding of critical success factors and the climate of internal 
communication and experience transfer between projects in the organisation (dissemination of 
tacit knowledge in communities of practice). From this it must be clear that in the absence of 
good quantitative performance measurement data across a wide range of projects, it will be 
practically difficult to select good performers.  
By good quantitative performance measurement data is meant absolute measures of actual 
performance as outlined in earlier chapters. The traditional relative measures of performance 
are certainly useful indicators for assessing performance at higher orders of aggregation, but 
are nevertheless deficient in identifying real efficiency. To elaborate, a cost under-run with 
respect to budget may simply be the result of generous budgeting. Under-run in such a context 
is not necessarily a sign of good practice. In contrast, an over-run project may, as a result of 
good management practices, have performed well with respect to the challenges inherent in 
the overrun context, but it will not be recognised as such if only the relative measures, to 
exclusion, are considered as selection criteria.  
It must be stressed that this review must take a qualitative form. The quantitative format is 
absolutely essential in order to establish levels of actual performance against norms of 
performance, but the actual evaluation can only be judged in terms of the project-specific 
issues confronting the project manager. As a point of departure in a review process aimed at 
establishing the root cause of performance gaps, quantitative deviations and anomalies in the 
actual performance in relation to anticipated values point to areas of specific interest for 
qualitative review of the project-specific issues that gave rise to the deviations.  
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Finally, benchmarking of projects is a matter of benchmarking the performance of individual 
managers, the quality and completeness of the best practice portfolio, the ability to apply the 
available tools and techniques to the problems and challenges of the mandate and the ability 
to communicate experiences within the community of practice.   
6.6 Conclusion 
Review of reference literature has exposed limitations with regard to the benchmarking of 
projects. In the texts of this discussion alternative perspectives have been argued in the form 
of comments and in the form of an introductory summary. In general this perspective has the 
following elements:  
- individual projects may viewed as a single repetitive cycle in a long term process for the 
implementation of capital investments that makes extensive use of the project form of 
organisation    
- processes of quantitative performance measurement may facilitate the benchmarking of 
projects by identifying performance deviations as a point of departure for qualitative 
review regarding causal effects 
- assessment of project success in terms of performance related to qualities of the product in 
absolute terms 
- a set of ‘generic’ parameters for ongoing quantitative performance measurement with 
associated metrics as background for benchmarking (specific to modification projects)  
- the process owner, and not the individual project must take the role of the benchmarker in 
a multi-project environment that uses the project form of organisation extensively  
- experience transfer between projects is the responsibility of the process owner through the 
medium of best practice and not the individual project 
 
The rationale has also demonstrated that the alternative approach presented here conforms to 
the general theory of benchmarking. Case studies have been included that demonstrate 
applications of the method in practice in Appendices 1 and 2. The case histories also 
demonstrate that the metrics and the parameter matrix are capable of identifying the locus of 
deviations, hence providing a focus for further investigation in a way that more aggregate 
metrics of performance and pure process benchmarking would not be able to achieve.  
It has also been demonstrated in other chapters in this document that the metrics of 
quantitative performance measurement support other project administration activities in an 
holistic fashion thus ensuring synergies in the data collection processes. 
 112
7 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AS AN INSTRUMENT 
OF EXPERIENCE TRANSFER AND ORGANISATIONAL 
LEARNING  
  AN ORGANISATION THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
7.1 Introduction 
The recurrent schedule and budget overruns which are experienced with all types of 
construction projects, in spite of the routine nature of the work and the familiarity and 
experience of the participants both with one another and with the type of work, provides an 
arena for focus on methods for organisational learning. This chapter will explore, from an 
organisational theoretical perspective, the insights gained in attempts to promote performance 
measurement and benchmarking methods for project control and experience transfer in 
production facility modification work in the oil industry.  
The project is seen by many as the modern form of organisation of work suitable for the 
realisation of major developments of unique one-off nature. Inspired by the success and 
achievements of such lofty ambitions as the ‘man on the moon by the end of the decade’ and 
‘the challenge of the North Sea’, the project form of work has become synonymous with 
innovation and industrial creativity and has become the all-pervasive organisational form for 
almost any non-routine type of work.  
Many industries employ the project organisational form for more mundane one-off tasks that 
are nevertheless sufficiently large, or complex, or unique as to warrant the use of the project 
type of organisation. Typical of this is the construction industry that for years employed the 
project form of organisation, but without capturing the public imagination in the same way as 
NASA’s space program or the earlier days of the oil industry developments in the North Sea 
have done.  
In my company, as an example, the project form of organisation is employed for all forms of 
construction work from the very smallest modifications (platform maintenance), through 
individual small, medium and large platform refitting projects combined at times with 
elements of new field developments, to very large new field developments that command a lot 
of attention in the national press and indeed national legislature. 
The greater number of these projects is relatively mundane, constructing the same type of 
constructions, involving the same participants both in terms of individuals and companies and 
generally employing well-known industrial components and manufacturing processes. The 
central task is to co-ordinate the effort of the individual participants in new but often similar 
contexts, where the participants are experts in their respective fields. Indeed the greater part of 
the task is bringing to fruition the concepts conceived, designed and conceptually engineered 
during the early, primarily creative phases of the project. The work is often of a routine and 
repetitive, but also often highly skilled, nature. The constraints are generally not conducive to 
creativity and innovation, which may in fact be actively discouraged, unless the project is 
confronted with a crisis. Nevertheless, a practical, dynamic, action-oriented, innovative and 
creative image of the project persists compared to the theoretical, non-action-oriented image 
of the base organisations.  
In spite of the repetitive and cyclic nature of the work, many industries that routinely employ 
the project form of work organisation often experience random but recurrent problems of 
schedule and budget overruns even in the more mundane areas of work. These random but 
recurrent overruns are associated by many with the lack of effective experience transfer 
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between projects as a process of organisational learning from past good performance or 
mistakes toward improvement of performance in the longer term. 
The intent of this chapter is to provide some insights and make some proposals pertaining to 
this problematic area of experience transfer on the basis of experiences gained with attempts 
to introduce performance measurement based methods to support project control processes 
and experience transfer in modification projects in the offshore oil industry.  
These experiences and proposals may also be applicable in other areas of project work such as 
process plant modifications and greenfield oil and gas developments both onshore and 
offshore.  
7.2 Considerations concerning criteria for success  
“On time within budget to prescribed quality”. This is a relative form of goal-setting that is 
consistent with the concept of the project as a unique one-off event and is legitimate in the 
short term of the individual project life cycle. However, in industries that repeatedly use the 
project form of organisation, the individual project can be seen as a batch in a longer-term 
multi-project multi-cycle work process. In such a context the levels of production 
performance in hard terms are of interest as a means to test the efficiency of production and 
administration methods, as well as contractual strategies, with a view to improvement of 
performance. The criteria for judging the success of a project gains a new dimension which is 
more in line with conventional production processes. 
The random but recurrent cost and schedule overruns mentioned in the introduction are 
generally associated with initial under-estimation of the quantities of materials embodied in 
the works, compounded by the complexity 46 of the work itself, the methods required for 
installation, the physical constraints of the location of the work and the constraints of the 
schedule. Particular circumstances may change the relative influence of these variables, where 
the recognition of and coping with changing circumstances constitutes the main task of the 
management and the project control functions in the project organisation. This is valid not 
only with respect to differences of character from project to project (batch-to-batch), but also 
with respect to changing circumstances within the individual project as it progresses through 
its life cycle. 
Central to this task is to monitor the status of the work with respect to the committed goals. 
This information constitutes the knowledge basis for control and corrective action by the 
project management. Experience has shown that the monitoring activities often ‘miss’ the 
quantity and complexity changes that occur during the process of concept development and 
which are recurrent features of overruns. Yet project management is in general slow to adopt 
alternative methods, such as the performance measurement based project control and 
benchmarking techniques put forward in this thesis, which have the capability of closing this 
important knowledge gap. This is in spite of the fact that ‘experience transfer’ is one of the 
foremost icons of project management, to which extensive lip service is offered. 
This thesis proposes that this phenomenon is rooted in the concept of the project as a unique 
one-off event where comparison with other projects is deemed of little relevance and that 
indeed the normative monitoring methods themselves reflect this ‘relative-to-itself’ control 
philosophy.  
                                                 
46 By complexity is meant a more work-hour demanding process as exemplified by the difference in work-hour 
content between the fabrication and installation of long lengths of straight run piping compared to piping with 
many bends and short runs of straight pipe. 
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An odd aspect of the normative perspective is the very uniformity and lack of differentiation 
in approach irrespective of the special properties of the task at hand. This is inconsistent with 
the image of uniqueness, especially as regards the ability of the project control methods to 
isolate the unique aspects of the work so that they may be handled as ‘uniquely’ as 
circumstances require. 
7.3 The nature of the performance measurement method 
The introduction proposes the use of performance measurement techniques to support project 
control processes both in the short term of the individual project life cycle and in the longer 
multi-project multi-cycle perspective.  
Any measurement system of production efficiency with aspirations to support long-term 
processes of experience transfer and improvement of project management methods will need 
to include a qualitative dimension that explicates the hard quantitative measurements of 
production efficiency. Qualitative methods are however inadequate in themselves. This 
qualitative/quantitative 47 interplay has the character of benchmarking processes and may be 
applied internally in the organisation or externally for comparison with external actors. 
Both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of benchmarking presuppose the correct 
identification of the core processes involved in the project life cycle. The greater the 
complexity of the work, the more challenging the selection of performance parameters 
sufficient to encompass and highlight the character of the individual project within a 
framework of generalised applicability to modification work. For information purposes, refer 
to the table of parameters proposed as suitable for the measurement of most modifications, 
Table 3-1). The table provides a practical example of the nature of the core processes and hard 
quantitative forms of production measurement featuring in this discussion.   
Central to the proposed benchmarking methods is to measure the development of the concept 
of each project in terms of the quantities of materials embodied in the works as well as to 
correlate with planned and actual resource use throughout the project lifecycle. Broken down 
into core processes and content, these material and resource data constitute a description of 
both the quantities and the complexity of the work to be performed. Comparison with 
previous work of similar nature, or possibly interpolation, provides a basis for adjusting the 
commitment frame (work-hours, cost, time) to changed circumstances. Review of the 
qualitative aspects of previous work can provide insights as to choice of method and approach 
to problems of a similar nature. A central point to be made is that the quantitative 
comparisons provide a pointer to areas of work where qualitative experiences of others may 
be of relevance. Benchmarking processes are seen as a form of search heuristic 48 with 
capability of exposing incipient problems before they manifest themselves in other forms 
(such as schedule stress, delays or excessive resource use) at a later time in the execution 
cycle of the project, thereby giving project management a longer response time for corrective 
action before problems become critical.  
This approach is supportive of both project control processes specific to an individual project 
in the short term and experience transfer between projects and the long-term cyclic 
perspective. In this context estimating is seen as a specialist form of experience transfer as 
well as a specific form of project control tool.     
                                                 
47 For the sake of clarity: quantitative means the use of numbers to measure performance such as work-hours per 
tonne while qualitative is descriptive in nature, defining circumstances that may have a bearing on the size of 
the numbers which were calculated from quantitative data.  
48 A heuristic is any principle or device that contributes to the reduction in the average search for a solution 
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7.4 Experience with implementation  
In the preceding introductory descriptions it has been suggested that the conservatism of 
project administration with respect to changing practice is organisationally grounded and 
reflected in the modus operandi of the project organisation and endorsed by its greater 
organisational environment. At the same time, however, the project administration is 
committed to support the ‘icons’ of management theory as embodied in corporate goals, such 
as continuous improvement, experience transfer and organisational learning. This is a 
potentially conflicting situation.  
Through the example of own observations and experiences over several years with 
implementation of data gathering routines and benchmarking techniques, there are indications 
of logical discontinuities, deficient ‘system’ understanding and poor cross-functional 
coordination on the part of the several actors concerned. This chapter presents a selection of 
rational anomalies drawn from experiences related to the author’s own attempts to gather data 
and promote benchmarking methods. This theme is very subject-specific and therefore the 
discussion must of necessity be technically quite detailed at times in order to expose the 
nature of the anomalies which are embedded in the logic of the work processes under 
scrutiny. Explanatory footnotes have been provided where found necessary.  
In the succeeding sections, and in justification of the methods proposed here, these constraints 
to organisational learning will be reviewed in the light of the work of several researchers in 
the field of organisational studies. 
7.4.1 Anomalies of behaviour encountered in projects 
Anomaly 1 – concerning comparability 
Among many modification project practitioners, a view prevails that modification work is too 
complex and variable to permit meaningful comparison at high orders of aggregation, 
commonly expressed as ‘… comparing apples to pears….’ for instance. This view refers typically 
to parameters such as NOK/barrel or NOK/tonne, which are used to compare capital 
investment efficiency between companies, also being used to compare performance between 
projects. This view is legitimate. Anomalous to that view, it is also commonly held that a 
simplified set of performance parameters, such as that shown in the Table 3-1, and the 
principles for data structuring that underpin these parameters are too complex for practical use 
and too demanding with regard to data collection in terms of work-hours. This opinion is 
often compounded by the view that ‘…. the work will cost what that sort of work costs….’ implying 
that the results cannot be significantly influenced. This view is depreciative of the role of 
project control overall and resistive to any forms of measurement of production efficiency.  
Anomaly 2 – concerning sufficiency of method despite past failures 
Amongst protagonists of project control as a discipline, on the other hand, the standard 
accepted methods of control are considered to be adequate project control tools in spite of 
repeated occasions of resource and schedule overrun that must be construable as failure or, at 
least, insufficiency of method. The method functions through the establishment of relative 
forms of resource measurement based on the results of detailed engineering through the 
preparation of detail level task sheets 49, which form part of the detailed planning effort. 
Control is based on the comparison of actual and planned man-hours with earned man-hours, 
all work having been converted to planned man-hours, which is the relative basis for 
comparing status. The planned work-hour accumulations, if deviant from the original 
                                                 
49 Task sheets are documents detailing the materials, technical documents, fabrication methods and installation 
procedures, and work-hour estimates related to a specific piece of work and containing sufficient information 
to support the work in the field.  
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assumptions, tell nothing of the reasons for the deviation, which may for example be quantity 
or complexity. The detailed basis for the work has the consequence that the overall fabrication 
resource requirement cannot be tested quantitatively until the full results of detail engineering 
are completed. If deviations to the committed values are present, a long period of planning 
will have been lost and particularly the opportunity to change elements of the design. This 
view was once aptly rephrased as ‘…. once we’ve done the detailed engineering, we normally have a good 
handle on the scope….’.  At this stage the average project may have run about 50% of its allotted 
course and committed about 50% of its budget, due allowance being made for early material 
purchases. In fact, the overall engineering resource requirement will normally not be tested 
quantitatively at all by the standard approach, the consequence being that engineering effort 
can only be influenced by hindsight of failed performance. This is unfortunate in view of the 
criticality of timely engineering activity for successful project execution.  
It may be added that the successful completion of projects that do not experience growth is 
not necessarily a result of the sufficiency of the monitoring systems. This is borne out by the 
fact that examination in hard terms of the final results of some projects which were generally 
considered to be a success, has at times revealed poor levels of performance. The opposite has 
also been experienced, namely that projects that were judged to have been difficult, were 
found to have performed well in the final result. But failure to predict the outcome in cases 
where growth does occur, is most likely to be a failure of method.  
There are, of course, situations other than growth that create problems for management, but 
uncertainty regarding the man-hour frame is a recurrent dilemma. These different types of 
situation have been addressed in the texts of the previous chapters and in the case studies of 
Appendix 1 and 2.  
Anomaly 3 – concerning the accuracy of cost and work-hour estimates based on weight 
estimates   
The above perspective is mirrored in the objection brought to bear by many contractors, and 
through them by the owner’s personnel, that there is an inadequate technical basis for making 
the weight reports, which are central to the benchmarking process, until the detailed 
engineering process is complete. This promotes doubt concerning the accuracy of the 
estimates that can be made from this source. Overlooked, however, is the fact that MTOs, for 
the purposes of initiating material purchases, must be, and are, prepared well before 
completion of the detailed engineering. Similarly structural analysis requires definition of the 
structural loadings embodied in the new installations. Both processes are based on preliminary 
quantity take-offs requiring iteration as detail engineering proceeds.  
If the above argument were true, weight estimates stemming from the technical basis of 
earlier studies would be even more prone to inaccuracy. Weight estimates are of course the 
basis of the project conceptual study estimates, made in an earlier phase of the development 
cycle, and often by the same contractor. These conceptual study estimates are the basis of the 
owner’s commitment and the master control estimate defining the project’s cost, schedule and 
work-hour goals, which are fundamental to the monitoring effort. By the above argument, the 
control foundation of the entire project is based on an inadequate premise.  
The discontinuity of insight and method implied by these arguments is often attributed to the 
differences in attitude resulting from organisational separation. The people as well as the 
organisation doing the conceptual engineering in the contractor’s organisation are not the 
same people and organisation doing the project detailed engineering and fabrication, which 
provides an argument in support of the need for experience transfer.  
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Anomaly 4 – concerning cross-functional alignment of common processes 
From the above it is evident that the weight reporting requirements seen from a technical 
point of view are different to the requirements of weight reporting seen in a project control 
and procurement point of view.  Technical personnel often make issue with the degree of 
detail required. Typically, being small items, the electrical and instrument materials have little 
impact on the structural loadings and are therefore often neglected. The same applies to small 
valves and small bore piping. However, the installation of these small weights is highly work-
hour demanding and accurate estimation is impossible in the absence of precision in defining 
the quantities involved. Clearly, a higher degree of precision is required to provide weight 
data intended for project control purposes and estimating. Again, the presence of such 
anomalies between different functions in the same organisation supports the argument for 
experience transfer. 
Anomaly 5 – more concerning the accuracy of estimates 
Regarding the accuracy of estimates derived from weight reports, it is of interest to note that 
as part of the standard budget control effort, the scope of the committed contracts is normally 
adjusted for additions to the contractual scope of work. These additions are normally very 
poorly defined and the estimates are correspondingly of low accuracy. The net result is 
normally inflation in the contract incentive mechanisms (target cost for example) due to the 
large risk content included in the additions. However, the budget coverage of the total labour 
scope is not verified in the update processes by monitoring growth of quantities of materials. 
Paradoxically, better quality estimates of the development of the total scope based on total 
material quantities that can be defined from the ongoing detailed engineering by the weight 
estimating specialists in the contractor organisation, are considered superfluous to the 
standard methods.  
Anomaly 6 – more concerning sufficiency of method despite past failures 
Experienced personnel, both base and project, resort to essentially three arguments when 
attempting to account for the overrun deviations and identify action to remedy the problem: 
firstly, deficient estimating practices, calling for improvement of methods, secondly, poor 
concept definition, calling for better quality engineering in early-phase work, and thirdly, 
additions to scope which are not included in the project budgets, calling for better change 
control. 
This evokes the response on the part of many actors (normally non-estimators) that the 
estimating practices are good enough given that the concept is well enough defined in the 
form of the input to the estimates. In short, if the weights are right then the estimate is usually 
right. The argument has the intent of calling for more front-end engineering, but has the effect 
of diminishing the estimating perspectives brought to bear on the problem such as the 
monitoring of the concept development (weight development) itself in a format suitable for 
estimating. The alternative is seen as simply to do more engineering, but for this there is no 
guarantee as to the quality of the work performed.  Unfortunately, and paradoxically, the 
effect of this argument, while implicitly consistent with the monitoring principle of control, 
does not endorse the use of weight estimating skills as a technical discipline for the purpose of 
improving the quality of the periodic updates. In the performance measurement approach 
proposed here this potential concept deficiency is recognised as a recurrent problem related to 
quality of the study work, complexity of concept, and so on, for which there is no certain 
remedy and for which reason it is deemed prudent to institute control mechanisms as part of 
the standard package of project control tools. The techniques also provide a basis for coping 
with the quantity and complexity changes embodied in the third argument above.  
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Anomaly 7 – concerning ‘explaining away’ the lack of response to improvement proposals 
There is normally no lack of agreement amongst project managers regarding the need for 
experience data from completed projects in the light of the uncertainty associated with quality 
and maturity of the concept, which it is their task to build. 
Yet the same managers often display a consistent reluctance to institute routines that monitor 
the development of the concept. Examples of the reasoning for not adopting such practices 
are: 
-   project control and engineering resources should have priority to work on the periodic 
cost and schedule adjustment 
- updating of weight estimates will disturb the work of engineering at a critical stage  
- the costs of performing the work are too high  
- the requested data will be part of the close-out report 
 
The terminal point endorses the point made earlier that comparison with other projects is 
often seen as having little relevance to the work at hand. Of no avail the argument that 
updated weight estimates provide a better basis to support the periodic updates. Of no avail 
the fact that engineering personnel must in any event give their timely input in the form of 
materials estimates in order to support the procurement of materials program or cause 
fabrication delay. Reduction of the number of weight estimate updates will only have a 
marginal effect since the task is normally part of the agreed scope of work, at least for the 
purposes of providing MTOs and supporting structural analyses. Overlooked are the added 
synergy values achieved by extending the use and range of application of work which must be 
carried out anyway.  
Anomaly 8 – concerning the help potential of experience data 
Many managers do not support the gathering of experience data, simply not believing in its 
potential. Justification for this attitude is that in the past the custodians of experience data 
have not been able to offer any help when problems arose. This is a self-predictive loop 
reflecting on the poor quality of data, which follows as a consequence of the scepticism and 
corresponding lack of support for data gathering in the first instance. The view is 
understandable though, since the efforts to accumulate performance data have generally been 
sporadic in the past, based on individual effort and as such are not organisational in nature.         
It must be added that initially the problem of non-support was related to the collection of 
close-out data with the express purpose of accumulating insight into the actual performance 
achievements as a basis for improving estimate quality. In such circumstances the solution 
suggested was to include the reporting requirements in the contracts, thereby binding both the 
company’s and the contractor’s project organisations. However, the reporting requirements 
have subsequently been incorporated in the contracts as part of the periodic updates, but the 
data collection situation has remained substantially the same. 
All in all then, it would seem that, in general, not much credence is placed on the value of 
experience transfer from other work. Evidently, each project is seen as a unique isolated event 
where experience from other work is deemed to be without relevance. Alternatively, the effort 
required to establish comparability is too complex and presumed not value-additive. However, 
even though the literature often portrays the project as a unique working environment 
especially suited to the production of one-offs, in the oil industry projects are by no means 
unique. Projects are in fact a standard method of working involving specialist personnel of 
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whom many seldom or never work in any other environment. The nature of the work is cyclic, 
but involves the same basic procedures and well-known industrial processes, especially 
during the execution phase. Under such circumstances there ought to be room for a greater 
degree of systematic measurement of production performance in order to accumulate data 
from project work seen as a cyclic process and the systematic use of the type of 
quantitative/qualitative analysis outlined here as a basis for cross-project experience exchange 
and improved project control.  
Unfortunately, just as the method of working is standardised, a basic set of problems is also 
repeatedly encountered, either alone or, in extreme cases, all together. The problems very 
often have a character stemming from the underestimation of the quantities of materials and 
complexity of the work such as: 
- delayed engineering documents 
- late ordering, pressed delivery lead time, late delivery and often increased acceleration 
cost of materials 
- tight delivery lead time for prefabricata offshore 
- incorrect prefabricata resulting in clashes and rework  
- low materials buffer offshore with resultant waiting time or inefficient sequencing of work 
operations 
- increased offshore bed requirements 
 
And so on, which may be due to undermanning, due in turn to unseen underestimated 
volumes or changed complexity, which can appear in many different guises not immediately 
relatable to underestimation. Times of stress often compound the situation and are not 
conducive to encouraging the increased insights that comparative performance measurement 
based analyses can provide. 
This thesis contends that these sporadic but recurrent failures can often be traced back to 
inadequate project control practices arising from misconceptions of project uniqueness, in 
turn aggravated by the type of fatalism or project control method conservatism mentioned 
above, and compounded by a poor ability to learn from past experience. 
7.4.2 Anomalies of behaviour stemming from the project environment 
So far only the anomalies arising out of the attitudes of the project personnel have been 
described, but there are several anomalies influencing project attitudes stemming from the 
organisational environment in which the projects operate.  
It is not to be denied that the pace and pressure of project work, compounded by the short-
term goals and constraints of contractual incentive mechanisms, are not conducive to the 
introduction of new methods. All project organisations operate in an organisational context of 
several actors, all with differing spheres of interest that exercise pressure on the project. The 
organisational context consists of the project and some sort of base organisation that is usually 
the repository of the theoretical method basis for the planning and administrative processes 
and methods to be used by the project organisation. The organisational context usually also 
includes the operator’s line organisation that commissions the works (on behalf of the asset 
owners) and the contractor’s line organisation that is responsible for the empowerment of the 
contractor’s project organisation. In the peripheries, but not without influence, are the license 
partners and their line and base organisations, and the authorities. All parties have a financial 
stake in the project and accordingly an interest in project performance. Of these it is the base 
organisations, rather than the projects, that are the natural locus of longer-term multi-project 
performance monitoring and analysis aimed at improvement, being as they are the repositories 
of best practice. This sort of activity is not part of the natural task of the project in view of the 
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limited life-span and the nature of the project’s mandate. But there are generally no such 
programs in the base organisations 50. It would seem that the base organisations, as well as the 
projects, bear some measure of responsibility for the enduring inconsistencies and 
discontinuities described above.   
The dialogue with these base organisations has similarities with the dialogue with project 
teams as discussed previously. The base organisations may indeed be the source of some of 
the arguments, bearing in mind that the base organisations are the repositories of best 
practice, and noting that benchmarking has currently only a superficial role as a project 
control tool in a post-project context. Of course, there may be aspects of entrenched interests 
within the base organisations where new methods come into conflict with established ones, 
which have not been drawn into the discussions so far. Similarly, there are actors within 
project teams that are not necessarily interested in encouraging a greater degree of insight into 
project performance, both during execution and after completion and especially in cases of 
overrun.  
Another aspect that complicates the issue as far as projects are concerned, is the lack of a 
standard format for the recording and reporting of data. Projects are often subject to requests 
for data and reports of different nature from various outside actors. These requests are often 
experienced as disruptive to the ongoing effort of ‘getting on with the job’ and are therefore 
resisted. A greater overall utility in the practice of project control could be achieved were a 
common format to be adopted for all the project control activities that are applied at various 
stages of the project life cycle. All too often are the structures of compensation formats in 
contracts, project control reporting and prognostication and budgeting/accounting formulated 
differently from project to project and indeed within the same project, based arbitrarily on the 
narrow interests which accord with the prevailing philosophy of the particular profession or 
person having responsibility for formulating the documents. The essential comparability of 
data, which is the essence of the methods presented in this paper, is thus made unduly 
difficult. The differences are often to all appearances small, but may nevertheless be 
significant enough to cause uncertainty and force tedious conversion of format. The lack of 
consistency in these reporting structures is a manifestation of poor cross-functional alignment 
between different departments in the base organisations. 
An odd aspect of the normative perspective to project management is the very uniformity and 
lack of differentiation in approach irrespective of the type of work and special properties of 
the task at hand. This is inconsistent with the image of uniqueness, especially as regards the 
ability of the project control methods to isolate the unique aspects of the work so that they 
may be identified and handled by management as ‘uniquely’ as circumstances might require. 
Review of the literature has not revealed exactly how, or by what methods, this capability to 
handle uniqueness is to be achieved, neither in the form of general principles of method nor in 
particular routines aimed at specific types of work.   
In the face of conflicting standards and formats, and the resulting duplication of effort in 
conforming to reporting requirements, and not recognising an own utility in the recycling 
practices embodied in a benchmarking approach, the project’s motivation to contribute data 
and align its own methods is undermined, and thereby the whole cycle in the longer term. The 
situation is compounded by unclear philosophy, lack of endorsement embodied in best 
practice and the fact that improvement of method is alien to the project’s modus operandi, 
being inconsistent with the temporary nature of the organisation and its task, which is to build.  
                                                 
50  The base organisations have various types of review processes, but for the time being benchmarking methods 
have only been conceded a peripheral role in the procedures of best practice, but only in applications with a 
high order of aggregation which have little relation to the detailed processes of project control.  
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Thus it behoves organisational units outside the project to provide the necessary coordination 
between functional units and across contractual boundaries. This is to ensure good alignment 
between the parameters and formats of the general performance data, and the monitoring 
interests of the project and the other actors operating in the project environment. In addition, 
they will also have to provide the incentives that are obviously necessary to encourage the 
adoption of improved work methods in the administration of projects.    
The intent of this section has been to provide evidence, through the example of own 
observations and experiences with implementation over several years, of logical 
discontinuities, poor system understanding and poor cross-functional coordination on the part 
of the several actors concerned.  
In the succeeding sections these constraints to organisational learning and justification of the 
methods proposed here will be reviewed in the light of the work of several researchers in the 
field of organisational studies.  
7.5 Congruence with organisation theory  
The task at hand is then to explore the reasons underlying recurrent cost and schedule 
overruns and poor ability to transfer and translate this experience into insights and 
preventative routines to improve project performance in the longer term. The reason for these 
overruns is often underestimation of the quantities of materials embodied in the product 
coupled with poor routines for monitoring these parameters as the design work proceeds. The 
proposed remedy is the implementation of routine cycles of performance measurement in the 
form of an internal benchmarking practice utilising the parameter set presented in Table 3-1, 
which is based on the core processes pertaining to modification work. This measurement 
program should furthermore be performed as part of the periodic review of the project’s 
resource basis with respect to the amount and nature of the work to be done and should 
include measurement of the properties of the product in the form of weight estimates. Finally 
the project history of performance, as defined in terms of the sanction estimates, periodic 
updates and the final result, should form the basis of a quantitative/qualitative close-out 
review with the intent to gather relevant experiences regarding methods, procedure and actual 
production efficiency for use in later projects. To facilitate this process, interaction by 
representatives of the base organisation with the project team should be routinised, preferably 
in the context of the periodic updates, in order that the representatives gain insight into the 
nature of the problems confronted by the project. This is inter-action is important since the 
base organisation is the repository of the recommended methods taken into use by the 
projects. 
In the following sections the following central aspects of this proposal will be explored in the 
light of research performed by organisational theorists: 
- the measurement of production efficiency and properties of the concept 
- the normative approach to project control   
- ambiguity or clarity? 
- routinisation of practise 
- data gathering 
- method of measurement 
- organisational learning and experience transfer  
- the constraints of governance networks  
- more about the relative method of monitoring: information technology 
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7.5.1 Measurement of production efficiency and properties of the concept  
In the introduction the nature of the work was described as routine and repetitive employing 
well-known industrial techniques and suggesting a likeness to a batch process of 
manufacturing, albeit on a large scale both physically and in time. This was in contrast to the 
prevailing image of the one-off nature of the project, which promotes the view that 
performance comparison is invalid due to the unique nature of each project. 
The central issue here is to find means to better monitor and predict the outcome of projects. 
The wider context of this control is to minimise the capital cost outlay of process 
improvements, which is what modification projects essentially are about, also, in addition, to 
increase the utilisation of existing infrastructure such as tie-backs of satellite fields. This is the 
core competence of the modification practitioner; to use the mechanical industry in petroleum 
related engineering and fabrication as a tool to produce cost-effective improvements in the oil 
and gas production process. 
James M Utterback has studied the dynamics of industrial development in a wide range of 
industries (ref Utterback: Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation, 1994) particularly the ‘role of 
innovation in industrial competition’ and ‘the relationship between product and process innovation in the cycle 
of industry development with special attention to the differences between assembled products and non-assembled 
products’. The terms assembled and non-assembled relate in the context of this paper to 
modification projects and oil and gas production respectively. Utterback concludes that 
‘leadership in incremental improvement requires persistence in measuring product and process performance 
and in seeking improvement from any source’. 
In the Abernathy-Utterback model of the dynamics of innovation, the major area for 
improvement of non-assembled production lies in process improvement rather than product 
innovation and particularly so in mature industries with a sophisticated production apparatus. 
Oil and gas production fits neatly into this generalisation. There are, however, also other 
mechanisms driving the need to improve and modify, primarily the changing functional 
requirements as a reservoir is depleted, but also the effective utilisation of existing 
infrastructure. Suffice to say that the general characteristic of continuous process 
modifications in the findings of Utterback is that they are costly. Thus it is appropriate for the 
modification practitioner to pursue methods that minimise the capital cost of these 
improvements.   
The project can of course be seen simply as a construction phase in a longer process that starts 
with a perceived need for infra-structural development and ends in a modification of the 
production systems. In this wider context process innovation, in the sense of improvement of 
production processes or extended utilisation of existing infrastructure, is indeed a major 
concern and has a great bearing on the economic survival of the company. It should be noted  
that this aspect of company behaviour can be said to be in tune with the Abernathy-Utterback 
model, should one judge by the considerable effort and resources spent internally and 
externally on continuous efforts to achieve production improvement. These extend to research 
sponsorship and even the establishment of independent industries that develop the 
technologies resulting from that research. The production efficiency is monitored over time 
and the effort is observed to bear fruit in the form of lower production costs.  
It has been commented earlier that the construction phase does not enjoy the same dynamic 
focus on improvement of method as do the production units of the organisation, although the 
findings of Utterback apply equally to assembled products as non-assembled products. This is 
borne out by previous observations regarding both the lack of routine for performance 
measurement and the lack of support for performance measurement processes, since it is only 
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by virtue of an independent and objective measurement that any form of continuous 
evaluation can be sustained. 
The theory of Utterbach does not translate completely, however, when applied to the 
construction phase of the process improvement. The nature of the work has been likened to 
batch processes of assembled-product type, potentially on a grand scale. This type of work 
does not fit well within the Abernathy-Utterback model. The model is based on the 
manufacture of specific products such as automobiles, which pass through an industrial 
development cycle where the competitive advantage is characterised by high product diversity 
in an innovative (fluid) phase succeeded by convergence (transition phase) to one more-or-
less standard (specific phase) design constituting a dominant technology. The manufacturing 
processes in the early fluid phase are general-purpose, relying on a large component of skill 
on the part of the workers, and are entrepreneurial in nature. At later phases the manufacturing 
processes become progressively purpose-built and automated, centred around a specific 
product or product range 51. The fluid phase fits best with the type of work dealt with in this 
chapter, but the work has no product diversity similar to that of the model. In fact the product 
is a purpose-built design to fit specific functional requirements (such as a process plant), 
which by its very nature cannot rely on highly automated forms of production. The 
competitive advantage lies in knowledge (technical and organisational) of the industrial sub-
components and the techniques for engineering, fabricating and assembling them into the final 
product in the most cost-effective manner. It is this knowledge that constitutes the skill base 
of the project personnel as individuals and the project team as an organisation.  
This is not to deny that technically innovative products are incorporated in the work scope of 
projects, but rather to say that product development and innovation in the form of individual 
components will have taken place in other sectors of industry and is not the concern of the 
project. Similarly the development of the specific concept will have taken place in earlier 
phases of the project where the essential technological character of the specific concept will 
have been defined in the form of functional criteria, a basic architecture and construction 
philosophy. By and large then, in spite of the final project being purpose-built and of a rather 
unique nature, the component materials will be well known products of industry, taking the 
form of standardised whole- and half fabricata. Similarly, the methods of fabrication are well-
known, of a general purpose nature and highly skilled, but nevertheless routine.  
This implies a focus in an improvement context on both product (as a whole) and process 
since the dynamic relationship between product and process is not likely to shift dramatically 
over time as it does with specific product manufacture. Industries of this type will locate in 
the Abernathy-Utterback model somewhere in the region of fluid to transitional phase. Thus, 
in order to optimise construction time and costs and consistent with Utterback’s general 
statement regarding competitive advantage, there ought to be a company focus on the 
methods and processes employed in the managing of capital projects. One might expect some 
form of objective performance measurement testing the efficacy of the methods and 
techniques involved - not so however - there are substantially no measurement routines in 
place looking beyond the life cycle of the individual project. This is the primary reason for 
proposing internal benchmarking practices as an essential element towards satisfying 
Utterbach’s criteria for establishing a climate of reflection and innovation essential to 
organisational success in the long term.  
                                                 
51 The closest analogous type of industry is that of shipbuilding, where some yards have developed an almost 
production-line method of manufacture. But experience has shown that highly complex purpose-built 
production vessels do not fit easily into conventional ship building processes.  
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7.5.2 The normative approach to project control 
So far the discussion has promoted the use of performance measurement based benchmarking 
techniques as an aid to experience transfer and organisational learning in a project 
environment. The techniques constitute specifically a project control method improvement 
aimed at reducing overruns, but have also a general relevance for other activities and tools 
employed in the administration of projects. Benchmarking techniques are a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of project performance, hard production measurement 
preceding soft qualitative analysis in order to identify method and practice anomalies causing 
good or poor performance. Central to the benchmarking concept is the comparison of 
performance with other projects. The contrast here is the view of the project as one-off unique 
type of work to which it is inappropriate to apply experience from previous work of similar 
character. The latter view is normative and is reflected in the general nature of the project’s 
modus operandi with respect to the task at hand, in interaction with the other actors in the 
operational environment and particularly in the relative nature of the control methods which 
are employed to monitor the task.  
The following definition of a project is found in the Guide to the Project Management Body 
of Knowledge published by the PMI Standards Committee (PMI, 1996) - ‘a project is a temporary 
endeavour undertaken to create a unique product or service’. The characteristics that are normative to 
the project in this definition, and which have a bearing on this discussion, are the temporary 
nature of the organisation, which is disbanded when the project’s objectives have been 
achieved, and the specific nature of the project’s objectives, to create a unique product or 
service, which is ‘different in some distinguishing way from all similar products or services’. This applies 
to all types of work in all sectors of industry. The project modus operandi that emerges from 
this is that of ‘progressive elaboration of product characteristics’ combined with ‘careful coordination 
with project scope definition’. When properly defined ‘the scope of the project should remain constant even 
while product characteristics are progressively elaborated’.   
In contrast to the quoted defintion, the suggestion of this thesis is that in organisations that 
regularly use the project form of organisation there are similarities from job to job which 
resemble batch production rather than totally unique events. These similarities encompass the 
elaboration and control processes, the materials, the fabrication processes, the actors and the 
personnel manning the project teams. This nuance is referred to as management by project in 
the PMI Guide. Organisations conforming to this model often have an organisational structure 
consisting of highly autonomous project teams backed by service departments (base 
organisation) and project management systems aligned with financial systems often designed 
for accounting, tracking and reporting on multiple simultaneous projects. In this context it 
would seem that the similarities between individual projects exceed the uniqueness. This 
circumstance is conducive to the use of production measurement metrics that are similar to 
ongoing production processes and the use of the comparative functionality of benchmarking 
techniques in support of the project management task. The normative approach of relative 
goals can be supplemented by absolute hard production measurement goals consistent with 
the characteristics of the product. But a prerequisite for this is the capability of mapping the 
product characteristics in appropriate metrics.   
7.5.3 Ambiguity or clarity as project execution strategy 
The above is an argument to play down the uniqueness aspect of the project in the interests of 
comparability with similar work for the purposes of reducing uncertainty. In contrast, Sahlin-
Andersens case-study (ref. Chap 4 in Brunsson and Olsen, Organising Organisations, 1998) of 
the Stockholm Globe suggests circumstances whereby playing up the uniqueness of the 
project may be an appropriate strategy for the realisation of projects. This strategy is coined 
the ambiguity strategy as opposed to the clarity strategy of normative project management and 
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suggests that stressing the opportunities present in an extraordinary situation can attract 
interest and achieve commitment also in the absence of a committed frame. The pursuit of an 
ambiguity strategy has a price, however, which is potentially losing control of the outcome of 
the project. 
In contrast, pursuit of the clarity strategy is said to play down the uniqueness of the project in 
the interests of minimising complexity and ambiguity in order to foster an image of a 
purposeful organisation pursuing a programd plan of action, i.e. play down risk. The project’s 
goals are to be established as early as possible and are assumed thereafter to remain the same. 
Opportunity for new actors to pursue their own special interest is lost in such a scenario 
because the normative project strategy is geared to avoid changes. In the ambiguity strategy, 
however, the frames of commitment will have to be established at some point in time, if for 
no other purpose than establishing a financial basis for the detailed engineering and 
construction activities. The project will be forced to move to a clarifying strategy for no other 
reason than to maintain a flow of funds. Sahlin-Andersen says that ‘the clarity model tends to 
ignore that many complexities and ambiguities cannot be solved’ emphasizing that ‘ambiguity and 
complexity cannot be organised away but have to be handled’ quoting March and Olsen (1976), 
Brunsson (1989) and Sahlin-Andersen (1986) in support.  
From the point of view of this dissertation, there need be no contradiction between the 
clarifying strategy and living with change if appropriate methods are adopted in the control 
strategy for mapping the effect of changes in the product characteristics. It is the normative 
assumption of no changes to the frame of commitment that is the constraint, prompting a 
behavioural response that shuns change. All projects will be subject to a degree of concept 
uncertainty. Uncertainty will inevitably be experienced with respect to potential changes to 
the nature of the product as a consequence of the process of progressive elaboration 
irrespective of the existence of programmed changes or not. All projects will have some 
degree of uniqueness – it is in the processes of progressive elaboration that the degree of 
uniqueness is defined (clarified) and appropriate action taken to accommodate any 
‘special’qualities the project may have in the execution plans. Ambiguity is an aspect of this 
uncertainty regarding the need for and the nature of decisions that have to be made in order to 
create a program for completion. Projects pursuing an ambiguity strategy for purposes of 
maintaining a window of opportunity should most certainly implement monitoring methods 
that are capable of mapping the characteristics of the product on an ongoing basis in order to 
minimise the risk of loss of control. 
With regard to maintaining windows of opportunity, one of the observations stemming from 
the case study in Appendix 2 is that the approval processes preceding sanction of execution 
may on occasion drag out while individual stakeholders are pursuing their internal interests. 
In the case in question, these delays were not accompanied by adjustment of the milestones. It 
is presumed that the resulting schedule pressure was in large measure responsible for the final 
poor outcome.   
Modification projects in the oil industry are known to be especially subject to growth and 
change. Eide’s study of changes in modification work (Eide, 1998) emphasises that change is 
inevitable and often beneficial and that the handling of changes should be built into the 
control strategy. Change is anathema to the project managers in her study. She maintains that 
the most important constraint is the belief that the commitment frame is sacrosanct and that 
the presence of changes in a project is synonymous with failure, whether beneficial for the 
final result or not. This is a judgement based exclusively on performance relative to the 
original frame of commitment. A control strategy that maintains flexibility with respect to the 
original plans will be able to maintain a ‘window of opportunity’ for the project management  
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to cope with situations that arise as the process of progressive elaboration defines ever more 
precisely the nature of the product and the correctness (or otherwise) of the original plan.  
This dissertation has suggested that the modus operandi of the normative project organisation 
is determined by the concept of uniqueness of the project, playing up uniqueness rather than 
playing it down. In contradiction to Sahlin-Andersen’s view, comparison with other work is 
not a part of the normative control strategy. As pointed out in the section on experiences with 
implementation in this chapter, many modification practitioners do not believe that 
comparisons can be made between projects for the simple reason that the projects are too 
different, they reject comparison at high degrees of aggregation as being non-representative 
and they reject comparison of individual functions as being too complex. The normative 
methods of control are relative to the established plan. Projects do not pursue performance 
goals based on any relation to external standards of production efficiency and such methods 
are absent from the general body of knowledge. This points to the (mis)conception of each 
project as being unique.   
In contrast, or rather in spite of the perceived uniqueness of the individual project, one can in 
fact observe that all projects are managed in much the same way. This is a consequence of the 
established project management body of knowledge espoused by the community of practice. 
But as previously mentioned, the explicit means of handling uniqueness is neither addressed 
in principle, nor specifically, in the established body of knowledge.   
7.5.4 Routinisation of practise as the project modus operandi 
In their work An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Nelson, Winter, 1982), Nelson 
and Winter present an alternative theory of the capabilities and behaviour of business firms 
operating in a market environment when confronted with phenomena of economic change 
stemming from changed market conditions, economic growth and competition through 
innovation.  
According to Nelson and Winter, an organisation’s knowledge base is embodied in the skills 
of the individuals comprising that organisation as co-ordinated in the routines of the 
organisation. Nelson and Winter maintain that this model has relevance for organisations 
performing work with a high frequency of repetition on a daily basis. Most projects are 
involved in production by design, which in the case of modification projects may be seen as 
purpose-built large-scale assembled products, and naturally have a long cycle of repetition. 
Does this mean that routines as a repository of an organisation’s knowledge have no relevance 
for project work? On the contrary, since all projects are managed in much the same way, one 
may argue that routinisation is a significant element of project’s modus operandi especially in 
project based organisations, whereby a team may be mobilised and become functional in a 
short space of time. However, at the same time this very routinisation has significant 
responsibility for the behaviour of the community of practice and thereby the individual 
project and accordingly is a contributory cause to the difficulties associated with the adoption 
of new methods and experience transfer. 
Nelson and Winter specifically limit the applicability of their models to organisations 
performing repetitive routines with high regularity, although acknowledging that the notion of 
routine behaviour does have application even with respect to the highly sophisticated and 
complex creative or problem-solving activities performed by engineers, scientists and 
management. The project is in this context much of a one-off having generally a low 
repeatability of routine. This low repeatability needs to be compensated by a higher degree of 
coordination of effort, supported by written procedures of practice (or blueprints 52) . But the 
                                                 
52 Blueprint: in this context seen as a formal procedure describing the essential elements for performing a task 
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functions concerning project control do have a highly repetitive cycle varying from weekly 
and monthly to bi-annually and of course the indeterminate length of the project life cycle 
from one to five or more years. In any event project personnel will normally experience 
several project life cycles and within each phase of the work many repetitions of the same 
activities in the handling of detail - accordingly, the general precepts of routinisation of skills 
can be regarded as applicable.  
Of perhaps greater interest, seen in the context of the batch nature of the project life cycle, is 
the way the setting up of new project teams can be paralleled with the setting up of new 
plants. In establishing a project team, aspects of replication 53 are of importance, the normal 
focus being to establish a working organisation from a new set of personnel as quickly as 
possible, which implies a focus on experienced personnel of whom can be expected the 
routinisation of the necessary skills and competencies. Organisational shake-down, often 
taking the form of team-building seminars, is a front-end activity in which a central aspect is 
the establishment of procedures of practice, domains of responsibility and interface 
definitions. All these find their parallels in Nelson and Winter in the form of for example 
truce 54, control 55 and optimisation 56.  The long cycle of routine repetition and associated 
rustiness of routine is accommodated by the establishment of procedures to assist the 
memories of the individuals and the organisation. The procedures are generally of an outline 
character and in no way substitute for experience derived from ‘having done’ that lies in 
previous practice. This previous practice, however, involves the tacit knowledge of 
individuals acquired in practice and often involves deviant routines only broadly conforming 
to the recommended procedures of practice.  
So, it may be concluded that the theories of Nelson and Winter are applicable in the project 
work context and can be used to explore the anomalies of behaviour and constraints to 
organisational learning already pointed to in the chapter Experiences with implementation. In 
this the nature of the project’s task and mandate is central, as is the way this is reflected in the 
organisational focus and in the interrelation and overlap of individual tasks and skills. The 
following key issues may be deduced: 
- procedures of practice (best practice) are needed to underpin the practice of project 
administration due to the long repetition cycle of the work seen as a whole  
- the project focus for the purposes of establishing functioning organisational routine 
quickly and efficiently at the start of a project relies on using skilled and experienced 
personnel routinised to project work and in the practice of their own skills 
- the setting up of new project teams is essentially replicative in nature and is implicitly 
inhibitive of debate concerning method leading in turn to copy-and-paste methods of 
establishing work procedures  
- project work involves a wide range of skills beyond the knowledge base of individuals, 
and organisational failure to meet its goals does not necessarily imply individual 
performance failure, practise being anchored in best practice procedures and endorsed by 
internal control 
- the project has no responsibility for best practice, which is located in the base organisation   
                                                 
53  Replication: the process of creating a new organisation in a new location, say a new plant, to perform the 
same task as an existing organisation 
54  Truce: the tacit understanding between individuals in an organisation controlling performance of duties and 
the interface between functions; the rules of behaviour in organisational culture   
55  Control: the process of ensuring conformance to a routine through monitoring, (re)selection or adaptation   
56  Optimisation: the processes and routines employed in decision making with the intent to maximise the 
outcome of an activity 
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- the concept of best practice has the aura of closure over it as long as there are no arenas or 
procedures questioning and debating method involving project performance   
- project autonomy and lack of dialogue between the base organisation and the project 
promotes different cultures within the community of practice, i.e. between the project and 
the base organisation, due to the fact that project personnel work more or less 
continuously in projects and that their relation to the base organisations is often that of a 
personnel pool  
- the basis for decision making, or exercise of choice, is routinised in the procedures; the 
main function of management is coordination of effort  
- the knowledge base for coordinative action by management lies in the tacit knowledge of 
the skilled individuals who perform the complex technical tasks involved in progressive 
elaboration of the product and constitutes a challenge of oversight to management and 
project control functions 
 
Thus the project modus operandi endures as a consequence of replication, being transferred 
more or less intact from project to project in a way congruent with the batch nature of the task 
and part of an ongoing long-term multi-cycle industrial practice. This can be done only 
because there is great similarity between the batches and therefore in the way of performing 
the tasks.  
Of central concern in most discussions of organisational structure is the way in which the 
work methods may influence the effects of bounded rationality (March, Simon, 1958) 57 in the 
decision making processes. Nelson and Winter reflect that for organisations like the project, 
which rely extensively and more than most on the knowledge base of highly skilled 
individuals, much of the problem lies in ‘…reconciling an exhaustive account of the details with a 
coherent view of the whole. Much more severe limits on the articulation of organisational knowledge arise from 
the same cause, because although attending to details is something that can be shared and decentralised, the 
task of achieving a coherent view of the whole is not. Similarly, improvisation of a coordinated response from a 
system requires a centralised control of the system. Organisations are poor at improvising coordinated 
responses to novel situations; an individual lacking skills appropriate to the situation may respond awkwardly; 
an organisation lacking appropriate routines may not respond at all’.     
Nelson and Winter suggest that one way in which the routine functioning of an organisation 
can contribute to innovation is that useful questions arise out of anomalies relating to 
prevailing routines (ref. Chapter 3-9 and the Case Studies in the Appendix). Applied to a 
project environment, this means that anomalies will be experienced perhaps once in a project 
lifetime, providing no opportunity or perhaps even need to resolve the anomaly for the 
purposes of meeting the project’s objectives. Action taken to handle problems may provide 
the basis for an alternative routine, but will in any event only be testable in terms of the final 
result. The central anomaly by which all projects are tested in terms of the normative routines, 
that of non-conformance to the prescribed commitment frame, will normally only be testable 
in terms of the final result. However, at this point many of the participants, whose detailed 
knowledge of the concept and the work processes may provide the insights necessary to 
resolve the issue, may already have demobilised. It is possible to conceive that continuity may 
be assured through the experiences of individuals mobilising into new projects, but this is 
highly unlikely for the reasons outlined in the above.  
                                                 
57 The term bounded rationality reflects the deficiencies in the knowledge on which decisions are based. The 
concept reflects upon the presumed rational basis for optimal decision making presuming real choice of 
alternatives arising out of full knowledge of the situation at hand.  This concept is attributed to March and 
Simon. They comment in the preface to the second edition that the concept of bounded rationality has become 
‘the received doctrine’ and ‘ more or less standard in modern theories of decision making ‘, and is thus a 
central concept to the theories of the working of organisations.   
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It follows then that the continuity will only be assured in some other organisational context 
with a longer horizon, and with a mandate to implement changes in the recommended 
procedures, which serve as guidelines for the routines brought into new projects. The natural 
locus of this continuity is the base organisations, which are the repositories of best practice, 
and to which the projects are expected to conform. Nelson and Winter see this as a typical 
pattern where a crisis or exception condition in one part of an organisation is part of the 
routine content of jobs of other personnel. Problem solving efforts that are initiated with the 
existing routines as a target, may lead to innovation instead. On the strength of these 
observations, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the base organisation should have a 
shared responsibility to recycle experience gained in resolving anomalies in the work routines. 
Any routine intended to promote dialogue, experience transfer and organisational learning 
ought ideally to actively involve both the base organisation for continuity, method 
responsibility and analysis and the project team as a practitioner of method in the face of the 
reality of active project work.  
Nelson and Winter advocate application of the theory of heuristic search to issues of 
improvement and innovation, suggesting that also these activities have routine nature. In a 
similar manner, the processes of benchmarking and performance review may be appropriate 
to the analysis of anomalies of performance, hopefully leading to insights that may provide 
the basis for reflective dialogue and improvement. 
7.5.5 Data gathering 
The data gathering and codification processes that underpin all science, as described by 
Latour in his book Science in Action (Latour,1987), may be seen as analogous to continual 
internal benchmarking processes based on reduction of product complexity to a set of 
generally applicable parameters representing the core production processes and central 
characteristics of the modification product. The test is the applicability of past experiences to 
current and future work of similar nature. In accordance with Latour, the data gathering and 
codification processes are understood to include engineering, technology, the administration 
sciences (project management), law (the contractual arrangement), economics, and so on.  
The accumulation of experience data is a demanding process. Numerous proposals for 
cataloguing the results of experience using database technology have in fact been launched, 
but few have survived. This failure is possibly due to the sheer complexity of the task of 
cataloguing qualitative data in a way that is meaningful to others. Eide points to other studies 
58 concluding that ‘experience is tacit knowledge and questioning whether experience can be handled using 
information technology’ and further noting a general preference for ‘informal and adaptable 
communication patterns when exchanging information rather than formal documents, reports and computer 
archives’ and  ‘informal channels and participatory approaches addressing tacit knowledge were clearly 
preferred to formalisation and information processing focusing on explicit knowledge’.  
Given these conclusions one may consider the following questions relating to the compilation 
of an experience database. What criteria will be used to decide which experiences are to be 
stored? How will the experiences be categorised – in terms of problem descriptions or 
solutions? Who will perform the storage and extraction tasks? In what format will the 
experiences be recorded - qualitative/descriptive or quantitative formats? Perhaps most 
important; how will the experiences be translated into practice - project start-up seminars, 
teambuilding séances, or brainstorming sessions? Perhaps a primary consideration is the fact 
                                                 
58 Sørensen,T, 1996: Experience as tacit knowledge: A method for learning in organisations. Established by 
investigating practice in Statoil’s drilling department from a knowledge perspective. Doctoral Thesis NTNU; 
Wulff, IA, 1997b: User Involvement in Engineering Design: Trial lecture for the Doctoral Degree. NTNU; 
Aase, K, 1997: Experience Transfer in Norwegian Oil and Gas Industry. Approaches and Organisational 
Mechanisms Doctoral, Thesis NTNU. 
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that the experiences most likely will become dissociated from the context in which they 
occurred. Shall one merely include all close-out reports in a data-base relying on search 
engines to dig out information of relevance? Any Internet user will understand the frustrating 
and time-consuming difficulty of finding anything useful in unstructured information. 
Without structure - chaos?  
To Latour certain aspects concerning data gathering are essential in order to prevent a chaos 
of information, or perhaps more precisely to create information out of the data. Firstly, the 
data are gathered back to a central location or repository where they were correlated with 
similar information from other sources, then analysed and codified in a format that was easy 
to understand and use by others. Secondly, there is consensus regarding the basis for 
codification i.e. that the code was understood, endorsed and used. Thirdly, the users ‘out 
there’ are committed to sending back the data of their experiences because they understood 
the value and purpose of the information generated by analysis of these data. This codified 
information and the insights provided by correlation and analysis can then be made available 
to users/others providing foresight as a basis for rational action when confronted with 
situations that would otherwise be completely unknown. In other words, this foreknowledge 
provides a basis for planning.  
When applied to the world of projects, a control philosophy that treats every new project as 
completely unique, cuts off the foresight potential embodied in knowledge of similar work. 
Personnel working close to the complexity of one project over time, see only that project and 
do not have the advantage (or perspective ?) of seeing the results of many projects of similar 
nature. Their foresight is limited to own experience or the tacit collective experiences of 
colleagues in the community of practice, communicated in story-telling over the lunch tables, 
or by other informal means (Brown, DuGuid, 199159). By the same token the control method 
that does not monitor the properties of the product progressively in order to improve the 
knowledge of that product, will not be able to update the basis for planning in the light of new 
information.  
In the Latour analogy the base organisation is seen as the repository of the methods of 
monitoring and the data and is responsible for the correlation, analysis and codification of 
project performance data with respect to a preconceived structure (ref. Table 3-1, Table of 
Performance Measurement Parameters).  
The basis for deciding which experiences are relevant to transfer lies in the context of the 
anomalies arising out of comparison of the hard facts of performance and the nature of the 
qualitative explanations for deviations of performance. In the short term of the project, 
anomalies provide a basis for re-alignment of the plans. In the longer term deviations of 
performance and associated qualitative analyses provide a basis for re-alignment of the 
recommended codes of practice in the light of relevant experiences from the world of practice.  
Over time this form of dialogue ought to lead to convergence between the formal procedures 
(best practice/espoused theory) and actual practices of individuals and projects (theories-in-
action60), relating to the terminology used by Argyris and Schøn.  
Judging by experiences outlined in the chapter Experiences with implementation, achieving 
consensus may not be the easiest of tasks. This dissertation is a contribution to that debate. 
                                                 
59 The terms ‘communities of practice’ and ‘story-telling’ apply to groups of people performing the same sort of 
work and  sharing a common ‘insider’ understanding and modes of communication with respect to problem-
solving. 
60 Espoused theory is the theory of action which is advanced to explain or justify a given pattern of activity. 
Theory-in-action is the theory of action which is implicit in the performance of that pattern of activity. 
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7.5.6 Method of measurement 
The control strategy adopted by the project may be regarded as a consequence of the 
perception of the project as unique. The work by Latour, which was discussed in the previous 
chapter, also provides an interesting perspective on the significance of the methods of 
measurement used in the control strategies adopted by projects. It is thus interesting to relate 
the concepts drawn from the work of Latour to the nature of the normative method of 
measuring (monitoring) the control status of the project.  
Latour is concerned with the concept of metrology 61 whereby appropriate forms of 
measurement bring together significant features of the physical world being measured. To 
borrow Latour’s metaphor, the cartographer’s coordinate pair uniquely describes the locus of 
one point on the globe; several points taken from distinct features in the terrain transpose into 
a picture of the physical world, a map, which can be studied in advance. A ship can set a 
course to any destination, and use navigational skills built on the same premise as the map, to 
check its absolute location with respect to the map at regular intervals, make due correction to 
its course to avoid dangers and reach its destination by adjusting its speed and the bearing of 
its course. Co-ordinate pairs are an appropriate metrology for tying together maps and 
methods of navigation. This is of course not to say that some form of look-out was no longer 
necessary after the introduction of navigation skills, since the quality of the maps leave a lot 
to be desired, requiring ongoing cartography until this day. This is the nature of science in 
action.   
An appropriate metrology applied to modification work ties together the physical properties 
of the product and the resources required to perform the work. Knowledge of achieved 
production efficiencies from performing similar tasks provides a basis for checking the frame 
of commitment with respect to the properties of the product at regular intervals as progressive 
elaboration proceeds. What is needed is a process for monitoring the properties of the product 
as progressive elaboration proceeds. The normative method, however, has no specific 
metrology relating properties of the product and the resources required to perform the work. 
The properties of the product are all translated into work-hours and into money in detail 
planning processes deeply embedded in work planning routines. Status is transposed once 
more into a unit-less number calculated from work-hours planned relative to work-hours used, 
money planned relative to money used. At the start of the project relations between the 
physical properties of the product and required resources have indeed been used to establish 
the work-hours and the money in the plan. But thereafter status checking relies on a one-
dimensional ‘relative to the plan’ metrology based on a single common unit of measure and 
unit-less numbers (percentages). Should the planned resource use at some future point in time 
not comply with expectations, the number of work-hours will be adjusted, not on the basis of 
the status of the properties of the product, at source so to speak, but on the basis of a trend.62 
Time is needed for a trend to develop - while the trend develops, action time is lost. 
Measurement of performance data linked to properties of the product provides the project 
with the means of continually testing the validity of its pre-planned course of action.  
                                                 
61 Metrology: Science; system of weights and measures. (The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1952) 
62 By analogy, even if it had a good map, without recourse to navigation skills the ship would have no means of 
checking whether it was still on the preset course and would have to resort to trending, by measuring its speed 
through the water and calculate progress along the preset path with respect to its expected speed. Likewise the 
project that does not measure the status of the properties of the product as progressive elaboration proceeds, 
has no means of knowing whether the expected number of work-hours is the correct amount needed to perform 
the work. Performance data linked to properties of the product provides the project with the means of 
continually testing the validity of its pre-planned course of action. 
 132
An inappropriate metrology is a consequence of the perception of the project as unique 
(comparison not relevant), but the situation is perhaps aggravated by the lack of guidelines 
concerning alternative methods for updating the commitment frame in the general body of 
knowledge. Consequently, there has developed a theory-in-action type of practice in the 
industry wherein the monitoring of the properties of the product as a project control tool, (i.e. 
a basis for estimating/verifying the commitment frame) by means of weight estimating 
techniques, is discontinued after award of contract in favour of the approach described above, 
that of linkage to the detail planning task sheets. The consequence is that the knowledge 
regarding deviations in the properties of the product will remain hidden until the weight basis 
is updated some time after the completion of detailed engineering, or the quantities of work-
hours defined by the detailed planning processes mentioned above begin to emerge. 
Unfortunately, these detailed planning processes are also dependent on the completion of the 
detailed engineering processes. By this time the project will often have completed about a 
third of its cycle and will be well into the production phase of transposing paper (design) into 
hardware.  
The effect of an appropriate metrology in the comparison of anomaly processes can be 
illustrated by referring briefly to the case study in the Appendix 1. The significant non-
correlation between the cost and the weight curve in Figure 9-1 indicates that something was 
wrong with the target cost (TC) or the commitment frame (Study). The anomaly is apparent 
already at award of contract, indicating that the basis for corrective action was available at 
that time. Later baselines deepen the anomaly, the weight apparently going down while the 
cost estimate is rising. Comparison with similar work would have indicated the likelihood of 
an underestimated TC. The same phenomena are apparent in Figure 9-2, showing a non-
correlation between engineering and integration work-hour development and the weight 
development, again indicating that something was wrong. This is already apparent at the time 
of the first periodic update, BL1, as manifested by the anomaly of the work-hour estimate 
increase while weight decreases. Comparison with similar work would have indicated that the 
piping engineering work-hours were severely underestimated in the TC. Information for 
adequate corrective action was available in the system. The continuous increase in the 
estimate of engineering work-hours is the consequence of the imprecision of the method of 
trending – too little, too late. The alternative was to estimate the engineering work-hour needs 
on the basis of the weight data in the concept and norms of production based on experience, 
and then make adjustments based on weight monitoring of the detail engineering. This would 
have resulted in an estimate of the same order of magnitude as the final result. That this was 
obviously not done is indicated by the continuously rising curve. That the weight monitoring 
was not updated during the detail engineering is apparent from the large discontinuity 
between the TC and third periodic update, BL3. Hence, it may be assumed that considerations 
of weight anomalies were not made available in the knowledge basis for action by the project 
management.  
These anomalies and the linkage between weight and cost/work-hours are made very clear by 
the metrology used in the presentation. By contrast the presentation formats of the normative 
approach would normally only show two aggregation curves of planned and actual work-hour 
development, but without a weight correlation. The essential linkage, and the corresponding 
course of action, is not made evident to the viewer.  
7.5.7 Organisational learning and experience transfer  
The discussion in the preceding section extends logically into the theories of organisational 
learning expounded by Argyris and Schøn in the two works The Reflective Practitioner  
(Schøn, 1983) and Organisational Learning II (Argyris and Schøn, 1996).  
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The normative control strategy of the project relies on a form of instrumental learning 
whereby anomaly comparison leads to some form of corrective action (feedback) in order to 
restore the status to the expected, in other words, return to plan. This form of organisational 
learning is termed single-loop learning 63 in the theories of Argyris and Schøn and would be 
the normal mode of operation in the project. In the section Methods of measurement above, it 
has been argued that the methods employed in performing these control activities are deficient 
and that the concern is to find a means that will lead to correction of the method itself, that 
which is termed double-loop learning 64 in the theories of Argyris and Schøn. To this end the 
introduction of routines of internal benchmarking applied in a multi-project multi-cycle 
context has been proposed. The benchmarking method can be applied in single loop processes 
within the individual project as part of a control strategy, which uses anomaly comparison, 
norms of production and ongoing measurement of the properties of the products as a basis for 
prediction and corrective action.Use of the recommended metrology would further enhance 
the learning potential of the single loop through the inclusion of measures of efficiency in the 
control data, which is a precept of the Argyris and Schøn theory (ref. Organisational 
Learning II).    
The experiences thus accumulated could then be the subject of a post project de-briefing 
(close-out review), which would use performance anomalies in the final outcome as a point of 
departure for reviewing the concept development and the projected performance history. 
From the debriefing, reflection on the methods employed in the control strategy leads to the 
possibility of double-loop learning. 65 
Organisational learning can, logically, only take place in an organisation that has continuity 
over time. Thus, a de-briefing of this nature may simultaneously form a convenient bridge 
from the limited life-span of the project to the more continuous base organisational unit as a 
repository of experience data and the best practice routines. This transfer is essential in order 
to implement any double-loop conclusions arising from the review into the recommended 
procedures (best practice). Experience exchange becomes a dual responsibility shared 
between base organisation and project. By placing the responsibility for the routine in the base 
organisation, continuity is assured. By using an analysis based on a fixed set of performance 
parameters as an objective starting point (performance anomalies), a focus for a dialogue is 
provided. In the absence of a routine the project, left to itself, has no guideline such as the 
relation of the anomaly to cost, quality, or recurrent problems in other projects, for judging 
relevant issues, as well as no experience (routine) for conducting such a search process. One 
can, in theory, visualise an experience transfer directly between projects, which is in fact one 
of the project start-up routines mentioned in the section Routinisation of practise. But there 
are obvious practical limitations, the most central being that the maintenance and 
development of a body of experience data is not consistent with the mandate of the project.  
A central concern of Argyris and Schøn is the relative roles of practitioners and academic 
researchers and the interplay between them. Argyris and Schøn recognise the knowledge base 
of the practitioner and the potential for organisational learning latent in the processes of 
instrumental learning mentioned above combined with the reflections of practitioners on the 
anomalies of experience in the daily work situation. Recognising also that participation 
encourages ownership, they recommend collaboration on research between researchers and 
practitioners. These principles may be mirrored in interplay between the non-continuous 
project and the continuous base organisation leading in time to the convergence between 
                                                 
63 Single loop learning: a process leading to correction of deviations to accepted norms of performance   
64 Double loop learning: a process leading to a change in the norms of performance by virtue of changes in the 
routines    
65 Analogous to the element of surprise stimulating enquiry as described by Nelson and Winter 
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theories-in-action and espoused theory (the recommended ‘best’ practice). In the same way 
participation may contribute to reducing interaction effects 66 resulting from enquiry into the 
causality underlying performance anomalies, particularly if the anomaly is negative.   
In the researcher/practitioner context the role of the author is that of a practitioner seeking a 
practical outcome from the results of reflection of several years of work with estimating, 
project control, contracting and quality assurance auditing. The results of this reflection are 
the practical methods for experience transfer, integrated with project control and estimating 
techniques which simultaneously provide a basis for structured dialogue potentially leading to 
double loop learning, which have been presented and justified using the works of several 
researchers in organisation theory. There are however, according to Argyris and Schøn, 
different stopping rules 67 for practitioners whose enquiry is seen as naturally coming to a 
close when intended results have been achieved that are good enough. To this it may be 
replied that the benchmarking concept is not a closed rule, but an open-ended procedure 
intended to promote reflective dialogue between practitioners as part of the organisation’s 
learning system 68 and that this may continue independently of formal research involvement 69. 
The data structure that has been put forward (the core processes in modification projects) is 
only a point of departure. The behavioural world 70 of the organisation is the major constraint, 
some aspects of which have been described in the section Experience with implementation. 
There are clear parallels between the perspectives of Nelson and Winter (routines of search 
heuristics) and the reflective practice of Schøn. In The Reflective Practitioner Schøn 
concludes that organisations wishing to promote organisational learning will have to 
institutionalise reflection in action 71 and stimulate constructive dialogue in order to ventilate 
dilemmas of practice. At the same time he is well aware of the conflicts that arise as a result 
of inquiry because of the potential threat to the stable system of rules and procedures 
constituting the framework within which an organisation operates. This stable system of rules 
and procedures is similar to what Nelson and Winter call truce. Schøn has no recipe for such 
an organisation beyond defining the essential characteristics that the organisation will need in 
order to convert the inherent tension in productive inquiry into fruitful dialogue. To use 
Schøn’s own words: ‘To the extent that an institution seeks to accommodate to the reflection-in-action of its 
(professional) members, it must meet several conditions. In contrast to the normal bureaucratic emphasis on 
uniform procedures, objective measures of performance, and centre/periphery systems of control, a reflective 
institution must place a high priority on flexible procedures, differentiated responses, qualitative appreciation of 
complex processes, and decentralised responsibility for judgement and action. In contrast to the normal 
bureaucratic emphasis on technical rationality 72, a reflective institution must make a place for attention to 
conflicting values and purposes.  But these extraordinary conditions are also necessary for significant 
organisational learning.’ (Schøn, 1983). 
                                                 
66 Interaction effects: the (normally) defensive responses provoked by inquiry into an individuals domain of 
performance 
67 Stopping rules: In contrast to the practitioner, who would stop once having achieved a satisfactory result of the 
inquiry, the academic researcher would continue to research as long as there remained alternative hypotheses 
to explore  
68 Learning system: the collection of activities and routines used for problem solving and organisational 
development  
69 This is not to diminish the potential for further fruitful academic research inherent in this situation.  
70 Behavioural world: the organisation’s cultural attitude to the processes of inquiry associated with the process 
of organisational learning  
71 The concept of reflection in action acknowledges that professional practice, in order to solve the complex and 
indeterminate problems that arise in the world of practice, is dependant on the insights, competencies and 
skills that are acquired through practice and that extend beyond the constraints of technical rationality.  
72 The concept of technical rationality presumes that professional practice is founded on the application of 
standardised methods, rules and procedures contained in a formal body of knowledge which is established, 
maintained and extended through processes of formal research. 
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Several of these characteristics will be found in the corporate organisational vision of many 
companies. The extent to which the corporate vision is successful may exercise influence on 
those aspects of the behavioural world that the participants bring to inquiry. That discussion is 
outside the range of this thesis.   
7.5.8 The constraints of governance networks  
Returning to the theme concerning the conservatism of practice, projects exist in a wider 
context (network) consisting of many actors with varying degrees of inter-dependence on each 
other. All these actors, in support of their own interests, exercise influence in some or other 
manner on the way things are done. Not all of these are supportive of innovation referring in 
general to the work of Brunsson and Olsen in Organising Organisations, Chapter 2, Networks 
as Governance Structures (Brunsson, Olsen; 1998) 
So far the discussion has not differentiated strictly between the central actors in the project, 
such as the company’s project team and the contractor, precisely because of the high degree 
of interaction and mutual dependency between them. All parties are participants in the same 
community of practise and are thereby adherents of the same espoused theories and practice 
much the same theories in action. This includes also formal representatives of professional 
practice such as the industrial standards committees, certifying institutions and consultant 
organisations selling good practice review services. Although these latter parties may not 
endorse deviant theories in action, they nevertheless have a vested interest in maintaining the 
status quo, unless perhaps innovative practice stems from their activities.     
The contractor is a central actor in the project whose behaviour with regard to innovative 
methods, will not be significantly different from that of the company since both are party to 
the same ultimate set of goals. The contractor’s focus will be on the use of established 
methods and routines, in order to save work-hours, and will tend to use the contract and the 
threats to the project’s goals to resist any efforts to introduce new methods that may have 
been incorporated in the terms of contract. The contractor has the added incentive of a 
relatively much greater and more immediate economic risk than the owner, without 
necessarily having a share of the gains. Besides, as previously mentioned (ref. anomaly 5 
concerning the accuracy of estimates), the contractors will most often benefit from the 
existing routines for adjusting the contract value to accommodate change and therefore have 
conceivably little interest in contributing to the control which early warning provides to the 
company. As Eide has pointed out, it is a well-known consequence of competitive tendering, 
that contractors rely on changes to correct the economic balance, something that is freely 
admitted by the contractors themselves. As a counter to this strategy, the company is 
definitively in need of the more reliable estimates, insight and early warning promised by the 
proposed method improvement, the better to handle the strategy of the contractor.  
For similar reasons, contractors have little interest in contributing to programs of performance 
measurement. One might expect, however, that contractors would maintain internal programs 
of performance measurement in order to maintain a competitive advantage in the industry, but 
this does not seem to be the case. Another reason would be for the purpose of maintaining 
good control over the project with a view to minimising their economic exposure and the 
better to exploit the change potential. It would, however, seem that the contractors more often 
position themselves in relation to the different demands made by the client companies through 
new forms of contract rather than pursuing independent own programs aimed at improvement 
of internal work processes. In this way methods of improvement initiated by companies may 
come to diffuse through the industry as a community of practise. This tendency to conformity 
will at the same time offer resistance to change as a result of previously established practice.  
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The owners of a venture, including the project operator, are generally motivated by risk 
aversion balanced by strong pressures to reduce costs. The initial tendency is to challenge the 
realism of estimates, believing that estimates are generally low in order to gain project 
approval. Subsequently they may exert pressure to reduce budgets based on elements such as 
contract value at award of contract, or on intensive technical reviews aimed at cutting 
contingency reserves, usually prematurely. In order to handle this sort of seesaw situation, the 
project team will be in need of the insight and estimate confidence mentioned above in order 
to ensure adequate budget coverage of the work scope. The inherent risk aversion of the 
venture owners, however, normally leads them to seek certainty in uncertainty by promoting 
the use of well-known practices of project control and discouraging experimentation of 
method. But they are often protagonists of technical innovation in order to save money. 
An interesting aside concerns the extent to which many oil companies have ceased to 
maintain in-house estimating competence and capacity, preferring to out-source this activity. 
This has an inherent logic for small companies with a limited number of projects. It would 
seem that a large portfolio of modification work is a prerequisite for the above-recommended 
methods to have full effect.  
In order to be accepted, the proposed methods will need to have an objectivity that overcomes 
all the resistive elements described above. Benchmarking is a generally well-known and 
respected concept. The proposed methods modify, extend and supplement but do not replace 
existing routines. A criterion for innovative success is the combination and refinement of 
existing routines as components of new routines. These are described as ‘new contexts of 
information flows’ and ‘genuinely innovative’ by Nelson and Winter quoting Schumpeter. 
This dissertation attempts to demonstrate that the proposed methods conform to this criterion.  
7.5.9 More about the relative method of monitoring – information technology  
The relative method of monitoring has already been discussed extensively in the preceding 
chapters. However, there are aspects reflecting on the extent to which modern data systems 
inhibit insights into the working of systems in a way that may be inherently conservative of 
method. This may be commented briefly by drawing on the work of Adler and Winograd, 
Usability: Turning Technologies into Tools specifically Chapter 7 by Brown and Duguid, 
Enacting Design for the Workplace (Adler, Winograd, 1992).  
The general organisational opacity 73 resulting from the high degree of task specialisation in 
the inner workings of the progressive elaboration processes has previously been described in 
other terms in the previous chapters.   
Brown and Duguid point to the modern tendency to automate espoused practice that has a 
tendency to hide the fundamentals of the task relationships comprising the system, or even to 
incorporate several functions within the system logic. The already remote activities of the 
detail planners become more remote by virtue of the fact that the task of input data logging is 
often placed in the hands of system operators, or even more extensively automated directly 
from the planning formats of the detail planners, rather than the users of the output. This in 
turn requires deeper insights and very convincing processes of inquiry on the part of 
practitioners who may be stimulated to question anomalies of performance or propose 
changes of routine. 
The systems are generally supplied and supported by an external agent and accordingly can 
acquire an own inertia, being often a considerable investment for the company and 
                                                 
73 The term organisational opacity has been borrowed from Brown and Duguid as the inverse of ‘Organisational 
transparency’ which is aimed at relating, through processes of work, the individual worksite and the work 
done there to the workings of the organisation as a whole.   
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representing long-term vested interests on the part of the support group. For the purposes of 
this discussion it is sufficient to point to the possible conservatory effects of data systems 
once introduced, without discussing the issue in further detail, apart from pointing to the extra 
demands on transparency in such systems, should one wish to promote reflection-in-action as 
a desirable component of the organisational learning system. 
7.6 Summary in conclusion 
The thread in the argument runs through the concept of uniqueness. The essence of the 
argument laid out in this chapter is that the concept is misconceived as to its very unique 
uniqueness. Consequently the methods used for monitoring a project are aligned with the 
commitment frame as reference, i.e. relative to itself rather than to the development of the 
technical properties of the product and norms of industrial performance by comparison to 
similar work. The result is that the project management is to a large degree deprived of the 
advantages that experience from previous projects can provide, thereby limiting its 
perspective and knowledge base for rational decision making. For the same reason project 
management is not particularly motivated to contribute to data gathering through which 
experience can be passed on to later projects. Indeed the project’s methods do not prescribe 
any method for consistent use of experience data, even though it is one of the icons of project 
management. In addition it is argued that the verifications of the commitment frame resulting 
from the normative methods arrive too late to be of any real use and that they are essentially 
inaccurate as corrective techniques, being based on trending rather than hard measurement.  
This does not mean that there is a direct causal link between the definitions of uniqueness 
contained in the normative literature and the concept of uniqueness prevailing in the 
community of practice. Rather that it is the concept of uniqueness common to the community 
of practice, which is expressed in the definitions embodied in the normative literature, 
although of course the normative literature over the course of time gains status and becomes a 
reference through newcomers to the community of practice. 
In contrast to the concept of uniqueness, this dissertation has redefined the project as a batch 
or a cycle in a multi-project community of practice. The true nature of the project is a 
purpose-designed and purpose-built large assembled product consisting of more-or-less 
standard industrial subcomponents employing skill-intensive, but more-or-less standard 
industrial methods of fabrication to which more-or-less standard measurement processes of 
production efficiency can be applied. This approach would foster practices of data gathering 
in one project for the purposes of experience transfer to the community and hence to 
succeeding projects in a manner consistent with industrial engineering practices in general. By 
these means the improvement of production efficiency over time may be included as 
performance targets in addition to the existing goals of cost, time and quality.  
The project, with its limited life and focused objectives, is not a suitable locus for the analysis 
and interpretation of experience data with respect to the standardised procedures of project 
management, for which a longer-term perspective is required. This task is the natural task of 
the supportive base organisation, which is also the repository of the standard procedures. 
Fruitful interplay between project and base organisation may be found by employing 
benchmarking techniques based on hard measurement of production efficiency to support 
processes of experience transfer of a more qualitative nature. An essential part of this process 
will be to find an appropriate form of codification of the experience data which all 
participants understand and which is easy to apply in the ongoing control work in the 
individual project. A proposal for this codification is presented in Table 3-1. The processes of 
experience transfer are also conducive to dialogues of inquiry based on the stimulus of 
anomalies of performance, ultimately leading to revisions of methods, if required.  
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This dissertation has attempted to demonstrate that the explanations and the proposed 
methods expounded here are congruent with the theories, conclusions and recommendations 
arising from organisational research. 
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. To this end case studies have been provided as 
practical example in order to demonstrate the type of anomalies brought out by the application 
of the benchmarking method proposed here - anomalies which highlight the occasions for 
management action taken from analysis of factual project historical data. The Benchmarking 
Case Study Summaries in Chapter 3.9 and the Appendices 1 and 2 should be sufficient to 
illustrate in what manner such an analysis can set the agenda for a close-out performance 
review on an objective basis.  
Finally, it remains to be said that there is of course no guarantee that the methods proposed 
here will result in fewer overruns. At best they provide a means to better insights into the 
technical nature of the work and a better knowledge basis on which to base decisions for 
action.  
7.6.1 Toward a modified theory of project management 
From the list of anomalies observed in the project environment, outlined in the sub-chapter 
Experiences with implementation, there emerges a picture of a community of practice which 
appears to lack a common understanding of the workings of the system among the various 
groups of experts contributing to the process of progressive elaboration. This statement also 
applies among the elements outside the project which affect its working environment. At the 
same time combination of specialisation and routinisation inherent in the skilled nature of 
project work, is inherently conservative of method.  
So far the reason for the conservatism of method is also attributed to the concept of the 
uniqueness of each project. So far the review of methods has not revealed how this 
uniqueness is actually handled in the work methods. All one finds is standardisation and 
uniformity typified by the metrology of the project control, which is one-dimensional. The 
subject is not handled specifically in the normative literature of project management. An 
answer may be that the treatment of detail (and ultimately special or unique detail) is 
embedded in the processes of detail planning where elements of uniqueness can be planned in 
a consistent fashion using conventional routines, along with all the other more or less special 
items that are a consequence of a purpose-built assembled-product. By implication, while 
there may be elements of uniqueness in the work scope of the project, this does not make the 
project unique from all other projects. In fact, as previously mentioned, the special items will 
normally already have been adequately defined in the earlier phases, so as to make them 
suitable for industrial production by the standard means employed by projects, perhaps 
requiring a bit of special attention and coordination. This being so, one may conclude that the 
fact of the matter supports the argument that the community of practice may benefit by 
redefining its concept of the nature of the work.  
In general all the details aggregate into normal well-understood products of industry and can 
be manufactured by well-understood processes of production. The failure situation regarding 
project control arises out of the metrology and methods that abstain from monitoring the 
development of the product as progressive elaboration proceeds and lack of a suitable 
metrology with which to draw together the aggregations of detail in a manner that gives 
meaningful insights and knowledge to the management as a basis for action. The normative 
method aggregates in one step from the rich detail of the detailed planning basis into total 
uniformity. While the management can handle special items by qualitative focus, as 
exemplified by preparation of lists of long lead items and other critical deliveries, or risk 
registers, for special follow-up, the volume work can only be handled in aggregation. The 
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methods of project control lack functionality to perceive and quantify in adequate 
intermediate aggregations the effects of changes in bulk quantities and volume of work. As 
long as this special relationship between the handling of detail in a purpose-built production 
process and appropriate methods to provide management insights as basis for action is not 
adequately addressed in the normative project management literature, the misconception of 
uniqueness will persist and relativistic methods of project control will persist. Projects are 
generally not unique, they are only a bit special, or more precisely perhaps, they only 
occasionally have some really special bits. 
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9 APPENDIX 1: Case 1 Performance Review 
This is a brief benchmarking review of a project performance history. The purpose is to 
investigate the cost and man-hour development in the light of the concept development 
history seen in terms of weight development. This review should be read in conjunction with 
the review of Chapter 3-9: Some results of quantitative and qualitative performance review. 
It is important to note that weight monitoring was not part of the project control effort. The 
correlation of weight with cost and man-hours used in this review has been undertaken 
expressly for the purposes of demonstrating the advantages of the recommended practice. 
DEVELOPMENT SUMMARY 
The concept comprised the installation of gas compression equipment on a GBS type 
platform. The central issue of the concept development history is the circumstances pertaining 
to the size of the modules and the installation complexity. The initial study indicated 
considerable complexity related to the installation requirements. For various reasons the 
project was postponed for one year. This year was used to place further studies with selected 
contractors that were to underpin a new tender round. The result was the TC shown in Figure 
9-1. This was deemed at the time to represent a potential saving of the order of 500 MNOK 
overall, due to a better module solution.  
The subsequent concept development history is summarised in the weight line shown in 
Figure 9-1, the module and integration weight columns in Figure 9-2 and the detailed 
discipline development charts of Figure 9-3. It is immediately of interest to note the large 
increase occurring at BL3 followed by a decline. It is suggested that the weight reports were 
subject to the first major update since contract award at this time. 
It is evident that both module weight and integration weight increase with respect to the Study 
and the TC. The module weight increase is primarily 200 tonne steelwork. The integration 
weight increase is 145 tonnes steelwork, 146 tonnes piping and 175 tonnes equipment. Some 
of the equipment was moved out of the module, conceivably giving rise to some of the extra 
steelwork and piping. 
Additional equipment in the form of pumps and compressor revamps was added to the scope. 
Note that neither the Study nor the TC includes this additional scope of work, which will have 
added additional bulk weight and equipment internals weight to the installation scope.  
The project cost and weight history is summarised in Figure 9-1 below, showing labour and 
materials cost as columns and aggregate weight development as a line (W1). The immediate 
impression is that the TC was grossly underestimated while the Study estimate had the correct 
order of magnitude and lay within the anticipated limits of accuracy. The TC, however, being 
a contractually committed target cost, would normally be more sensitive to later additions to 
the scope, the tender situation not allowing for inclusion of risk contingency. But it is 
interesting to note that the labour cost estimates increase with respect to the TC, while the 
estimated weight is actually decreasing between the award of contract and the BL2, and again 
between BL3 and the end. The rate of increase per BL is steady from the start (TC), peaking 
at BL4. There is no clear change in the cost estimate corresponding to the marked weight 
increase at BL3. In contrast, the material growth rate is much higher initially, flattening off by 
BL3. 
From the high initial materials cost growth rate can be deduced that both the weight 
development, and accordingly the labour cost and man-hour base, should have been higher at 
BL1 and BL2 than the Figure 9-1 shows. Simulated labour cost and weight development 
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based on the materials cost development profile, this being the most reliable considering 
procurement requirements, have been included on the chart to illustrate this effect. 
 
Figure 9-1: Case 1 EPCI weight and cost life-cycle development 
It can be noted that the inflation corrected cost difference between the Study and the final 
result is only 10 % while the difference between the TC and the final result is 45 %. The 
corresponding weight growth is 6% contra 17%, noting that neither the Study nor the TC 
estimate have been corrected for the effects of work added to the original concept, although 
the TC should include an updated modular concept as result of pre-tender studies.  
The conclusion to be drawn from the lack of correspondence between the labour cost and 
weight development and the materials cost growth, is that weight monitoring and weight 
based verification estimating was not used in the forecasting of labour cost and man-hours. 
Had this technique been used, the cost and man-hour estimates would have been higher at 
BL1 and BL2 giving earlier warning, by the order of 12 months, of the impending cost and 
man-hour overruns with respect to the TC. The extra planning horizon would have been 
located during, rather than after, the detailed engineering period, thus providing greater 
efficacy to any corrective action that might have been taken. The final results may have been 
more cost effective as a result. A general comparison of the final performance with 
comparative reference work can be seen in Figure 9-3.  
Review of the change register indicates that the sum of approved changes corresponds in large 
measure to the increase in the TC. This translates into a cost per tonne of 1,18 MNOK/tonne 
for the added work compared to 0,44 MNOK/tonne in the original target cost (TC).  This fact 
alone raises questions of relevance to the contracting philosophy and control strategy. 
The labour cost development pattern is mirrored in the aggregate man-hour and weight 
development charts of Figure 9-2 below. In Figure 9-2 the man-hour estimates and the 
production efficiencies for engineering, prefabrication, module building and integration have 
been correlated with weight development in the plots. The plots for engineering man-hours 
should be read against the combined module and integration weight while the prefabrication 
and integration should be read against the integration weight alone. Likewise, the module 
fabrication should be read against the module weight alone. 
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Figure 9-2: Overall man-hour and weight development 
From the charts it can be observed the large and steady increase of the engineering man-hour 
forecasts from a low starting value. In contrast the integration man-hours dip with respect to 
the weight profile at the start of the offshore period in the period from BL2 to BL4 before 
increasing abruptly in the period BL4/CO. Both bear little relationship to the weight 
development profile. One may ask what led the contractor to believe that the engineering 
performance would be so much better than general levels of performance in the industry? 
What was the reason for lowering the integration man-hour forecast in circumstances where 
the weight was actually increasing?  
The discipline breakdown of these aggregate man-hour effects and impact in each discipline 
can be seen in Figure 9-4. 
Discipline Man-hour and Weight Development 
For this comparison the disciplines will be reviewed individually, simultaneously throwing 
light onto the labour cost development and weight development for the individual disciplines.  
Steelwork 
The forecast engineering, integration and module fabrication man-hours increase steadily in 
rather loose correspondence with the weight development, but the corresponding production 
efficiencies (man-hours per tonne) do not at all fluctuate in correspondence with the weight 
changes. Particularly, the offshore integration man-hour/tonne is seen to decrease from the 
initial TC value, only to rebound, in a seesaw fashion, to a similar but higher level at the end. 
This may be related to the large volume (289 tonnes) of support frame reinforcement and 
stiffening, all of which is high man-hour per tonne welded construction performed during 
shutdown. Judging by the large increase in man-hours and man-hour per tonne from BL4 to 
BL5, this underestimation must have been discovered in the field.  
It is difficult to conceive of the basis for the man-hour estimates, especially considering the 
large changes in the man-hour per tonne norm for the integration activities. This is 
particularly notable considering that the mhr/tonne performance level at the TC is almost the 
same as the final value. Did the contractor reason to assume that the complexity of the work 
changed as much as the variation in man-hour per tonne would seem to imply? Simple weight 
adjustments would have given early warning by BL3, conceivably also by BL2, if the weight 
basis had been updated. Sub-discipline complexity monitoring would have provided 
additional measures of the work complexity.  
Piping 
The piping discipline shows no weight growth to speak of, but in contrast a steady increase in 
engineering man-hours, culminating in a 200% man-hour growth. The final level is in the 
high range. The integration man-hour estimates fluctuate considerably in a way that bears no 
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relation to the piping weight development, increasing dramatically in the period from BL to 
BL5 to a high final level, considerably higher than the TC level. Note that the dip in the 
period BL3/BL4 indicates a too low resource level at the start of the offshore phase. The 
weight variations can be partly related to the fact that the instrument valves are not 
consistently placed in the piping discipline, but vary from BL to BL.  
Close-out reviews have reported possible knock-on effects of delayed engineering such as 
delays in finalising layout, late definition of basis of procurement, cost aggravating 
accelerated delivery requirements, pressure on prefabrication for offshore integration, delayed 
start-up of offshore integration activities and concentration of offshore bed requirements, as 
well as poor integration efficiency. The reviews did not, however, couple these observations 
specifically to the low manning of piping engineering or the low man-hour/tonne basis for the 
man-hour estimates. Noting the extremely low level of the piping engineering man-hour/tonne 
value in the TC, it may be asked if the contractor had reason to believe that they would be 
able to achieve a level of performance so much better than normal industry levels of 
performance? What was the occasion to lower the forecast resource level in the period 
BL3/BL4, for which there is no associated weight reduction ? 
Instrument 
As previously mentioned the instrument valves have not been consistently placed within the 
piping discipline. Having a large weight relative to the instrument bulk weights, it is clear that 
there can be no realistic comparison of weight and man-hour development. There is also 
reason to believe that the instrument cable has been included in the electrical discipline, 
thereby further complicating the issue. 
It is sufficient to point to the steady growth of engineering man-hours, the low starting norm, 
the peak at BL4 and the final growth of ca 280%, all coupled with a highly erratic material 
development profile, to question the basis for forecasting.    
The scope included weightless control room upgrading not suitable for weight estimating, but 
final levels are consistent with this.  
Electrical 
The electrical discipline is subject to weight growth in the module. The engineering man-
hours grow steadily in accordance with the weight growth, with the exception of BL4 and 
BL5. Module fabrication man-hours grow in a likewise manner. 
Note that the integration man-hour forecasts do not correspond with the integration weight 
development.  
Equipment 
The equipment weight and engineering man-hour growth reflects the added scope of work, 
but the integration resource forecasts do not follow the weight development profile. 
Conclusion man-hour review 
The engineering growth endured throughout the project, starting at initial levels that were low 
by comparison with equivalent work, implying a general underestimating of the engineering 
resource requirements. This had observable effects on the orderly progression of the work. A 
large part of the integration growth occurred between BL4 and BL5. This implies an 
undervaluing of complexity that was most likely discovered as a result of underperformance 
in the field.  
If proper weight monitoring routines and reference data had been used, engineering could 
have been adequately resourced from the start. The greater part of the cost and man-hour 
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increase would have been identified by BL3, perhaps even BL2. The piping and steelwork 
fabrication resource dip would not have come about and the project offshore work would have 
been properly resourced from the start.  
OVERALL CONCLUSION 
The review conducted here has indicated that the project may have achieved an earlier 
warning regarding the overrun potential if weight monitoring and weight based estimating 
methods had been followed in accordance with the best practice recommendations for 
modification works.  
This early warning, being detail weight related, would have identified the locus of the 
potential problems, facilitating management intervention.  
The fact that the materials estimates were updated quickly, and largely within BL2, indicates 
that there must have existed an MTO basis good enough for an updated weight estimate of 
reasonable accuracy. The actual estimating practices are not known, but may be questioned 
for no other reason than the weight inconsistencies in the baseline data, which indicate lack of 
good order.  
It is difficult to understand why the piping engineering man-hour estimates were not fully 
corrected at BL1, since modification project performance data pointing to the likelihood of a 
significant man-hour overrun with respect to the MB, were available. This must have resulted 
in under-manning and poor progress afflicting the project throughout. This observation is 
borne out by interviews with personnel who were evidently aware of this deficiency in the 
TC. Similarly, interviews have indicated the presence of problems with material ordering, 
prefabrication, clashes and misfits offshore and late start on piping offshore, all of which may 
be attributed to knock-on effects of poor quality engineering. The extent of the problems is 
not known. Similar effects may have been experienced with other disciplines regarding 
engineering growth effects.  
Finally, the growth in steelwork for both the module (temporary) and in integration (structural 
strengthening) indicates that there may have been deficiencies in the concept underlying the 
TC, which were not apparent during the tender evaluation. It is similarly difficult to 
understand why the integration man-hour forecasts for steelwork did not maintain the same 
mhr/tonne performance level as the TC, in view of the fact the final value is very close to the 
TC value and that the total weight and sub-discipline content are very similar at BL3 and at 
close-out.  
The result was that the project suffered the consequences of delays and disturbances to the 
normal progress of the work brought about by poor engineering progress, particularly on the 
piping discipline, the final cost being higher than that of comparable types of work judged in 
terms of performance efficiency (cost per tonne; work-hours per tonne). The project achieved 
its schedule deadline, but at a cost.   
Judging in the clear light of hindsight it is apparent that sufficient information was available 
in the contractor’s registers to provide better estimates of the final cost already at the time of 
the award of contract. Quantity monitoring during detailed engineering could have reduced 
the information deficiencies resulting from scope development. That information was 
somehow not brought sufficiently to management attention by the monitoring processes of the 
normative control strategy. In any event the deficiency in engineering work-hours was known 
at least qualitatively. This knowledge should have resulted in determined action on the part of 
the project management, ensuring that adequate resources to support the engineering program 
were provided in spite of the low level of the TC, and, in particular, the piping engineering. 
The lack of significant action indicates that the severity of the anomaly was not known. 
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There are several other aspects it may be fruitful to question, for example, the contract 
strategy (fixed target cost with profit sharing incentive mechanism designed to minimise 
cost), or the strategy of the contractor seen in the light of the final result and the development 
of the concept from the early commitment to the final product. Note that the contractor was 
paid a positive profit share in spite of the low TC, implying that the difference between the 
initial and final target cost (TC) must have been made up of approved adjustments to the 
contract.  
The juxtaposition of significant parameters of performance in the formats presented here 
clarifies significant resource relationships, which would otherwise be embedded in detail 
registers, in a manner that supports management insight and response. 
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Comparative Performance Summary 
 
Figure 9-3: Case 1 core parameter comparative performance summary 
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Discipline Weight, Man-hour and Norm Development Summaries 
 
Figure 9-4: Case 1 discipline weight, man-hour and norm development summary 
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10 APPENDIX 2: Case 2 Performance Review 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of the analysis is to quantify the project’s results measured in terms of efficiency, 
compare to performance data from other modification work, evaluate whether the results are 
consistent with the character and complexity of the work and, if relevant, consider reasons for 
deviation.  
SUMMARY 
The basis for the project is the retrofit of a production semi to treat the condensate stream 
from a neighbouring satellite field. The project was special in that the retrofit was planned as 
part of an atshore hull maintenance period, believing this would provide more beneficial 
circumstances than a modification offshore. The short period of time atshore would, however, 
pose special circumstances in view of the large volume of materials to be installed in a short 
period of time. 
The project was subject to extensive man-hour overruns. The overruns can be attributed in a 
small part to under-dimensioned resources, but in a major part to extensive field rework as a 
result of extensive clashes. Both these effects are considered to have their roots in incomplete 
engineering as a result of front-end schedule stress. Market conditions at the time (high 
activity) and the timing of the atshore phase (summer holiday necessitated use of non-familiar 
imported labour) are contributory factors. 
The concept development resulted in a reduced material cost stemming from reduced piping 
and steelwork weight, but increased electro and instrument work combined with optimisation 
of the equipment costs through the use of revamping rather than new equipment. Piping 
complexity marginally changed towards a greater content of high grade steel, which in itself 
contributes some part of the man-hour growth since extensive welding was employed. In 
other respects the concept may be regarded as mature, having gone through several study 
rounds in the hands of the same contractor.  
The following additional contributory factors were cited by project personal in the course of 
informal interviews: 
-  a tight schedule for front end engineering, procurement and prefabrication 
-  the tight schedule excluded the possibility for field survey in advance of prefabrication 
resulting in extensive collisions (particularly piping), rework and disturbances to the 
orderly progress of the work. The specific volume of rework man-hours is not known.         
- the EPCI contractor’s construction partner lacked experience with modifications being 
more familiar with greenfield work  
-  The contractor’s risk aversion, along with strong performance related incentives, hindered 
the contractor from utilising the company’s experience regarding traditional methods for 
modification work  
- field erection methods for steelwork were chosen rather than optimal prefabrication of 
steelwork as used in traditional modification work, possibly as a consequence of the 
schedule pressure. While reducing the criticality of the front-end engineering regarding 
coordination of detailed engineering, installation planning and prefabrication lead time, 
this had the effect of increasing fabrication resource pressure in the atshore phase.  
-  deficiencies in the control methods or errors in the MTO/weight estimates resulted in 
under-dimensioning of the man-hour needs 
-  no specific unforeseen elements of work were identified 
 154
 
EPCI Cost and weight development  
The cost and weight development is summarised in the chart Figure 10-1 below. Each 
position represents a discrete development stage, the Study, completed prior to the bid stage, 
the Bid, the provisional target cost (PTC), the final target cost (FTC), the BL prior to start of 
the offshore phase and the close-out (CO).  
The most notable feature is a marked increase in the labour costs associated with an overall 
decrease in weight and materials costs. The weight development can be seen to decrease 
overall by approx. 10%, consisting of 140 T equipment, 64 T piping and 40 T increase in 
elektro bulk. The sudden drop in the weight basis is related to an excessive risk allowance 
deemed necessary by the contractor, but later dropped. Details regarding weight development 
can be seen in the discipline weight and man-hour development charts in Figure 10-3 at the 
end of this Appendix.  
 
Figure 10-1: Case 2 EPCI  weight and cost life-cycle development 
Material costs 
The material cost level is consistent with the nature of the work, evaluated on a basis of the 
overall discipline mix and the sub-discipline character of the work. The materials cost is 
marked by:  
-  below average steelwork content (low cost per tonne) 
-  below average piping content but high cost per tonne due to high content of high grade 
steels (60%) and high valve content (50%) 
-  high equipment and electro content at high cost per tonne  
 
In total the cost per tonne is 0.248 mnok/tonne compared to a normative median value of 0.42 
mnok/tonne. As can be observed on the chart, the material cost per tonne was marginally 
reduced overall, in spite of changes within the disciplines.  
Labour Cost Development 
As can be observed on the chart, the labour cost and the labour cost per tonne increases 
progressively from left to right across the chart. As previously stated this is largely due to the 
large overruns applicable to engineering and the atshore installation. As judged by the 
comparative performance charts of Figure 10-3, the final resource levels are well over 
comparable work.  
The high costs are partly a consequence of the high hourly rates that were in turn a 
consequence of the market situation (high activity) and corresponding shortage of qualified 
personnel. The industry was also subject to risk aversion at the time due to large overruns in 
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many greenfield projects at the time as consequence of NORSOK. The hourly rate included 
an extra profit element, which may have tended to cancel the incentive elements in the 
contract aimed at optimising man-hour resources. This extra labour cost comprises approx. 
13% extra cost compared to the market rates of the period. 
Man-hour and Weight development  
The overall man-hour and weight development shown in the chart below, Figure 10-2, mirrors   
the labour cost development seen above. Corresponding discipline weight and man-hour 
detail charts can be seen in Figure 10-4. 
 
Figure 10-2: Case 2 overall man-hour and weight development  
The interesting features to note are the overall decrease in prefabrication man-hours and the 
late abrupt overall increase in engineering and integration man-hours.  
The reduction in planned prefabrication man-hours is consistent with the decision to focus, as 
previously mentioned, on field erection of steelwork rather than optimise prefabrication. The 
norm increase after FTC may be consistent with this assumption, indicating that some 
allowance was made in the planning basis for this decision.   
The abrupt engineering increases after the FTC forecast can be associated with under-
dimensioned resources and a low progress status considering the high degree of preparation 
required to support the intensive atshore installation program. Engineering resources are seen 
to rise right until termination, indicating that engineering was ongoing after preparation for 
the atshore phase should gave been completed, and indeed during the full duration of the 
atshore phase. The latter was a necessary due to the large number of field clashes reported 
earlier. 
Piping 
Engineering and integration resource use is high compared to similar work. This is most likely 
due to the initial schedule stress combined with the large number of clashes that occurred. As 
previously mentioned, field surveys could not be performed due to pressure of time.  
There is some scope reduction but little other change as a result of the concept development, 
though the piping composition did change slightly towards an increased content of high grade 
steels (40% CS to 60% CS content).  
The forecast, BL1, immediately prior to the start of the atshore phase, is of interest. 
Engineering is already in overrun and reported progress was only 58%, at a point in time 
when preparation for the atshore phase should have been complete. At this same point in time 
the integration forecast showed a marked reduction in the atshore man-hours associated with a 
decrease in integration weight. These man-hours were to double in the following atshore 
phase. 
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This indicates that the overrun problems are not a consequence of under-evaluated complexity 
or other unforeseen problems but, more likely, a consequence of incomplete engineering 
(incomplete field surveys/collisions) and installation planning aggravated by a the tight and 
demanding conditions of the atshore installation program.  
Steelwork 
The steelwork resource use is much higher than normal (median) levels of performance would 
suggest, but part of this is considered to be consistent with the characteristics of the work, 
consisting of a high content of small items, mostly welded construction, and a focus on field 
erection methods. Some part of the overrun may be associated with under-evaluation of this 
greater complexity while some part is most likely associated with rework resulting from 
piping clashes.  
Considering the degree of preparation required to support the intensive atshore work program, 
the steelwork engineering progress was low at the start of the atshore phase, only 72%. At this 
point in time the steelwork engineering was already in overrun, and continued to draw 
resources all through the atshore construction phase.  
This is the same situation as with piping, and the same conclusions can be drawn. 
Instrument:  The instrument man-hour level and efficiency is may be regarded as normative 
considering the fact that the scope included a large component of control room work which is 
difficult to estimate. It is nevertheless interesting to note that the man-hour profile harmonises 
with the weight profile and should perhaps not be regarded as an overrun. However, it is 
likely that the planned construction resource needs were under-dimensioned by approx. 13000 
man-hours, due to the late materials update, which can be seen in the chart Figure 10-4. 
Electro: The disciplines weight share is larger than usual, of which approx 96% is cabling and 
associated materials. Bulk growth was experienced, but, judging by the integration man-hour 
profile with respect to the electro weight development profile, referring to the charts of Figure 
10-4, the information appears not to have been translated into the planned man-hour basis for 
the atshore phase. It is interesting to note the engineering man-hour increment coincides with 
the weight growth. Better weight monitoring would have eliminated part of the volume 
related man-hour shortfall by approx. 30000 man-hours.    
Equipment: Weight reductions for equipment can be attributed to the elimination of scope due 
to the use of revamping rather than new equipment. Man-hour usage is normal and an 
insignificant part of the total.  
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the recorded results and in comparison with similar work, it may be concluded 
that the execution of the project has not been optimal. The project was not subject to 
significant conceptual changes and the project maturity at the time of contract award may be 
regarded as good. Accordingly; the reasons for the poor performance must be sought 
elsewhere. Some of the overrun can be attributed to quantity growth (electro/instrument) and 
changes in the piping material composition, but the low efficiency has other causes.  
Considering the character of the work, the projects forecast resource needs for the installation 
phase were marginally under-dimensioned, by about 6%. But the over-consumption with 
respect to the contract was much larger. This was partly due to changes in the nature of the 
work (steelwork installation method) and growth (electro, instrument), but primarily due to 
poor productivity during execution, as a consequence of collisions and associated rework, 
aggravated by the demanding conditions of the atshore phase (high manning, high density, 
high work volume, unsuitable period, non-routine workforce).  
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In summary, the root cause of the overruns may be found in a compound of the following 
conditions: 
-   the schedule and volume of work were tight 
-   the atshore installation circumstances were challenging   
-   success was particularly dependent on the quality and completeness of the preparations for 
the atshore phase 
-  engineering resources were initially under-dimensioned 
- important preparatory activities, such as field survey, were not performed due to lack of 
time leading to extensive collisions  
-  due to schedule pressure, installation planning opted for inappropriate steelwork 
installation methods requiring high field manning (note that this may, in the long run, 
have been advantageous in view of the need for extensive rework as a result of collisions)  
- the atshore period was not advantageous (summer holiday) 
-  planned manning levels were high and the timing necessitated the use of non-routine 
personnel 
-  the effects of crashing  
   
From this it may be deduced that organisational dispositions and circumstances of execution 
may exert a considerable influence on the efficiency of execution, particularly in cases such as 
this where the tight time frame for execution severely limited any possibility for corrective 
action.   
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Core Parameter Comparative Performance Summary 
 
Figure 10-3: Case 2 core parameter comparative performance summary
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Discipline Weight, Man-hour and Norm Development Summaries  
 
Figure 10-4: Case 2 discipline weight, man-hour and norm development summary
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11 APPENDIX 3: Criteria for selection of estimating parameters 
from performance data and premises of the simulation model 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation promotes the use of performance measurement data from completed projects 
as basis for the various project control practices that rely on estimating. Amongst these 
proposals is a quantitative risk analysis model based on performance data from completed 
projects. Since the normative perspective underpinning risk analysis theory basically does not 
rely on the use of statistical data directly 74, it has been found necessary for the sake of 
consistency to seek some form of alignment between the normative perspective and the use of 
data derived from performance measurement of field work. 
In general the dissertation has favoured the use of median values drawn from the data in 
preference to the average values of normative practice. This practice has been adopted 
because of alignment with the 50/50 concept and believing that the median, being less 
sensitive to influence of highly deviant values in an array than the average, is more 
representative of the most likely value of any given array of data than the average. 
Acknowledging a certain objectivity in retaining extreme values in an array of performance 
data, this approach makes it possible to retain the deviant value in the data set, but without 
excessive distortion of the reference values drawn from the array. The median perspective is 
also seen as consistent with the normative theory underpinning stochastic uncertainty analysis 
routines, which assume that the sub-elements in an estimate are most likely values or modes 
(Arrto, 1986; Austeng, Hugstad, 1995; Hilsen, Hulett, 2004; Hulett, 2002/2003; Klakegg, 
1994; Lichtenberg 1984, 2000; Rolstadås, 2001; Westney, 1985). It follows that medians, 
being closer to the modes than averages and assuming an upward skewed distribution profile, 
are to be preferred to averages. Given that the mode of an array cannot be established with the 
same ease as medians and averages, and knowing that the result will have a margin of 
conservatism, it seems pragmatic to select median values as reference values for the base 
estimates.  
Circumstances where there is large diversity in the reference data, such as the modification 
reference data presented in Chapter 3 which are sensitive to effects of scale, are not quite so 
easy to handle, since neither medians nor averages taken from the full array will be fully 
representative. Trend functions have been identified using standardised functions in the 
software, but none are considered to be correct for all cases. The estimator is left in an 
undesirable position with at least four alternatives amongst which to select a reference value 
for any particular case. The basis for selection is not obvious since individual trend lines may 
deviate considerably from each other, presumably a result of the high degree of variability in 
the reference data. For practical purposes some means must be found to resolve the problem 
in the interests of consistency of practice amongst several users and in the interest of QA 
practices that seek predictable results.   
The problem has been resolved partly by objective means and partly by subjective intuitive 
means, by comparing results of the standard trend functions with moving average and moving 
median values in the data sets. 
 
                                                 
74 The unique nature of many projects and the associated lack of performance data  has resulted in the adoption 
of subjective methods based on expert judgement for assessing uncertainty and quantifying risk (Artto, 
1986)(Hillsen, Hulett, 2004)    
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Comparing the results of the standard trend functions in the software 
The trend functions in the software include best fit functions, which ought to provide a basis 
for comparing and selecting the most representative trend functions. However, due to the high 
degree of variance in the data, the ‘fit’ is by no means good for all functions and the best 
functions are often judged to be wrong on an intuitive basis. The basis for this intuition is 
demonstrated visually in the chart of Figure 11-1 below referring to the trend line TREND -
Integr Rawdata (Log), which has the best ‘best fit’ values. However, it can be seen from the 
extrapolation towards larger projects that the slope of the trend line is too steep compared to 
the other trend lines. This raises doubts about the correctness of the values of the trend within 
the range of the reference data as well. Note that the linear trend function, which is located 
above the log function, has not been shown on the chart, since this introduces negative values 
in the array. On this basis the linear function is also suspect, leaving the power and 
exponential functions as credible candidates to provide consistent results within the range of 
the data and in extrapolation. These two functions are also seen to fit best with respect to each 
other. 
 
Figure 11-1: Equipment integration norm - Effect of trending 
Considerations of medians versus averages:    
Following the discussion in the introduction to this Appendix, the medians are the preferred 
choice judged on a general basis. Consistent with this view, a method must be established to 
identify which of the standard trend functions coincides best with the median values of the 
subgroups in the array. Accordingly, plots of median and average based trend lines were 
established using subgroups of 5 size-related cases centred on each case in the array and 
moving progressively through the entire range, noting that the range was aligned by size. 
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These new datasets were in turn trended using the standard functions, and the results were 
compared to the trend lines derived from the raw data. This process was repeated for all 
disciplines and for both the man-hour–related data and the cost related data. By this process of 
comparison it was observed that the median-based power and exponential trend lines 
corresponded best with rawdata-based power and exponential trend lines. The locus of the 
median trend lines was in some cases above and in some cases below, but mostly above the 
rawdata-based trend lines.  
By a similar process of comparison, the average-based log- and linear trend lines were found 
to correspond broadly with rawdata-based log and linear trend lines.  
 
Conclusion: 
On the basis of the above rationale, the power and exponential trend lines are deemed to 
provide the best overall fit. Further, since the rawdata trend line lies below the median based 
trend line, this rawdata value may approximate the mode of any data subgroup more closely, 
and may thus be used as the reference value for estimating sub-elements, in preference to a 
median based value. In the cases where the rawdata trend line lies above the median trend 
line, the use of parameters from the trend line will be conservative.  
Finally, noting that the power and exponential trend lines cross at two points, an 
approximation for selecting norms may be achieved by using a midpoint approximation. 
However, at the large project end of the array, and judging by the results of the extrapolation, 
it is assumed that such an approximation should follow the power trend line. 
Considerations of the risk analysis model 
The choice of median or average as a basis for dimensioning the sub-elements of an estimate 
has implications for the premises of the risk evaluation model. Most companies define 
estimate acceptance criteria to be either a 50/50 or Expected Value with prescribed upper and 
lower limits within a confidence interval of 80%. Similarly most companies predefine 
recommended levels of contingency in order to raise the base estimate to an acceptable level 
consistent with commercial risk and uncertainties inherent in the estimate. Analytic or 
simulation techniques are then used to verify or override the recommended levels of 
contingency, although some companies avoid the use of such techniques, regarding them to 
be of little value. However, in the absence of a consistent definition of the basis for deriving 
the base estimates, the results can be misleading.  
From the chart above it can be established that, dependant on size, the difference between 
median and average parameters has an order of magnitude varying between 15% and 25%. 
This implies that the base estimates derived from median- or average-based parameters will 
vary by a similar order of magnitude. In broad terms the sum of the sub-elements based on 
averages may be equated with the Expected Value. This is not the case regarding median 
based sub-elements, where some simulation procedure will be required. However, it can be 
seen from the above that the uplift from median-based base estimate to an expected value will 
have a similar order of magnitude. Since it is common practice to use averaging, and 
uncommon to prescribe the use of medians, it seems reasonable to assume that base estimates 
will often be average-based and thus already approximate an expected value. In such 
circumstances, uncritical application of a prescribed contingency will have a result that is too 
high by an order of magnitude similar to the above. Accordingly, for the sake of consistency, 
median-based estimates should be prescribed.  
The same conclusion will apply to the application of stochastic analysis techniques. 
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In a simulation situation, the results will similarly be dependent on a clear understanding of 
the correct premises for defining variable constraints.  
Ranges of variance for the simulation model may be drawn from the performance data by 
establishing p10 and p90 trend lines in a similar manner to the average and median based 
trend lines described above. 
From the above it can be understood that in the case of estimating parameters derived from 
performance data it is relevant to question on what basis the estimating parameters should be 
determined and what implications the choice will have for the premises of the risk analysis 
procedure.  
Modification projects appear to have a large variability and by experience require a larger 
prescribed contingency than greenfield projects. This general conclusion is also validated by 
the analysis of overrun projects from Chapter 5. It may be a consequence of this greater 
variability and anticipated need for higher contingencies, that the anomalies described above 
have greater visibility in modification projects than greenfield projects  
Premises of the risk evaluation model 
Consistent with the arguments presented above, the following premises have been applied to 
the risk analysis model defined in Chapter 5: 
-  estimating parameters are median-based, derived from the effects of scale curves  
- the profile of the sub-elements are defined as log-normal 
-  the range of the sub-elements is defined as P10/P90 values of the range of all the projects 
in the array 
 
In addition the following elements have been defined: 
- the range of the weight input is taken from weight uncertainty prescribed for the class of 
the estimate under review, but applied asymmetrically consistent with experience that 
weight growth is seldom negative 
- correlations are applied 1:1 between weight input and the weight dependent activities 
- correlations are applied  1:1 between engineering overrun with respect to the base estimate 
and the engineering dependent activities 
 
The engineering correlation is a consequence of the overrun analysis described in Chapter 5. 
The model premises may be adapted to conform to successive stages of development and 
execution in the following manner:  
- Forecasts are estimated on the basis of updated weight estimates. These forecasts form the 
input to the simulation. The residual work is defined on the basis of the forecast degree of 
completion. The variances in the model are limited to apply only to the residual work. 
Problems may arise in situations where the actual performance does not align well with 
the estimates that are based on total installed weights. In such cases some correction factor 
will need to be applied to the completed work to reflect the actual performance. 
- The technical uncertainty is defined by the weight variances, which can be narrowed 
successively in line with the estimate class requirements as engineering develops. The 
piece-small and weightless elements that often materialise in the field are normally 
accounted for, partly in the norms themselves and partly in the performance variance. 
Nevertheless, special attention should be paid to quantifying these items in terms of 
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discipline and sub-discipline characteristics, by means of field surveys, so that they can be 
incorporated in the base estimate input to the risk simulation. 
- The engineering correlation elements will endure as long as engineering proceeds and can 
normally be removed after completion of detailed engineering. Residual elements of 
engineering inefficiencies that may endure through the integration and hook-up phase, are 
accounted for in the performance variances. However, special attention should be paid to 
the system testing and commissioning phase. This model can realistically only account for 
the above uncertainty on a generalised basis and should be supplemented with a more 
detailed evaluation 
- The fabrication correlation elements between the prefabrication and the offshore 
integration can be removed after completion of prefabrication. However, special attention 
should be paid to the effects of carry-over from onshore module fabrication to the offshore 
integration and system testing. The sensitivity case 6 currently assumes a 5% manhour 
carry-over, but the simulation model does not account for carry-over effects. Particular 
consideration should be paid to quantifying the nature of the outstanding work in terms of 
discipline and sub-discipline characteristics, so that these effects can be incorporated in 
the base estimate input to the simulation. As this model can realistically only account for 
the above uncertainty on a generalised basis, it should be supplemented with a more 
detailed evaluation. 
- The fabrication correlation elements between the offshore integration and the logistics 
cost elements will endure until the job is completed.  
- The equations that define correlation can be altered to suit the circumstances. This model 
covers a full spread hire for the duration, which has been coupled to schedule uncertainty 
by applying an offshore manhour overrun penalty to the flotel hire costs. This sets the 
premise that the accommodation costs and flotel hire costs must be separated. Similarly, 
carry-over can be modelled into the module fabrication in the form of an overrun penalty. 
This approach may also be used to apply a rescheduling penalty to an HLV contract. 
 
Conclusion  
Experience with the model so far indicates that the deterministic base estimate is lower than 
the mode, and the simulated Expected Value is lower than the value of the Recommended 
Value (base estimate plus the prescribed contingency). This suggests that the mode would be 
a suitable basis for setting performance targets and the Expected Value, or the Recommended 
Value, for setting budget levels, while project management should look to the P90 value for 
motivation to introduce the risk mitigation procedures described elsewhere in this dissertation. 
The dispersion profile Figure 5-2 is representative of this view.  
 
 
 
   
